length of service. It is manifestly unjust to give a man the same pension for a wound after two years' service, as after seventeen. Promotion should go by selection, with due regard to seniority, merit being equal or nearly so. We would make a little allowance for the senior, and give him the promotion, if fit, even if the junior had the more shining abilities. We would propose that all the Company's European regiments of foot be called grenadiers or fusiliers, and all the native Light Infantry. We have several reasons for this. First, it is the nomenclature most consonant to the uses we would put each description of force to, as a rule. Secondly, it is a distinction, and as far as the natives are concerned, would at once mark them as a different force from the locals. Thirdly, it does away with companies of elite, an institution to which, as it obtains in the British army, we have the very strongest objections. Were the men of those companies selected for having served so many campaigns, for distinguished courage, or for uniform good conduct, there would be reason for collecting them together. In this case though, we think, it would be better to gather them into battalions, and let them form the reserve of the army, like the French imperial guard. But to select men, simply because they are so many inches high, or measure so much round the chest, though justifiable in the embodying of troops whose principal duties. are connected with the pageantry of a court, is quite unsuited to the working army of India. It is unfair, and the men do not like it. These companies are considered "crack," and we have known regiments of native infantry in which an orderly was never to be seen, who did not belong to one of these companies. All duties ought to go by honest roster, and the commanding officer, instead of selecting the best set of men to go on general officer's guards, &c.-by which he fancies, he gets a reputation for his corps,-should make it his business to see that all his men are smart, well set up, and fit to be seen any where. The system is bad, it discourages the men who are not selected, it is favoritism, and surely the taking away from one company officer his best men to please another who happens to command a flank company, is not likely to make the former very zealous in his business. We would not dwell on the necessity of making the senior officers do their duty; unless they do, the juniors never will. Brigades and divisions should not be the right of the senior. Should a man not be fit for these posts, the £1,000 a year which a colonel may draw in Europe, must be reckoned a liberal provision. We think that commanding officers of regiments should not be held, as they now are, directly responsible to the commander-in-chief; we would make the brigadier responsible for any impropriety occurring in any regiment in his brigade, for its discipline and conduct. He ought to inspect each of his corps at least once a month, without previous notice. He should have the brigade constantly out to exercise, so that they might know what to do, and himself also. The general also might make much more frequent inspections than he does, and at no certain fixed time of the year. Prepared manœuvres should be as nought. The general should rather say to the brigadier or the commanding officer of a regiment: "Your right flank is threatened by the enemy's horse," or, "there is a masked battery to your left flank in the front about 700 yards, which you must take," or "you have to pass through a gorge occupied by the enemy who are in possession of the hills on either sides," and ask these gentlemen to dispose their troops so as to meet these several cases. Each division might have its camp of exercise in the cold weather, where all sorts of military operations could be carried on. If this was done, with four field officers to each regiment, one of whom might be reckoned on as fit to command it, the Bengal Army would be a very different body from the mutinous rabble it now is. To give an idea of how we would dispose of this army in the country, suppose the following to be the distribution :— Fort William Barrackpore..... Eastern Bengal Dinapore Segowlie PRESIDENCY DIVISION. 3 Reserve companies artillery. 1 Regiment European infantry. 1 Troop horse artillery. 1 Horse field battery. 1 Native light horse regiment. 1 Horse field battery. 1 Regiment European infantry. DINAPORE DIVISION. 1 Troop horse artillery. LUCKNOW DIVISION. 1 Horse field battery. 2 Companies European artillery reserve. 1 Company sappers. 1 Regiment European infantry. 2 Troops horse artillery. 2 Horse field batteries. 2 Companies European artillery reserve. 1 Company sappers. 1 Regiment dragoons. 2 Regiments native light horse. 2 Regiments European infantry. 2 Regiments native infantry. SAUGOR DIVISION. 1 Troop horse artillery. 1 Horse field battery. 1 Reserve company artillery. 2 Native light horse. 2 Regiments European infantry. 2 Ditto native infantry. 1 Horse field battery. 1 Regiment native light horse. 2 Companies reserve artillery. 1 Regiment native light horse. DELHI DIVISION. 1 Troop horse artillery. 1 Horse field battery. 2 Companies reserve artillery. 1 Regiment dragoons. 1 Regiment native light horse. Bareilly 1 Horse field battery. 1 Regiment native light horse. SIRHIND DIVISION.-COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF'S RESERVE. Umballah and Hills Lahore Mooltan Sealkote Jhelum Peshawur... 2 Troops horse artillery. 2 Regiments dragoons. 3 Ditto native light horse. LAHORE DIVISION. 1 Troop horse artillery. 2 Companies reserve artillery. 1 Regiment dragoons. 2 Companies reserve artillery. 1 Regiment native light horse. 1 Regiment European infantry. PESHAWUR DIVISION. 2 Troops horse artillery. 2 Horse field batteries. 3 Reserve companies artillery. 2 Companies sappers. 1 Regiment Dragoons. Peshawur...... Rawul Pindee 2 Regiments native light horse. 4 Regiments European infantry. 2 Ditto native infantry. 1 Horse field battery. 1 Regiment European infantry. In this distribution which we propose, it will be observed that we have left out several large stations at present occupied, such as Cawnpore, Meerut, and Ferozepore. Cawnpore and Ferozepore we think no longer necessary. Cawnpore is an unhealthy place, and its importance was gone with the annexation of Oude. It appears to us that Lucknow is the more fitting place for a large station, from which Cawnpore is only fifty miles. The same remark applies to Ferozepore, whose importance ceased on the annexation of the Punjab. Its magazine, united to that of Phillour, should be established at Lahore, and the fort at Phillour and that at Ferozepore blown up. If it is acknowledged to be necessary to concentrate the army, a great number of stations must be given up, and we prefer to put a large number of troops together, as it keeps up better discipline, and having fewer posts to guard, makes a larger portion of the army available for field or foreign service without any risk. The magazines we think should be at Fort William, Allahabad, Delhi, Lahore, Mooltan, and Peshawur, each and all in a regular fortification, with an European regiment, and reserve artillery inside always. If deemed necessary, an expense magazine might be established at Saugor, but we think Allahabad near enough to supply the means for any extended operations. The Fort of Chunarghur might be retained and garrisoned by the invalids, whose number would of course increase with so large an augmentation to the European army, but all others should be blown up. Forts only hamper us in India, even although they may have proved places of shelter during these mutinies to Europeans; but an army constituted as we recommend, would be free from suspicion of mutiny. And then the forts could not be abandoned, lest others should occupy them. We have recommended Gwalior rather than Agra as the military station for that part of the country. Should political reasons however prevent our occupying it, the station would be at Agra. Meerut was a mistake from the beginning. The station ought to be Delhi, and there is fine high ground near Humayoon's tomb, suitable for a cantonment. The cantonments of Delhi were in the worst spot that could have been chosen, and we believe that to be the cause of the unhealthiness. With a magazine at Delhi, we think there is no occasion for one at Agra, which might with advantage be broken up. |
