III.

militate with the common cause of Greece. But SECT. Lichas and his collegues would not, for any temporary interest of their country, surrender its honor. They condemned the treaties, both that concluded by Chalcideus, and that by Theramenes, in the strongest manner; they declared that they would on no account ratify them; and they insisted that the troops should receive no more pay from the satrap, unless he would enter into a new treaty upon other terms. Tissaphernes, disgusted with their authoritative tone and unbending manner, went away without concluding anything.

1. 8. c. 44.

How far the conduct of the commissioners would be approved by the troops, to whom Persian pay had been no small gratification, may be doubted; but a circumstance occurred of a nature to obviate present dissatisfaction. Overtures came to the Thucyd. Peloponnesian commanders from some leading men of the wealthy iland of Rhodes. The fleet, consisting of ninety-four triremes, went thither; Cameirus, one of the principal towns, but unfortified, was taken without resistance: the chief men of the iland were summoned to an assembly, and all the towns were peaceably brought over to the Peloponnesian interest. Intelligence of the motion of the Peloponnesian fleet being conveyed to the Athenian commanders at Samos, they sailed in all haste for Rhodes, but arrived too late for any effectual interposition. The Peloponnesians obtained thirty-two B.C.411. talents from the Rhodians, toward the expenses January. of the war, and, the winter being already advanced, they laid up their fleet in the harbors of the iland.

SECTION IV.

Alcibiades, persecuted by the new Spartan Administration; favored by the Satrap of Caria; communicates with the Athenian Armament at Samos. Plot for changing the Constitution of Athens: Synomosies, or political Clubs at Athens: Breach between Alcibiades and the Managers of the Plot. New Treaty between Lacedæmon and Persia. Continuation of the Siege of Chios, and Transactions of the Fleets.

CHAP. WHILE an important acquisition was thus made XIX. to the Peloponnesian confederacy, intrigue had

1. 8. c. 45.

been prosecuting with no inconsiderable effect, in opposition to it. Since the expiration of the magistracy of Endius, the party of Agis had been gaining strength in Lacedæmon; and not only Thucyd. Alcibiades could no longer lead measures, as before, on the coast of Asia, but his designs became more and more suspected in Peloponnesus. In thwarting Alcibiades, however, the Lacedæmonian administration feared him. What precisely to expect they knew not; but they apprehended some great stroke in politics to their disadvantage; and, according to the concurrent testimony of historians, too unquestionable when Thucydides is in the list, private instructions were sent to Astyochus, to have Alcibiades assassinated. This measure has been attributed by some to the vengeance of Agis: whose bed, it is said, Alcibiades had dishonored, and whose queen is reported to have been so shameless, as to boast of her connection with the greatest and handsomest man of the age. Others have ascribed it to the revenge of the queen herself, for a silly declaration of Alcibiades, if he really made it, that no inclination for her person, but meerly the vanity of giving a king to Sparta and an

IV.

heir to the race of Hercules, induced him to pay SECT. her any attention. The cotemporary historian mentions upon the occasion neither Agis nor the queen his expression rather goes to fix the crime upon the Spartan administration; and, tho the other stories possibly may have originated in that age, they bear much more the character of the taste of following times. Alcibiades however, whether informed of the design, or only suspicious of the Lacedæmonians, from acquaintance with their principles and consciousness of deserving their enmity, withdrew from their armament and took his residence with Tissaphernes.

He was not unprepared for the change. Uneasy, notwithstanding the favor he found and the attention paid him, in the dependent character of a stranger and a fugitive, it was his object to restore himself to his country, before that country was reduced so low as to be not worth returning to. With this view he had courted the satrap assiduously and successfully. Neither the interest of the Persian empire, nor the satrap's interest, were, any more than his own, the same with that of Lacedæmon or the Peloponnesian confederacy.

An opening therefore was not wanting, first for insinuations, and then for advice, that might set the satrap at variance with the Peloponnesians, and render Alcibiades not only agreeable but necessary to him. Tissaphernes, pressed for money, both by his court and by the expenses of his government, and at the same time desirous of amassing for himself, listened with ready attention to any suggestion of means to spare his treasury. Alcibiades told him, that the allowance of pay to 'the Peloponnesian forces was extravagant. The 'Athenians,' he said, ' long versed in naval affairs,

VOL. III.

42

CHAP.
XIX.

' and highly attentive to them, gave no more than half a drachma for daily pay to their seamen ; not,' as he pretended, from economical motives, or 'from any inability to afford more, but because they esteemed a larger pay disadvantageous to 'their service.' Tissaphernes approved the proposal for a reduction, but dreaded the discontent that would insue. Alcibiades assured him, that ⚫he need not apprehend it: a sum of money judiciously distributed among the commanders, would quiet all outcry; or, if there was a man among 'them not to be bought, it was only the Syracusan 'Hermocrates. Representations and remonstran

ces would probably be made: but they might ' easily be refuted; nor need the satrap give him'self any trouble about them; he would undertake 'to answer every argument and silence every cla" mor. The pretensions indeed of most of the "Grecian states were extravagant: that of the 'Chians, he would not scruple to tell them, was ' even impudent. The richest people of Greece, 'they were not contented with gaining independency at the expence of the blood and treasure of others, but expected to be paid for defending it. 'Nor were the less wealthy states, which had been ' tributary to Athens, more reasonable. Delivered from the burden of tribute, they now grudged an 'unbought service, to preserve the independency and immunity which had been freely given them.' Having thus persuaded the satrap that he could obviate clamor, Alcibiades undertook to conciliate favor to him, and excite zeal in his service: 'He 'would assert,' he said, that the pay hitherto "given was from the private income of the satrapy; 'that Tissaphernes was laboring to obtain an al'lowance from the royal revenue; and should it

IV.

Ch. 19. s.

be granted, whatever it might be, the whole SECT. 'should be distributed to the forces without re'serve.' Tissaphernes approved the proposal, and that reduction of pay, which has been already no- 3. of this ticed, with the insuing discontent, and at length, Hist, through the dexterity of Alcibiades, the compromise followed.

1. 8. c. 46.

Having thus gained the satrap's ear, and recommended himself to his confidence, Alcibiades proceeded to promote his own views at the expence of the most important interests of the Peloponnesian confederacy. 'He urged, that both the public in- Thucyd. 'terest of the Persian empire, and the private interest of the satrap, required, not speedy nor complete 'success to the Peloponnesian cause, but a protraction of the war that the Phenician squadron, which had been promised, ought not to be allowed to join the Peloponnesian fleet: that, for the same reason, to incourage reinforcement from Greece, by holding out the lure of Persian pay, was impolitic: that the king's interest clearly required a 'partition of power among the Greeks: the same 'state should not preponderate by land at the same ' time and by sea; but rather the Athenians should 'be supported in their wonted superiority on one ' element, and the Lacedæmonians on the other. • Thus it would always be in the king's power to 'hold the balance between them, or to employ one against the other, as he pleased. These being the principles that should regulate the politics of Persia toward Greece, it followed that the Athenians were the more commodious allies for the king; they had no landforce capable of coping with his landforce they were powerful and rich only by ' holding other states in subjection; and, through their fear of revolts and of forein interference,

6