Part II. that even while I have the Idea of Matter before me, and contemplate Things that have an intelligible Extenfion; for even thofe very Things admit of a pure intellectual Confideration, as Des Cartes has most happily observed and proved by the Inftances of a Triangle and a Chiliagone. Of this diftinction between pure Intellect and Imagination (one of the best Difcoveries of the new Philofophy) I fhall have occa fion to fay more hereafter. At prefent, fuppofing it, I thence infer that the Idea of Matter is not fo neceffary to Thought, but that I can think without it. And if I can think without it, then I can have an Idea of a Thinking Being, tho' I had no Idea of Matter; nay, (were fuch a Suppofition poffible) tho' there were indeed no fuch Idea at all. And if I can, then I would further propound it to be confider'd, whether this does not prove that these are not abstract but compleatly distinct Ideas, and confequently that the things are as really distinct as the Ideas.

27. Further yet, if Thinking Being and Extended Being were diftinct only by a modal Abstraction, in like manner as figured Being and movable Being are conceived to be, then however by fuch an Abstraction one of them may not formally include the other, yet it would never pofitively and actually exclude it, even as figured Being never excludes moveable Being. Well then, if I can instance in a Thinking Being, from whofe Idea all Extenfion is

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pofitively and neceffarily excluded, then I hope. it will be granted me that Thinking Being and Extended Being are not distinct by a modal Abftraction. But now this I can do; for I have in me the Idea of a Being abfolutely perfect, and fo has every Body elfe, even thofe that deny. the real Existence of fuch a Being, fince otherwife they will deny what they do not conceive, and fo will deny they know not what. But then as fuch an Idea muft include Thought, as being a Perfection, fo for the contrary Reason it muft exclude Extenfion. Such a Being then must be a Thinking Being, and must not be an Extended Being. Here then is an Instance of a Thinking Being, that is not an Extended Being; nay, that cannot be, and that because his Idea pofitively excludes all Extenfion. But now give me fuch an Inftance of a figured Being, that is not a moveable Being: You cannot. But then does not this plainly fhew that thefe Things are not diftinct by a modal Diftinction, fince if fo 'tis reasonable to think that they would never be found to be exclufive of each other; but on the contrary, as every Extended Being would then be a Thinking Being, fo every Thinking Being would alfo be an Extended Being, even as every figured Being is also a moveable Being. The Sum is, if these Ideas, Thinking Being and Extended Being, were diftinct only by a modal Abftraction, then 'tis reasonable to think they would be always

Part II. undivided, even as figured Being and moveable Being are, whofe diftinction is fuch. But we are fure at leaft of one Inftance wherein they are divided. And therefore 'tis reasonable to think that they do not owe their distinction to any fuch modal Abstraction.

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28. But there is an eafy Suppofition that will yet further clear and conclude the Point. hall only beg leave to fuppofe (what even Geometrick ftrictnefs will allow to be a reafonable Poftulatum) that God is able to create a pure Thinking Being, that is not at all Corporeal, as alfo on the other fide that he is able to create a Being purely Corporeal that does not think. What I here fuppofe as poffible, is no more than what is generally prefumed to be, de facto, actually done; but I fhall content my felf with fuppofing only the Poffibility of it: And that, I hope, is fo fair a Demand, that even the Author of the Letters against the Bishop of Worcefter, who is fo liberal of Thought, as to beftow a Capacity of it upon Matter, left he fhould limit the Power of God, will not ftick to grant it me. For fure he that exalts the Power of God fo far as to be able to endue Matter with Thought, (which in its Effence, by his own Confeffion, it does not include) muft needs allow me to fuppofe what is a great deal lefs, that by the fame Omnipotence he is able to make Matter without it, that is, pure Matter that does not think, as alfo for the like reason that he is able to make a Thinking Be

ing that is not at all Material, but a pure Spirit. Or if he pleafes, we will fuppofe that as God is able to make two fuch Beings, fo he is able to make them feparately by themselves, a Thinking Being by it felf, and a Material Being by it felf, (notwithstanding the prefent actual Union of these in Human Nature;) or that he can make one of them without making the other; or which comes to the fame, that when he has made them both he can preferve one of them in being, and annihilate the other.

29. These two laft Suppofitions proceed up on the two-fold Separability of Things; for Things may be feparated either thus, as when one remains, the other perishing or not being; or thus, as when both remain, but without any real Union with each other. Now in the firit place, either of thefe Suppofitions would immediately prove a reality of diftinction in the Things, and that becaufe either of the Separalities does fo, as is moft clearly demonstrable of each of them: For when one Thing can be when the other is not, then most certainly one is not the other; fince if they were really the fame, it would follow that the fame Thing could be and not be at once. And fo again, when Things can exist separately from one another, tho' at the fame time 'tis as neceffary that one should not be the other, fince otherwife it would follow that the fame Thing could be feparated from it felf, which is repugnant to the Metaphyfical Unity of any Being. This then would

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would clearly prove the diftinction of these Things, fince if one be produceable without the other in either of the Senfes fuppofed, it appears that one is not the other, which is all that we can understand by a real diftinЄtion.

30. Well, but to fet by this Conclufion for a while, according to our prefent Method of reafoning, we are to prove the diftinction of the Ideas, and by that the diftinction of the Things. Let us then to our Suppofition again, and fee whether it will do that too. The Things are feparately produceable, which fuppofes that they are fimply fo. Now as from their being fimply produceable, we may conclude (according to the Principles establish'd in the former part of this Theory) that there are Ideas according to which they are to be produced; fo from their being Separately produceable we may as well argue, that thofe Ideas whereby they are fo produceable are complete and really diftinct Ideas. For if a Thinking Being and an Extended Being are feparately produceable then it seems plain that the Idea whereby one of these is produceable, is not the Idea whereby the other is produceable, fince if it were, then the Production of the one would involve alfo the Production of the other, and fo they could not be produced afunder, which is against the Suppofition. In other words, If a Thinking Being and an Extended Being be really but one Idea, that is, (for I would willingly be understood