cluding Argument for the purpofe, if Matter can think. For if fo, how can I prove from my thinking that I have any fuch Principle in me diftinct from Matter as I call my Soul, fince upon the Suppofition of Matter's having a Capacity of Thought, that very Principle may be no other than Matter, which by my Thinking I would diftinguish from it? And as I cannot know whether I have any thing in me diftinct from Matter, fo neither for the fame Reafon can I know whether that be it which thinks in me, if Matter be fuppofed capable of the fame. So that both these Questions, Whether I have a Soul, or whether it be my Soul that thinks, muft be determin'd by one and the fame common Measure, and can neither of them be establish'd in the Affirmative but upon this Principle, viz. The utter Incapacity that Matter has to Think.

7. Indeed, had I but a clear Idea of my own Soul, fuch as I have of Extenfion, Numbers or Figures, I might then without troubling my felf about Matter, barely by confulting that Idea, fee in one and the fame View what Properties and Modifications it includes, and confequently whether Thinking be one of them. And fo need not argue this' round about way, that 'tis my Soul that thinks because Matter is not capable of doing it. But fuch an Idea I cannot at prefent find that I have, and if I had it yet even then tho' I should know whether my Soul thought or no, yet I would not

be affured that 'tis my Soul only that thinks, unlefs I am alfo fatisfy'd that Matter is not capable of Thought. For if it be, how know I but that I may think with my Body as well as with my Soul? But in cafe Matter be found not to have any capacity for thinking, then I fhall know two things of no ordinary Importance, and which I have hitherto been used to take for granted. 1. That I have a Soul. 2. That 'tis my Soul, and that only, which is the true Principle of all that Thought which I am now, or any other time, Conscious of. So that the Question will ftill turn upon this, Whether Matter can think?

8. Those that think it can (of whom I hope the Philofophick World has not many) do as far as I can apprehend, make it plainly unpoffible to prove the Immateriality, and confequently the Natural Immortality of the Soul, Nay, indeed whether we have any fuch thing as a Soul in us, or no. I fay the Natural Immortality of the Soul. For as to a Pofitive Immortality, fuch as is founded upon the pure Will of God, and the extraordinary influx of his Confervative Power, that any thing may have, be the Nature or Quality of it what it will, if God please to stay it in its Being, by fuch an External fupport. But for any thing to be Immortal in its own Nature fo as to be above the Force of any created Power to destroy it, that I think Philofophy has always referv'd as the Privilege of Spiritual and Immaterial Beings.

Beings. Indeed as Immortal fignifies only Unperishable, and is oppofed to Annihilation, so all things have a Natural Immortality, Matter as well as Spirit (from fomething to fall to nothing, or from nothing to rife to fomething, being equally above the Force of Natural Caufality) and accordingly in this Senfe, the Soul would be Immortal tho' it were not of a Substance, in its whole Kind distinct from the Body, provided it were a Substance at all, and not as fome have fanfied, a Modality, or Temperament of the Body only. To be a Substance at large a fufficient Qualification for this kind of Immortality: But as Immortal is taken for indiffolvible, and as 'tis oppofed to Corruption, fo nothing but what is Immaterial, can be Immortal. Since if Material it will be divifible and fo Mortal or Corruptible. But now as I cannot know that I have any Substance in me diftinct from my Body, but by my Thinking (for what else is there in me, that Matter may not do as well as Spirit ?) fo I cannot know it by that neither, if Matter can think. And confequently upon this Suppofition, tho by the affistance of Revelation, I may Believe, yet I cannot by any pure Method of Reason, prove that I have an Im

mortal Soul.

9. But to prevent any misunderstanding in a Point of fo great Confequence to be rightly understood, I think fit here to enter a double Caution, before we proceed any further. 1. That I do not pretend by this that the Question of

the

the Soul's Immortality is fo far concern'd in that other,concerning the Cogitative Power of Matter, that the holding this in the Affirmative, fhould oblige us to hold the other in the Negative, that is, that if Matter be allow'd to think, then the Soul is not Immortal. No, my meaning is not that it concludes against the Soul's Immortality in it felf, but only that it does fo as to us, fo far as it makes it impoffible for us to know, or prove, but that our Souls may be as Corruptible as our Bodies. And fo much I conceive it plainly does. For as the Soul cannot be Immortal, unless it be Immaterial, fo it cannot be proved to be Immaterial but by its Thinking. Nor by that neither, if Thought be within the Power of Matter. Since if Matter can think, then my Soul notwithstanding its thinking may be, for ought I know, no other than Matter, and fo as liable to Corruption as Matter is. 2. That I would not be thought hereby to infinuate that all those who allow a Power of thinking in Matter,do advance fo fingular a Notion with any defign of prejudice, to the Do&rin of the Soul's Immortality, or even to the very poffibility of its Proof, but only that is the Natural Confequence and tendency of the thing which makes it impoffible for us, in a rational way, to have any fatisfaction concern

*Ifay All, because certain late Author, who by his fecond Thoughts of Human Soul (a Book which fhews that fe

I think there is a

cond Thoughts are not always the wifeft) has given_us but too juft an Occafion, that we fhould except him.

ing that great Article in Philofophy as well as in Divinity, the Immortality of our Souls, as undermining the Foundation upon which it ftands. That is in fhort, we cannot upon this Principle know the Soul to be Immortal because we cannot know it to be Immaterial.

10. Now tho' this be not only a great Prejudice, but also a confiderable Objection against Matters being capable of thinking, and a good reafon to make the Patrons of this Paradoxical Notion very fufpicious of it, as well as to make all others Cautious of admitting it, yet however fince it will hardly amount to a fatisfactory Refolution of the Point, as expofing rather than proving, and as tending rather to fhew which fide of the Queftion is moft for our Intereft to have true, than pofitively to determine which is fo, let us confider whether we can confirm these Prefumptions by fome more direct and convincing Evidence. And because we cannot Judge of things any better, or indeed any otherwife than by thofe Ideas which we have of them, we will firft confider what Idea we have of Matter, and then examine whether Matter according to that Idea, can have that Thought or Power of Thinking which we are confcious of to our felves. 11. Matter or Body according to the Philo fophy of fome, is either Phyfical or Geometrical, which Geometrical Body is faid to be Extenfi

*See the Burgundian Philofophy Tom. 4. p. 184. as alfo Du Hamel de Confenf Vet. & Nov. Phil. p. 666.

on.