ful, we cannot ftrictly conclude, that therefore Error is in the Will as the Subject of it, (for then we might alfo conclude Ignorance to be in the Will, fince that alfo may be Wilful) yet from Errors being in the Will, we may on the other fide conclude that 'tis always Wilful. As indeed it is, it being always in our Power to avoid it, by not judging if we do not Perceive, or by not Judging any farther than we Perceive. Which I take to be the true Reason why tho' Ignorance may be fometimes excufable, yet Error is always a Fault.

SE C T. IV.

Of Active and Paffive Thought, with a Reflection upon the Scholaftick Distinction of agent and patient Understanding.

I.

T

Hought in the Latitude of it, comprehending Volition as well as Perception, and Perception being Senfible as well as Ideal, we have from hence,an Occafion given us to confider another Diftinction that may be made of Thought into Active and Paffive. Which denomination, tho' attributed to Thought, may yet perhaps more primarily and properly belong to the Mind that Thinks, there being fome Thoughts wherein the Mind is active, or does fomething, and other Thoughts, wherein the Mind is Paffive, and receives as it were

the

the Action of fomething else. I fay the Mind, that fignifying as I apprehend the whole Thinking Power of the Soul, or the Soul as it Thinks at large. For as by the Understanding here is intended that Power in us which Perceives, fo by Mind I think (as that Term is distinguish'd from the other) we are properly to mean that Power which both Perceives and Wills, the latter being attributed to the Mind as well as the former, which is therefore efteem'd the Subject of Moral, as well as of Rational Perfection, According to which is the Language of Scripture, when it fpeaks of

our being renew'd in the Spirit Ephef. 4. 23.

of our Mind.

2. Now to distinguish what Thought in us is Active, and what Paffive (meaning in which it is that the Mind is one or the other refpectively) we have no other way, but to reflect upon what we are confcious of in our felves, and when we do fo, we fhall find in the first Place, that all Volition is Active, and purely Active. For tho' Love, which is a fort of Willing, is often call'd a Paffion (a general Name for the feveral Acts of the Will, as they are accompanied with certain bodily Movements) yet this I think ought to be understood, only with refpect to that certain Mechanical Commotion of the Body, which attends that Thought of the Mind, and not with refpect to the Thought it felf, wherein, whatever affections or alterations the Body may fuffer, the

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Mind

Part II. Mind is truly active, as indeed it is in all the Operations of the Will. Which as I conceive is the Reason why the Soul is accountable for thefe fort of Thoughts, and of that moral diftinction, as to Good and Evil, whereof they are capable.

3. And as Thought of Volition is purely active, fo fenfible Perception or Senfation is as purely paffive. The Soul has no immediate Power over her Senfations, as not being able to modify her felf. And accordingly we find by experience that we cannot give our felves Pleasure or Pain, any otherwife than by making ufe of fuch impreffions of Bodies, as by the Law of Union, between our Soul and Body, have an ordinary connexion with fuch Sentiments, nor then neither, if the mechanical Texture of our own Bodies happen to be fo difturb'd or indifpos'd that the Motion imprefs'd upon the Nerves be hinder'd from being communicated to the Brain. And as the Soul has no immediate Power over her Senfations, fo as to produce them by any Act of hers, fo neither is Senfation it felf an Act of the Soul, but rather the Reception of the Act of fome other Being, which has Power over her. Indeed when we have any Senfation, as Pleasure or Pain, 'tis hardly poffible but that some Act of the Mind will be confequent upon it, as of intellectual Perception in reflecting upon what we feel, or of Volition in willing or refusing it as grateful or ungrateful, but ftill the Senfation

it felf is no Act, but only a different state or manner of Being in the Soul, which as it comes from the Caufe that produces it, however it may be call'd an A&t, yet as it is in the Soul, it is no Act but a Paffion, as not being any thing that the Soul does, but fomething which it fuffers or receives.

4. But now as to that other Perception which (to diftinguish it from Sensation, which is alfo a kind of Perception) we call Intellectual, that is partly active and partly paffive. Some will tell you that 'tis only the latter. And I confefs they have fo far reafon for what they fay, as it is a kind of Reception of the intelligible Object or Idea, which indeed may import no more than a Paffivity, but fure methinks to perceive fhould alfo imply fome Act of the Mind about that intelligible Object, or else how is it perceiv'd? And our own Experience and Reflection will teach us that the Soul is not idle

of

in this any more than in any other way Thinking, but imploys her felf with a great deal of Activity, especially in the Contemplation of fome Objects, where the Ideas are very abstract, or where their Relations are very compounded. Nor is this Activity of Perception only the Will which the Soul has to perceive. This indeed it has, but then besides this (for every one that is willing to perceive, does not prefently perceive, as a Man may be willing to fee, and yet be in the dark) there is alfo a certain Effort or Exertion of Mind in intellectual

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tellectual Perception, that which is ufually exprefs'd by Attention, and in this confifts that labour of Thought which we call Study. And if we reflect, we fhall find that this Attention in perceiving is a very distinct thing from the being barely willing to perceive, fince there is a caufal connexion or dependence between them, our willingness to perceive being the reason why we attend. But befides the Soul finds difficulty in Thinking, efpecially upon fome things, which would not be if the Understanding were only paffive, or receptive of Ideas, and had nothing to do in the Contemplation of them, which very word feems to imply Action as well, if not rather than Paffion. And this is fo natural a Supposition that our conimon Language runs upon it, wherein 'tis ordinary to fay, an Act of Thought, or an Act of Perception. And accordingly the Schools themselves, tho' they exprefly make the Understanding to be a paffive Power; yet 'tis obvious to obferve that they call (let them fee with what confiftence) the feveral Thoughts of it by the name of Operations. And fo Knowledge which belongs to the Understanding, and is a fort of Perception, is by them said to be a Habit; tho' again, by their own Doctrine, a Habit refults from a frequency of Acts. And fo likewife Happiness is faid to be an Operation, and that not of the fenfitive, but of the intellective part only, and that too more minutely yet (according to the School of Aquinas) of the