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upāsikā, pursuing a temporary course of such religous and philosophic discipline as the rising schools of Buddhism afforded, might be expected to avail himself or herself of it more or less. But those good" dhammas alluded to were those which characterized the Four Paths, or Four Stages, of the way, to the full "emancipation" of Nirvana. If I have rendered lo kutta ram cittam by "thought engaged upon the higher ideal" instead of selecting a term more literally accurate, it is because there is, in a way, less of the "supramundane" or "transcendent ", as we usually understand these expressions, about this cit ta m than about the aspiring moods described above. For this sort of consciousness was that of the man or woman who regarded not heaven nor re-birth, but one thing only as "needful": the full and perfect efflorescence of mind and character to be brought about, if it might be, here and now.
The Dhamma-Sangani never quits its severely dry and formal style to descant on the characteristics and methods of that progress to the Ideal, every step in which is elsewhere said to be more wonderful and excellent than the last,1 with a wealth of eulogy besides. Edifying discourse it left to the Suttanta Books. But no rhetoric could more effectively describe the separateness and uncompromising other-ness of that higher quest than the one word A-pariyā pannam -Unincluded-by which reference is made to it in Book III.
Yet for all this world of difference in the quo vadis of aspiration, there is a great deal of common ground covered by the moral consciousness in each case, as the respective expositions show. That of the Arahat in spe differs only in two sets of additional features conferring greater richness of content, and in the loftier quality of other features not in themselves additional.
This quality is due to mental awakening or enlightenment (sambodhi). And the added factors are three constituents of the Noble Eightfold Path of conduct (which are, 1 S. iv, 225 f.
more obviously, modes of overt activity than of consciousness) and the progressive stages in the attainment of the sublime knowledge or insight termed a ñ ñ ã‚1 Our Western languages are scarcely rich enough to ring the changes on the words signifying "to know" as those of India did on jñā and vid, dṛś, and p a ś. Our religious ideals have tended to be emotional in excess of our intellectual enthusiasm.." Absence of dullness" has not ranked with us as a cardinal virtue or fundamental cause of good. Hence it is difficult to reproduce the Pali so as to give impressiveness to a term like a ñ ñ ā as compared with the more general term ñā ņ a m,2 (which usually, though not always, implies less advanced insight), with which the "first type of good thought" is said to be associated.
But I must pass on. As a compilation dealing with positive culture, undertaken for a positive end, it is only consistent that the Manual should deal briefly with the subject of bad states of consciousness. It is true that akusalam, as a means leading to unhappy result, was not conceived as negatively as its logical form might lead us to suppose. Bad karma was a piling up", no less than its opposite. Nevertheless, to a great extent, the, difference between bad types of thought and good is described in terms of the contradictories of the factors in the one kind and in the other. Nor are the negatives always on the side of evil. The three cardinal sources of misery are positive in form. And the five "Path-factors" go to constitute what was called the Base Eightfold Path.2
We come, finally, to the third ethical category of vyā katam, the Inexplicit or Indeterminate. The subject is difficult, if interesting, bringing us as it does within. closer range of the Buddhist view of moral causation. The
1 Viz. Ana ññā t'aññas samitindriyam, aññindriyam, aññātā vindriy a m, pp. 86, 96, 97, 150. Cf. Dh.K. 53.
2 S. ii, 168; iii, 109; v, i; 15-18; 23; 334; A. ii, 220, etc.
hall-mark of Indeterminate thought is said to be "absence of result" that is, of pleasant or painful result. And there are said to be four species of such thought: (1) vipā ko, or thought which is a result; (2) kiriyā, or consciousness leading to no result; (3) form, as outside moral causation; (4) unconditioned element (or, in later records, Nirvana), as above or beyond the further efficacy of moral causation.
Of these four, the third has been dealt with already; the fourth I cannot discuss here and now. It is conceivable that the earlier Buddhists considered their summum bonum a subject too ineffably sublime and mysterious for logical and analytical discussion. Two instances, at least, occur to me in the Nikayas 3 where the talk was cut short, in the one case by Gotama himself, in the other by the womanapostle Dhammadinna, when the interlocutor brought up Nirvana for discussion of this sort. This is possibly the reason why, in a work like our Manual, the concept is presented in all but the commentarial appendixes-under the quasi-metaphysical term "unconditioned element". It is classed here as a species of Indeterminate, because, although it was the outcome of the utmost carrying power of good karma, it could, as a state of mind and character, itself work no good effect for that individual mind and character. These represented pure effect. The Arahat could afford to live wholly on withdrawn capital and to use it up. His conduct, speech, and thought are, of course, necessarily "good", but good with no "heaping-up" potency.
Of the other two Indeterminates, it is not easy to say whether they represent aspects only of states considered with respect to moral efficacy, or whether they represent divisions in a more rigid and artificial view of moral causation than we should, at the present day, be prepared to maintain. To explain every thought, word, and deed (morally considered)
1 Asl. 39.
2 See Appendix II.
is for us at once the effect of certain antecedents and the cause, or part of the cause, of subsequent manifestations of character. It is a link, both held and holding. But in vipāko we have dhammas considered, with respect to cause, merely as effects; in kiriyā1 we have dhammas considered, with respect to effect, as having none. And the fact that both are divided off from Good and Bad-that is to say, from conduct or consciousness considered as causally effective—and are called Indeterminate, seems to point, not to aspects only, but to that artificial view alluded to. Yet in this matter I confess to the greater wisdom of "fearing to tread" with the angels, rather than of rushing in with the fools. Life presented itself to the Buddhist much as the Surrey heath appeared to the watchful eye of a Darwin—as a teeming soil, a khettam, 2 where swarmed the seeds of previous karmas waiting for "room", for opportunity to come to effect. And in considering the seed as itself an effect, they were not, to that extent, concerned with that seed as a cause, [capable of producing not only its own flower and fruit, but other seed] in its turn.
However that may have been, one thing is clear, and for us suggestive. Moral experience as result pure and simple was not in itself uninteresting to the Buddhists. In dealing with good and bad dhammas they show us a field of the struggle for moral life, the sowing of potential well-being or of ill. But in the Avyākatas either we are outside the struggle and concerned with the unmoral R u pa m, or we walk among the sheaves of harvest. From the Western standpoint the struggle covers the whole field of temporal life. Good and
1 Inoperative consciousness (S.Z. Aung). I am indebted to the Rev. Sumangala, of Ceylon, for information very kindly given concerning the term kiriya or kriya. He defines it as action ineffective as to result", and kiriyā cittam as mind in relation to action ineffective as to result He adds a full analysis of the various modes of kiriyā taught by Buddhists at the present day.
2 Origin of Species, p. 56.~ A. i, 223, 224. Cf. Asl. 360.
bad "war in the members" even of its Arahants. The ideal of the Buddhist, held as realizable under temporal conditions, was to walk among his sheaves "beyond the Good and the Bad " The Good consisted in giving hostages to the future. His realized ideal was to be releasing them,2 and, in a span of final, but glorious existence, to be tasting of the finest fruit of living the peace of insight, the joy of emancipation. This was life supremely worth living, for
In Freiheit leben und mit freiem Geist ! " 3
The Good, to take his own metaphor, was as a raft bearing him across the stream of danger. After that he was to leave
it and go on. "And ye, brethren, learn by the parable of the raft that ye must put away good conditions, let alone bad.” 4
It is not easy for us, who have learnt from Plato to call our Absolute the Good and our Ideal a summum bonum, to sympathize readily with this moral standpoint. Critics see in it an aspiration towards moral stultification and selfcomplacent egoism. Yet there is little fear but that in the long run fuller knowledge will bring deeper insight into what in Buddhism is really worthy of admiration for all time. If it is now accused of weakening the concept of individuality by rejecting soul, and, at the same time, of fostering egoistic morality, it is just possible that criticism is here at fault. On the ruins of the animistic view, Buddhism had to reconstruct a new personality, wholly phenomenal, impermanent, law-determined, yet none the less able, and alone able, by indomitable faith and will, to work out a personal salvation, a personal perfection. Bearing this in mind and surveying the history of its altruistic missionary labours, we cannot
1 Cf. Nietzsche on Buddhism in "Der Antichrist ". 2 C. A. i, 108.
3 A. Pfungst, "An Giordano Bruno."
4 See the third quotation above, p. vii, and "puññañ ca papañ ca bahitvā ... bhikkhu vuccati", S. i, 182; Dhp., ver. 267.