body of science, we may truly plead that such sciences have been raised to the first relations of importance, and not of science, by the peculiar circumstances and necessities which have called them forth; that all sciences are tributary, immediately or remotely, to every science, whence many of them have become artificially and extensively compounded, according to expedience, without regard to natural order and actual relations; and that what is chiefly wanting in this respect is a rule and principle, such as we have attempted to supply, whereby we may securely analyze any of the established forms of science, and exhibit their natural relations; and as to those who seek extent of science in any other view, we can but refer them to the great fund of literature; or, failing there, and as a last resort, to the exhaustless stores of nature, reflection, and experiment.

727. Our chief and incumbent endeavour has been to render no individual science or subject principal, but to assign to every one its place, in subordination to the supremacy of the whole; and our greatest difficulty-a difficulty, too, which, if we overcome, we shall incur those individual reprehensions which we may escape by failing has been, not to say all we might have worthily and originally said upon each particular branch of science, but as little only as might serve our general purpose.

728. Science is essentially theoretical; and he

who pursues science as practical deviates from its chief office into art; and, however useful his performance may prove, he has yet performed in error; and it is to this that we owe the confusion, and many artificial and isolic forms of science, and the frequent contempt of practical men for reasoning and just speculation.

729. So intimately is every part of science related to the whole, that each science may be regarded as the centre of all knowledge, and the universe may be subordinated to every subject; nor can there be any objection to such a mode of regarding it, under due and expedient limitation, when it becomes the principal subject of a distinct treatise.

730. Now, although no one can analyze a subject which he does not comprehend and understand, yet to treat thus principally of any individual science or subject, so as fully to satisfy the mind accomplished therein, would require a depth, extent, and excellence of knowledge, and a long and elaborate discipline and practice therein, that would, if we are not mistaken, disqualify any finite mind for the task of universal arrangement, and for that impartial and uncoloured perception, which an entire and philosophic survey of science demands.

731. For it has been by overshooting the boundaries of particular sciences that the learned have hitherto failed to produce a balanced whole thereof, in which each principal branch bears its

equal and appropriate part. And although flourishing shoots have at different seasons sprung from the soil of science, they have failed to afford the stately plant which, occupying the entire ground, draws the whole nourishment of the root, and by a single stem supports all its branches.

732. It is, however, no just reproach to the current sciences, that they have not always observed a due boundary, or taken a right station, and the simple, invariable forms of nature; since these, like the arts, must accommodate themselves in all ages to the wants of society, and to each other nor do we, therefore, impugn the utility and vast importance of many of the conventional and complex forms of instituted sciences, of which the natural sciences are nevertheless the roots, and of which we have thence attempted a catalogue in a tabular view, coinciding and in connexion with our general Synopsis.

733. It remains, then, to this third part of our design, to trace the Outlines of

Chemical, Vegetal, Animal. Plastic, Chromatic, Harmonic. Moral, Political, and Theological.

And their dependent branches, which, taken altogether, are so far universal, that they comprehend all objective science between the extremes of the lowest matter and the highest mind, and include

the majority of those sciences about which mankind has been most generally solicitous.

734. The present part will therefore constitute a system proceeding from the purely theoretical and universal view of our first part, and approaching to particulars, and to the practical view of our final part. In this course we may hope to confirm our prior analogical deductions à posteriori, or upon the foundation of experience, in the infinite field of the physical, sensible, and moral sciences; and first in the following outline of Physics, or Natural Philosophy.

735. It is requisite to remark, ere we proceed, that in changing our position from the universal view of our first outline to the particulars of physiological science in those which follow, we have changed our logical procedure from the categorical or theoretical analogism of the former to the hypothetical or practical analogism, which coincides with the induction, and is the mode especially appropriate to the deduction of analogical relations from the established observations and experience of empirical science, upon which these latter outlines are principally founded.

736. In this procedure we take our departure, as it were, from the opposite extreme of science, with the design of connecting the experimental with the rational, and particulars with the universal, in universal coincidence and analogy; and to unite these sciences formally as a whole.

737. Yet, in proportion as we proceed from the stem to the branches and extremes of science, systematic analogy becomes slenderer and more umbrageous; it will, therefore, be no just reproach here, that the natural or artificial analogies we may adduce are not actual deductions of reason, or essentials of the mind, or internal; since it will be sufficient if they are facts involving no contradiction or absurdity; for facts are as authoritative nay, they are the only adequate authorities in external nature as reasons only are strictly to the intellect or internal.

738. And these are essentially coincident; for that is not a fact which contradicts reason, nor that a reason which is contrary to fact; by pursuing the latter, therefore, throughout nature and experience, we may hope, in the end, to connect them in universal coincidence; for if facts are authoritative reasons, such also must be the rational deductions or generalizations of facts, by which we may mount to that which is general and total.

739. Any error that may, however, occur in these outlines, from our adjustments of the particulars of experience to universals, or of the material and sensible to the intellectual, ought rather to be attributed to the deficiency of experience than to the defect of theory, and subject to future correction; for particulars are infinite, and experience is partial and limited.

740. And if hence, also, coincidence should in