XIX.

HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAP. had been so rapid, so uninterrupted, so important, and so little expected, that he could not but have great present credit for it. But one powerful party in Lacedæmon was already hostile to him, and the moment his services ceased to be necessary, he would have to apprehend more jealousy than gratitude among the other. Moreover, with the insuing annual change of magistrates there, the ephor his friend would go out of office, and a new commander-in-chief would supersede Chalcideus ; whom his friend's interest, and perhaps his own recommendation, had raised to the command, and who seems to have acted in it constantly under his influence. His next measure accordingly seems to show a purpose adverse to the interest of those in whose service he was ingaged. Having, together with Chalcideus, pursued Strombichides as far as Samos, they proceeded to Chios, where they completely changed their crews, putting the Peloponnesians ashore, to act as heavy-armed infantry in the guard of the iland, and taking Chian seamen in their room. The pretended purpose was to give security to the aristocratical party in Chios, against the democratical, who were less satisfied with the late change. But Alcibiades had evidently other views. In persuading the Ionian cities to revolt from Athens, it was his purpose to attach them as much as possible to himself, and as little as possible to Lacedæmon: an Ionian force would be more manageable in his hands than a Peloponnesian; and with an Ionian force he might accomplish what a Peloponnesian would prevent. Ostensibly, however, he was still the most zealous as well as the ablest promoter of the Lacedæmonian interest. Thrasycles, with his squadron of twelve triremes from Attica, had joined Strombichides at

Samos. Apprehensive for Miletus, they hastened SECT. their course thither. But Alcibiades was so secret II. and so rapid in his measures, that, when they anchored off the iland of Ladë, at the mouth of the harbor, he was already received into the city, and his friends were in possession of the government.

A new event in Grecian politics followed; a treaty of alliance between Tissaphernes, in the name of the Persian monarch, and Chalcideus, in that of the Lacedæmonian republic. The terms of this treaty were perfectly accommodated to promote the purposes of Alcibiades, but not at all honorable to Lacedæmon or to Chalcideus. By the first article a most dangerous concession was made to Persia; for it was declared in general terms, that all the country and all the cities which Thucyd. 'had belonged to the predecessors of the king, 'should belong to the king.' It was then added, 'that the king, with the Lacedæmonians and their 'allies, should in common prevent the accruing of

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any revenue, and of any advantage whatsoever, 'from those cities to the Athenians; that the king, with the Lacedæmonians and their allies, 'should carry on war against the Athenians in common; that neither party should make peace 'without the other; that if any subjects of the king should revolt, they should be held as ene'mies by the Lacedæmonians; and that equally if 6 any allies of the Lacedæmonians should revolt,' (for by that term the renunciation of alliance with the leading state was described) they should be 'held as enemies by the king.'

1. 8. c. 18.

XIX.

SECTION III.

Progress of Revolt against Athens: Exertions of Athens. Siege of Chios. Battle of Miletus. Service of the Peloponnesian Armament to the Satrap of Caria. Spartan Officers, with the Title of Harmost, placed in the Cities of the Confederacy. Dissatisfaction of the Peloponnesians with the Satrap. Operations of the adverse Armaments, and Intrigues among the Asiatic Cities. Change in the Administration of Sparta. Commissioners, sent from Sparta to Ionia, refuse to confirm the Treaty with the Satrap. Revolt of Rhodes to the Peloponnesian Confederacy.

CHAP. THE riches of Persia being thus by treaty ingaged to assist the military force of the Peloponnesian Ol. 91. 4. confederacy, the power collected against the totterB.C.412. ing dominion of Athens might seem more than P. W. 20. sufficient to insure its almost instant downfall.

92. 1.

Thucyd.

1. 8. c. 19.

c. 22.

But party divisions and constitutional sluggishness prevailed in Lacedæmon, and the opposite interests of different commonwealths impeded every measure of the confederacy; while, the pressure of extreme danger inforcing unanimity in the Athenian councils, such was the energy of the administration, and such still the resources of the commonwealth, that Athens was already again approaching to a superiority at sea.

Diomedon, conducting from Attica a reinforcement of sixteen ships to the fleet on the Asiatic station, took four Chian triremes, from which however the crews escaped. The Peloponnesians and their allies meanwhile obtained the more important advantage of ingaging in revolt the towns of Lebedus and Eræ on the continent, and afterward the city of Methymnë in Lesbos, the only one of the iland remaining to Athens. But that wretched system of Grecian policy, which, equally under Lacedæmonian as under Athenian supre

1

III.

1. 8. c. 21.

macy, kept the higher and the lower people every, SECT. where at perpetual enmity, afforded opportunity for the Athenians, the moment they could show a force at sea, to give a turn, in all maritime cities, in favor of the democratical interest. Diomedon therefore, proceeding to Teos, where the democratical interest was strong, recovered that city to Thucyd. the Athenian alliance. Meanwhile the body of the higher people of Samos, more depressed than all others since their reduction on their former revolt, were proposing to seize the opportunity that seemed to offer, through the prevalence of the Peloponnesian arms, for mending their condition. The lower people, having intelligence of the design, rose upon them, and, with the assistance of the crews of three Athenian triremes then at Samos, overpowered them, put to death two hundred, and driving about four hundred more to seek their personal safety by flight, shared among themselves the property of all. Nothing could insure to Athens the dominion of that valuable iland equally with this measure, at which humanity shudders. But indignation will rise higher at the following conduct of Athens. The massacre and robbery were rewarded by a decree of the Athenian people, granting to the perpetrators the independent administration of the affairs of their iland, which, since the last rebellion, had been kept under the immediate control of the Athenian government.

While success was thus beginning to shine again upon the Athenians, on the eastern side of the Ægean, they met with an unexpected reverse nearer home. The Peloponnesian ships in the c. 20. Corinthian Peiræus, to the number of twenty, making a sudden attack upon an Athenian squadron of equal force watching them, gained the

HISTORY OF GREECE.

CHAP. victory and took four ships.

XIX.

1. 8. c. 24.

Astyochus was then sent from Lacedæmon to conduct the victorious squadron to Asia, there to assume the command in chief of the fleet.

The exertions of the Athenian government nevertheless continued to be efficacious. Leon, bringThucyd. ing from Attica a fresh reinforcement of ten ships, proceeded with Diomedon to Lesbos; and, tho Astyochus arrived in time to interfere, yet by their able management, with the coöperation of the de-mocratical party, they recovered the whole of that important iland. They proceeded to Clazomena on the continent, and that city also renewed its connection with Athens. Such, in short, had been the energy of the Athenian administration, and such the supineness of the Peloponnesians, that the Athenian fleet in the Asiatic seas could now be divided and yet everywhere superior. The squadron of twenty triremes under Thrasycles and Strombichides had not moved from Ladë, but watched there for an opportunity of advantage. Making a descent on the Milesian lands, they defeated the troops which, under Chalcideus, the Lacedæmonian commander-in-chief, marched out against them, and Chalcideus himself was killed; but their force was insufficient for any attempt against the town of Miletus.

Naval superiority however being recovered, it was determined to carry on operations against Chios, with a view to the reduction of the iland; and the Chians had the mortification to find, contrary not only to their own expectation but that of all Greece, that their revolt had been determined on without due precaution and just foresight. Till the present conjuncture, the affairs of Chios had long been managed with a steddy prudence, uncommon among the