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SECT. II.

Of Direct and Reflex Thought.

I. AD we as clear a Notion of Thought as we have of fome other Things, 'tis not likely that fo many thinking and philofophical Men would have agreed to exprefs the Properties that belong to it by fuch Terms, and that because they are Figurative, that is, in their strict fimplicity belonging to fomething elfe, and only by a proportional Accommodation applied to this. For fure that clearness which is fo highly valuable elsewhere, is more especially to be affected and endeavour'd after here (when we speak of Thought) and to this purpose nothing can be more unferviceable than Metaphor. For however it may have its use in the perfwafive way of Speaking, as working upon the Imagination, and stirring the Paffions by thofe lively Scenes of Corporeal Imagery which it fets before us, yet certainly it is not fo well fitted to inlighten and inftruct the Mind as the more chast and simple way is, and that because it does not express things according to their exact Natures which they have in themselves, but only according to fome general and confufe Refemblances which they have as to other things. For which reason this Figurative way is not to be used when we defign clearnefs, and our Bufinefs is only to Inftruct, and therefore whenI 3

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ever in fuch Cafes we do use it (as fometimes we are forced to do) 'tis either because we want Judgment in the manner of wording our Difcourfe, or because we have not a clear Idea of the Subject we would difcourfe of, and so not being able to difcourfe of it exactly as it is, we are fain to express our felves of it as we can. The latter of these may be prefumed to be the prefent Cafe, when we fay of Thought that 'tis Direct, or Reflex. For it being not prefumable that fo many Philofophical Men fhould be fo injudicious as not to prefer a fimple way of Speaking here before a figurative one, if it could be had, we may suppose that they used the latter because they had not an Idea of Thought clear enough to support the former.

2. 'Tis fuppofed here that these Terms, Direct and Reflex, are figurative when applied to Thought. And 'tis certain that they are fo, and that because they properly belong to Motion, between which (as being a Mode of Matter) and Thought, there is no less than an intire and ideal Diverfity. And whatever is proper to one thing, muft be Figurative if applied to another. Then we fay a Motion is Direct when a Body moves on without changing its determination, and then Reflex when there is a change of its determination upon the Rencontre of another Body which it cannot move or difplace. For it being impoffible that a Body fhould lofe its Motion any otherwife than as it communicates it, if it meets with one to whom

whom by reafon of its refiftance it cannot communicate it, it must needs continue its Motion in the fame Quantity, and only take a new Determination, quite contrary to what it had before, which is what I conceive we are properly to understand by Reflexion. By which it appears that Motion is one thing, and the Determination of it another thing, because the Motion continuing the fame the Determination of it is changed, and that in a Direct and Reflex Motion the contrariety does not fo properly lie in the Motions (for Motion is not contrary to Motion, but Reft) as in their Determinations, which are the only Things that are here truly opposite, and in refpect of which all Motion must be said to be either Direct or Reflex.

3. These Terms then when applied to Thought are Figurative, and the Figure is taken from Motion, or rather the Determination of it, where indeed they are proper. All the Bufinefs will be to reduce this Figure to a Simplicity: Direct and Reflex as it is in Motion cannot be in Thought, because Thought is ideally diftinct from Motion, and fo cannot be capable of its Properties. But there is fomething in Thought, or at least this Form of Expreffion fuppofes that there is, that carries fome refemblance to these determinations of Motion. But to exprefs this refemblance in its naked fimplicity, is perhaps no more poffible than to tell what Thought it felf is, and that for the fame common reafon, becaufe we have no clear Idea

of our Souls. All that can be done here is to defign what that Thought is which we call Direct, and what that Thought is which we call Reflex, that fo we may not be fuppofed to talk like Parrots, by using these Terms altogether without any meaning under them. Now as to this, I conceive that then Thought is faid to be Direct when the Act of Thought terminates upon its ideal Object; and then Reflex, when the fame Act of Thought terminates upon it felf, or is its own Object. As when a Man thinks that he thinks: In which A&t there seems to be a kind of a return of the Mind upon it felf as in that determination of Motion which wę call Reflex, but how or what it is I do not well understand, and therefore fhall not go about to explain.

4. We may take occafion here to remark by the way, that tho', as was faid, there is no thinking without thinking upon fomething, yet that 'tis not neceffary that that fomething fhould be always an Idea, fince as you fee it may fometimes be the very Act of Thought, which may be an Object to it felf. And 'tis further obfervable that Object is of a larger extent than Idea. For tho' every Idea is an Object, yet every Object is not an Idea, fince the very formal Act of Thinking which is most apparently diftinct from Idea, may also be confider'd as having the exprefs formality of an Object, as it is in that reflex way of thinking we are now fpeaking of, wherein the Mind retiring

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as it were from all Ideas turns its view as I may fay inwards, and in a very wonderful manner confiders what paffes there. In which Act of hers 'tis hard to tell which is the moft great and noble, whether the Spectacle beheld, or the View.

5. 'Tis this reflex Thought that chiefly diftinguishes the Character of what we call a Thinking Man. Direct Thought is more eafy (the Mind feeing better a little from it, than fo very near at hand) and for that reafon more common: Men ordinarily ufe this in confidering the feveral Ideal Objects that occur to their Minds, and there is alfo fomething in those Objects upon the account of the novelty and variety of them, as well as the greater brightnefs of the Light wherein we behold them, which draws off the Mind from it felf to the Contemplation of them, wherein finding more Light and more Pleafure, no wonder that it chufes to be out of it felf, and converse abroad rather than at home, upon a Principle not much unlike that whereby we generally love the company of Strangers better than our own. For this reafon it is that all the World thinks directly, at one rate or another. But there is but here and there a Man that reflects, that turns himself to himfelf, and carefully and attentively obferves what's doing in his own Mind, and confiders the various workings of that intellectual Principle which is the Dignity and Excellency of his Nature, that fets him a