eternal glory according to his immutable purpose, and of grace and love, without the least foresight of faith, good or any condition performed by the creature." The dist is obvious. The former predestination is based on fore edge, and is consequently conditional, while the latter is ab and is itself the logical antecedent of foreknowledge. one case, God predestinates because he foreknows, in the he foreknows because he predestinates. In the first, he mines what he will do on the conditions of repentance persevering faith; in the second, he determines what he w unconditionally. He predetermines not only his own act also the acts of the creature. As in nature, God forekn

physical event because he has predetermined it according law of physical necessity; so here in the moral world he has determined "whatsoever comes to pass," by a necessity w though called moral, is no less certain and no less indispens There is no such thing as foreknowledge, logically speaking, tecedent to the decree; it is posterior and has no influence it whatever. It is absolute, predetermining the final res and all the means, including the acts of the creature, neces to secure those results. We do not make these statements w out authority. Calvinistic creeds, the instructions of their T ological Seminaries, and their distinguished authors sustain

Edwards maintains that "God has decreed every action men, yea, every action that is sinful, and every circumstance those actions. Again he says, "All the sins of men are fore dained and ordered by a wise providence." He argues that G

could not foreknow a contingent action, or a free voluntary action, as Arminians, against whom he writes, use the term, in distinction from a necessary action, because foreknowledge would render the action of man certain. But Arminians contend that certainty is not a quality of the human action, but of the mind that foresees the action, so that it belongs to the mind of God and not to the action of the creature; and that God's foreknowledge of the action is antecedent to the certainty, somewhat as our knowledge of a fact is antecedent and indispensable to our certainty of it. The action is logically antecedent to the foreknowledge and the foreknowledge to the decree. In other words the action may be said to determine the foreknowledge, and the foreknowledge the decree. God's decree is in accordance with his foreknowledge and his foreknowledge is in accordance with the act to be foreknown; i. e., God knows what we do as a free act because we do it. If we did not do it, he could not know it, because it would not be to be known. The fact is indispensable to the knowledge everywhere.

But Edwards declares, "There certainly will come to pass no more good than God has absolutely decreed to cause, and there certainly and infallibly will no more believe, and no more be godly, and no more be saved, than God has decreed that he will cause to believe, and cause to be godly, and will save." "Election is not from a foresight of works or conditional;" and why? Because "God could not foreknow that things would be, unless he had decreed they should be." This he says of human action. The decree is antecedent to the foreknowledge. According to this philosophy human action is governed by the will and the will is governed by the strongest motive, and the motive is governed by God, so that by a fixed concatenation, God governs man just as absolutely as he governs the brute by instinct, or the river by gravity. Volition with him is an effect which must have an adequate cause—a cause which will produce that effect and no other. This cause is not the will, nor anything which the will can control; for then in some sense, it could determine itself, which he denies; but it is what he calls motive, meaning by it "the whole of that which moves-whether it be one thing singly or many things conjunctly." The motive which governs is the strongest

because it governs, i. e., because it is the strongest. You wait until the will acts before you can possibly decide motive is the strongest, and then, it may be that what you sider the weakest will appear the strongest. In a given where there are several motives, one is called the strongest no cause it is so per se, or in view of the conscience or reason, or be it would be considered so by the majority of men, but becau that time the will acts in that direction. If at another tim acts in the direction of another motive, then that would be strongest. We claim the power to follow either motive in e case, the will being the free cause of its own acts. Our ap is both to consciousness and conscience. When a wrong right course are before us with their motives and we choose wrong, we are conscious that we could and ought, at the s time, to have chosen the right; and hence our conscience condemn us for choosing the wrong. Calvinistic predestinar deny this power. Volition is an effect as we have already s and the motive is a cause which will produce that effect and other; and to suppose a change in the volition, we must pose a change in the motive; and therefore under the circ stances the volition and the consequent act could not have b otherwise. Thus human conduct is determined by a neces as fixed and unalterable as the laws of nature. This is the ner-stone of absolute predestination, and we have said eno already to show that we have no faith either in the foundat or the superstructure.

5. Why does God predetermine to save? It is "To the pra of the glory of his grace, wherein he hath made us accepted the beloved." We are told in the text that "love"" the go pleasure of his will”—“ his grace”—"riches of his grace”—“ good pleasure"-were brought to bear on this matter. It is n on account of the merit of acceptance, that God predetermin to save, though acceptance is indispensable on our part, but is an exhibition of his pleasure and love an act of pure gra or favor on his part-a mere gift offered freely to all. If present were offered in good faith to each and every one of th inhabitants of a town, on the simple conditions of acceptance with which a part comply and the rest do not, it does not fol

would-as if the strongest possible motive with all me that direction, and yet they do not, and why? Simpl they will not. This is Christ's answer: "Ye will not me that ye might have life." The sinner will have fo one to blame but himself; "for the grace of God that salvation (or saving grace) hath appeared to all men."

The third and concluding sentence of this chapter, nine verses, is simply a prayer for the Ephesian brethr which we infer that prayer should be intimately blend doctrine.

Paul praised God for their Christian virtues of had heard since he visited them about half a dozen yea and he prayed that God would give them wisdom or ma wise to comprehend these things, and reveal to them Christ for their further acknowledgement of him; wo them enlightened understandings that they might a the hope to which they are called and the glorious riche ed for them, and especially the exceeding great power which he had exercised towards them. The same po also manifested in raising Christ from the dead, setting his right hand, and above every thing else putting all t der his feet and making him the head of the churc power it was safe for them to trust.

In conclusion we simply say, accept the terms of salv a Christian, a persevering Christian, and you will be on who are predestinated to salvation from the foundati world.

devise. Why God should deal thus with one that ser with so much fidelity, is a question over which many soul has been long and sorely perplexed. Some have c that the story must be an allegory, or fable, designed important truths illustrative of the providences of God many reject the book altogether. If it be a true hist man that really existed, then its lessons should be c studied, for it is witten for our instruction and profit there such a man as Job? when and where did he live? the author of the book? and what are the lessons it teach legitimate questions for discussion. We will now consid first question, Was there such a man as Job?

The principal argument urged against the belief of Job al existence, are drawn from the manner in which satan is sented as the accuser of Job,-the severe trials the Alr permitted to fall upon a perfect and upright man, and the pleteness of the numbers by which his wealth is desc With regard to the argument drawn from the incredibil the conversation said to have occurred between the Alm and satan, who is represented as "returning to the celestia gions with news," "an able commentator," says Horne, "ha marked, Why should such a conversation be supposed ind ble? The attempt at wit in the word news, is somewhat o place; for the interrogation of the Almighty, Hast thou thy view upon my servant Job, a perfect and upright man stead of aiming at the acquisition of news, is intended severe and most appropriate sarcasm upon the fallen sp