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darkness dropped down to Brown's Ferry. Both were on time. Palmer crossed and held the road to Kelley's Ferry on the south. Hazen landed on the south side, pushed his forces to the almost inaccessible heights over the river, and soon had them in a position where they commanded the Ferry over which he was to lay his pontoon bridge, and the mouth of Lookout Valley also.
Meanwhile Hooker had orders to cross from Bridgeport. He did so with Howard's corps, and Geary's division of Slocum's corps, and on the morning of the 26th, marched down the west side of Raccoon Mountain, passed a gorge into Lookout Valley, and turned Tennessee. He met with but
northward toward the slight resistance, for the whole movement was in the nature of a surprise and upon an unfortified flank of the enemy. On the 28th he was within a mile of Brown's Ferry. That night Longstreet's corps made a fierce assault on him, which was resisted amid confusion but with great determination. The battle raged for several hours with the utmost intensity. By repeated charges the Federals forced their way up the steep heights and gained a permanent foothold on the summits, which they were not slow to fortify and make secure against further assault. Hooker had nearly seven thousand men engaged, and his loss was four hundred and sixteen in killed and wounded. The Confederate loss was much heavier. This sealed the fate of Lookout Valley, and gave the Federals almost entire control of the two wagon roads from Chattanooga to Bridgeport. Thus in five days from Grant's arrival at the point of danger the beleaguered
army had found an outlet, and a bold and confident enemy had been put on the defensive. The Confederate authorities were terribly chagrined at the unexpected result. They saw their prize suddenly snatched from their grasp by one who had outwitted them in strategy and dazed them with his boldness and quickness. Looking down from their fortified peaks on a camp where misery reigned and starvation impended, they saw it, as if by magic, transformed into a busy, cheerful, formidable scene. Old steamboats were repaired and new ones built. Railroads were replaced. Pontoons were laid. Horses, mules and wagons came with ample supplies. Sherman was nearing the place with his western veterans. Other reinforcements were expected. The gloom of Chickamauga was fast giving way to a confident spirit of aggression. The soldiers felt they had a commander who could see and relieve their necessities. On October 28th, General Grant said: "If the Confederates give us one week more time, I think all danger of losing territory now held by us will have passed away, and preparations may commence for active operations.'
But though the pressing emergency at Chattanooga was met by Grant's activity and admirable strategy, there were still other needs requiring instant attention, equal vigor and a wider range of generalship. His new military division extended from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi, and included two hundred thousand soldiers. Burnside, with twenty-five thousand men, was in the Valley of the Tennessee, at Knoxville, east of the Cumberland Mountains. He was away from a base of supplies. These had to be sent from St. Louis, by way of the Ohio and Cumberland rivers, and then overland by wagon from Big South Fork, a hundred miles. This varied and complicated business was superintended directly by Grant, for he had not only heard Burnside's plaint for stores, but knew how important it was to hold the line of the upper Tennessee against any and every attack.
Sherman was nearing Chattanooga, and every preparation had to be made for expediting his march. The gunboat ordered to meet him at Eastport was promptly there, also barges for ferry purposes. In a day or two the fleet of steamers ordered up with provisions arrived. Thus all Grant's advance plans to help him culminated as he intended. Sherman's march from Memphis had been toilsome, and not without opposition, though no great battle had been fought. He was most anxious to reach Grant, whom he, with true soldierly spirit, had urged to "Accept the command of the great army of the centre; don't hesitate. By your presence at Nashville you will unite all discordant elements, and impress the enemy in proportion. All success and honor to you!" And again, with equal magnanimity, he wrote Grant: "I am very anxious you shall go to Nashville, as foreshadowed by Halleck, and chiefly as you can harmonize all conflicts of feeling that may exist in that vast crowd. Rosecrans, and Burnside, and Sherman, with their subordinates, would be ashamed of petty quarrels, if you were behind and near them-between them and Washington. Next, the union of such armies, and the direction of it, is worthy your ambition. I shall wait news from you with great anxiety."
From the date of Grant's assumption of command, October 19th, 1863, he sent orders to Sherman, regulating his marches and the in-gathering and disposition of his forces, all of which were obeyed with a promptitude which showed that the older general's heart was in his words. On November 7th, Grant sent him word of Bragg's prospective move on Burnside at Knoxville, and that he expected to make a countermove directly on the enemy in his front. Haste was urged, and Sherman responded with forced marches. On November 13th he reported his arrival at Bridgeport, and was summoned in person to Chattanooga. And now Grant had with him all his trustiest lieutenants. They were a united band of officers in spirit, determined in valor, able in council. He could look
with some serenity on the situation, and devise and order with the certainty of co-operation and the assurance of loyal execution. Extricated from the entanglements of the preceding weeks, every subordinate, clear down to the lines, felt a freedom and confidence which was unwonted, and burned with a desire to show by brave acts his love for one who had brought them through midnight to morning, and gave them promise of a glorious day of victory.
BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA.
TRANGE as it may appear, Burnside's position at Knoxville, a hundred miles away from Chattanooga, and amid the mountains of East Tennessee, was now one of greater anxiety than that at Chattanooga. That General had, before Grant assumed direction of affairs, pushed his way from Kentucky through the Cumberland Gap and upon Knoxville, which he regarded as a key to the upper Tennessee. It was so in some respects, but not in all. It would have been entirely so for the Confederates, who held the railroad from East Tennessee into Virginia, and who, by virtue of their position at Chattanooga, controlled it from that point almost to Knoxville. Yet it was one worthy of maintainance, and Grant felt that Burnside must be supported at all hazards. He did not contemplate doing it directly, but by means of one of those masterly counter movements which he had so often employed successfully and which formed such a conspicuous feature of his military operations.
At Knoxville, Burnside's rear was open to a sudden movement of the enemy from the east. He could be attacked in front with equal facility by any portion of the army detached from Chattanooga. Halleck was most anxious for his safety, and repeatedly urged Grant to reinforce and protect him, all of which was done, but in Grant's own way. He did it by opening his supply lines for him, by ordering him to entrench him