For many reasons, the closing of the Mississippi river was one of the first things attempted by the Confederate government; Columbus, Ky., was occupied, partially fortified, and the river chained; New Madrid, Island No. 10, Fort Pillow, and Memphis were made important points, and the resources of the Rebellion were taxed to provide armed cruisers to coöperate and effectually resist all Union advance by the Father of Waters.

The same reasons were equally cogent at Washington, and soon the Mississippi floated a noble fleet of iron-clads under Commodore Foote; the Western army assumed large proportions and became uniformly victorious; one after another the rebel strongholds fell, until the Upper Mississippi was unobstructed, and, New Orleans having been taken, there were left to the Confederacy but two points of strategic importance on the river, Vicksburg and Port Hudson.

Of these, Vicksburg was naturally by far the stronger, and was speed

ily strengthened until it was held to be nearly impregnable, and from a river approach quite so. All serious danger from our gunboats being out of the question, an approach in the rear through the heart of the Confederacy could alone succeed, and that they confidently expected to easily defeat in the open field.

The fall of 1862 having brought large reinforcement to our armies, witnessed the first serious attempt to reduce this stronghold, which was from the rear. Grant, leaving his summer camps at Memphis, Jackson and Bolivar, Tenn., moved by the way of the Mississippi Central railroad through Holly Springs and Oxford, Miss., while a force under Hovey should move from Helena, Ark., toward Grenada to strike the army confronting Grant, if possible, in the rear. ment failed through the swift riding of Van Dorn's cavalry, and the capture and burning of Grant's supplies at Holly Springs, Dec. 20; and the army, which had reached a point seventeen miles south of Oxford,

This move