SECTION VII. Passage through Thessaly denied to the Lacedæmonian Troops. Negotiation for Peace resumed by Lacedæmon and Athens: A partial Peace concluded. CHAP. Too late the envy of the leading men in the XVI. Spartan administration had yielded to the press1. 12. ing occasions of the commonwealth, which want Thucyd. ed abilities like those of Brasidas, and a body of nine hundred heavy-armed, under the command of Ramphias, Autocharidas, and Epicydides, had Mid. Sept. been ordered to his assistance. Toward the end of summer they arrived at Heracleia in Trachinia, and while they were settling the deranged affairs of that colony, the action near Amphipo every citizen of either sex, and it may have had its foundation in fact: but according to every account of the times, particularly that of Thucydides, Argaleonis, if the story is fairly told, was more partial to her country than just to her son, and tho the sentiment had something noble, the assertion was not true; for Brasidas did not leave his equal behind him in Sparta, nor, pparently, in all Greece. The high reputation in which he was held by his enemies, may be gathered from an expression which Plato has put into the mouth of Alcibiades, where, speaking of great characters, and of Socrates as the only one without a parallel, he says Brasidas was not so, for he might be compared to Achilles: Οἷος γὰρ Αχιλλεὺς ἐγένετο, ἀπεικάσειεν ἄν τις καὶ Βρασίδαν. Conviv. p. 221. t. 3. This expression of Plato seems to mark the superior strength and activity of Brasidas, and his disposition to personal exertion in battle. Perhaps we might do him an honor not less his due, by comparing him with a soldier of our own country, not particularly remarkable for those qualities. The concluding part of his life, at least, bore a strong resemblance to that of our conqueror of Canada. The obvious differences are, that Wolfe commanded the smaller and more disciplined army against the more numerous and less regular; that his business was attack, that of Brasidas defence; and that, instead of a Cleon, the general opposed to him was a man of rank, and of distinguished abilities, experience and general worth. SECT. VII. lis happened. They had already entered Thessaly, when intelligence of it reached them; and about the same time a declaration was commu- Thucyd. 1.5. c. 13. nicated to them from the Thessalians, that their march through Thessaly would be opposed. The difficulty thus presented, the consciousness, as Thucydides adds, of their insufficiency for the prosecution of those designs which had originated with Brasidas, the consideration that the necessity for reinforcing the Peloponnesian troops in Thrace was alleviated by the advantages already gained there, and the knowlege that the leading men of their administration were more anxious for peace than willing to risk farther the events of war, all together determined them immediately to lead their little army home. A concurrence of circumstances now contributed c. 14. to induce the two leading powers nearly equally to desire peace. The Lacedæmonians had originally ingaged in the war in confidence of decisive superiority, and in full hope that the waste of Attica, with a battle, which they expected would insue, and in which they had no doubt of being victorious, would bring the Athenians to their terms. The event had everyway deceived their expectation. The ravage of Attica had produced no important consequence; they found themselves utterly unable to raise that formidable navy which they had projected: on the contrary, their allies had been exposed to continual danger, and suffered extensive injury, from the Athenian fleets; and at length the blow had fallen severely on themselves. Their loss in killed and prisoners at Pylus was such as never within memory had happened to their state: the enemy possessed a fortress within their country; a most galling circumstance, and still more strange to them: an XVI. 1. 5. c. 15. CHAP. iland was taken from them, which commanded their coast; and from Pylus and from Cythera their lands were infested, and depredation was spred, in a manner before totally unexperienced. Their slaves at the same time deserted in numbers, and the apprehension was continual, that confidence in forein assistance would excite insurrection among the numerous remainder of those oppressed men. AnxThucyd. iety was unceasing in the principal families, for their friends and relations confined in the public prison of Athens; and, to make the prospect more alarming, a truce, which had been concluded for thirty years between Lacedæmon and Argos, was on the point of expiring, and the Argians refused to renew it but on terms to which the Lacedæmonians were very unwilling to submit; while at the same time there appeared reason to apprehend that a breach with Argos would make a schism in Peloponnesus, and that some of the principal states of their alliance would side with the Argians against them. c. 14. Thucyd. So many and so weighty were the causes which still urged Lacedæmon, notwithstanding the late turn of fortune in her favor, to be solicitous for peace. At the same time that turn of fortune had considerably lowered the haughty tone of Athens. The defeats at Delium and Amphipolis, the revolt of so many of their dependencies, and the fear that others would follow a successful example, had checked the ideä before prevailing, that they could command the fortune of war, and might dictate the terms of peace; and there followed a very general regret, that the favorable opportunity, procured by the success at Pylus, had been, in wanton haughtiness, thrown away. With the inclination of the people, on both sides, 1. 5. c. 16. it fortunately happened that the temper and inte VII. Ch. 12. s. 5. of this rests of the leading men concurred. By the death SECT. of the turbulent Cleon, the mild Nicias was left undisputedly first minister of the Athenian commonwealth. While the innate temper of Nicias dis posed him to peace, the inclination was heightened by the accidental circumstance of possessing a very large patrimony, which, in the insecurity of the scanty territory of a Grecian republic, peace only could inable to injoy; and even the desire of glory, to which he was not insensible, led him to seek the reputation of being the peace-maker for his country, while peace could yet be made with certain advantage. At the same time, among the Lacedæmonians, the interest of Pleistoanax, the reigning prince of the house of Eurysthenes, led him to be urgent for peace. Pleistoanax, as we have heretofore seen, in early youth, had been condemned to banishment, on Hist. suspicion of taking bribes from Pericles to lead the Peloponnesian army out of Attica. The Lacedæ- Thucyd monian ministry, it appears, whether in the necessity of complying with popular superstition, or desirous of finding a cover for their own inability and an excuse for miscarriages, frequently applied for advice to the Delphian oracle; and they were disturbed with the continual repetition of an exhortation annexed to every response, 'That the Lacedæ'monians should bring back the demigod, son of Jupiter.' The friends of Pleistoanax interpreted this as a divine admonition to restore that prince, the descendant and representative of the demigods Hercules and Perseus, acknowleged by Grecian superstition as sons of Jupiter; and Pleistoanax was in consequence restored, after a banishment of nineteen years. But a report was circulated, and gained extensive credit, that the admonitory response had been procured by bribery to the Del ut ant. XVI. CHAP. phian priests; and the party in opposition did not fail to make advantage of that report, attributing every adversity that befel the Spartan arms, to the anger of the gods at the restoration of Pleistoanax, at any rate offensive to them, but doubly so as having been procured by such impious collusion. Thus it became particularly an object with that prince to obviate the risk of calamities from war. Thucyd. Such being the disposition on both sides, con1. 5. c. 17. ferences were opened, and they were continued through the winter. Toward spring the negotiation was so little advanced, that the Lacedæmonians circulated notices among their allies, to prepare, not only for a fresh invasion of Attica, but for the establishment of a fortified post in the country. Soon after, however, preliminaries were agreed upon; the fundamental principle of which was, that each party should restore what had been taken in the war; except that Nisæa was reserved to Athens, in consideration of the refusal of the Thebans to surrender Platea. A convention of deputies from the states of the Lacedæmonian alliance was then assembled, when the Baotians, Corinthians, Eleians, and Megarians, protested against the proposed terms: but the other states, who formed a majority of the assembly, approving them, the Lacedæmonian government proceeded to ratify the peace in the name of the whole confederacy. It ran nearly thus: That the common temples, the religious 'rites, and the oracles of the Greek nation, (those 'of Delphi particularly named) should be equally open to all, to pass to and from at all times in safety, by sea or by land; and that the Delphian people should be independent, yielding obedience and paying tribute to none: That the treaty should remain in force for fifty years: That if any dis c. 18. |