I. extent of the scene of action, would make attention SECT. to the revenue more than ever necessary; and thus again a new interest was created, intimately connected with that which led the kings to desire war always rather than peace, and any residence rather than that of Sparta. Through the business of the revenue, the leading men at home might have an interest in yielding to the king's wish for forein command; and hence the influence of the king, Thucyd. tho at a distance, might keep together a party in Lacedæmon. Agis in his command at Deceleia did not neglect this policy. 1.8. c. 3. The Lacedæmonian government now, with se- Ibid. rious earnestness, applied themselves to what had been their professed purpose at the beginning of the war, the acquisition of a fleet to rival that of Athens. The project, then wild, was become at length practicable. Instead of five hundred triremes, originally proposed, one hundred were now required of the confederacy. The Lacedæmonians themselves undertook for twenty-five. An equal number was appointed to Boeotia, fifteen only to Corinth, fifteen to Locris and Phocis, ten to Arcadia with Pallenë and Sicyon, and ten to Megara, Træzen, Epidaurus, and Hermione. Agis was directed to collect the contributions for the purpose from the northern states. Accordingly, with such an escort as he judged sufficient, he marched from Deceleia about the beginning of November; and after receiving what had been assessed upon the friendly, he proceeded to increase the sum by taking from the hostile. Turning toward the Malian bay, he carried off considerable booty from the Etæan valleys; and then, advancing still northward, he compelled the Phthiot Achaians, with some other tribes subject to the Thessalians, in de- c. 4. 38 VOL. III. CHAP. fiance of the resentment of that people, to deliver hostages and pay contributions. XIX. Meanwhile the Athenians, recovered in some degree from the first emotions of grief and alarm, and submitting themselves to able guidance, were taking measures, suited to their reduced circumstances, for resisting the impending storm. Their first diligence was directed to the collection of naval stores, and the building of ships; for on the possession of a powerful fleet every thing depended. Their next care was to increase the security of vessels passing between Euboea and Athens; for without free communication with Euboea, the city could not easily be subsisted. With this view therefore a fort was erected on the promontory of Sunium. Thus, but especially in the renovation of the fleet, a large but indispensable expence would be incurred, which would inforce the necessity of parsimony in matters of inferior moment. The garrison was therefore withdrawn from that post in Laconia which had been occupied by Demosthenes in his way to Sicily, and measures were taken to reduce unnecessary expences, and establish exact economy in public Thucyd. affairs. Thus, says the cotemporary historian, in 1.8. c. 5. the close of the nineteenth year of the war, preparations were making on both sides, as if war was just then beginning. But it was not possible for any prudence, among the Athenians, to prevent that consequence of their late misfortune, which they most apprehended and their enemies most hoped, the defection of their allies and the revolt of their subjects. The Eubœans, whose country was so important to Athens, that a better government would never have left it in the situation of a subject-state, but would have I. given its people one interest with themselves, were SECT. foremost to take measures for breaking their dependency. The residence of the Lacedæmonian king in their neighborhood offered new opportunity for the intrigues of the discontented: the consideration of the force that he could command from the surrounding states, in addition to that constantly under his orders, gave large incouragement; and, soon after the arrival of the news of the Sicilian defeat, a proposal was communicated to Agis from a strong party in Euboea, to bring over the whole iland to the Lacedæmonian con federacy. Agis gave assurances that the force under his command should be employed in their favor, and in communicating the project to the Lacedæmonian administration, he used his interest to promote their cause. But the cautious government of Lacedæmon, tho unwilling to reject so advantageous a proposal, was nevertheless little disposed to any spirited exertion for assisting it. Three hundred only of those called neodamodes, newly-admitted citizens, were granted for the service; who, under the command of Alcamenes, marched into Attica. Agis was taking measures for transporting this body into Euboea, when a deputation from Lesbos, also proposing revolt, reduced him to difficulty. His desire coïncided with the wishes both of the Euboeans and the Lesbians; but neither people could effect their purpose without assistance, and he was unable to give it at the same time to both. He was already ingaged to the Euboeans; and their extensive country, almost adjoining to the coast of Boeotia, whether as loss to Athens, or gain to the Peloponnesian confederacy, was far more important than the smaller iland of Lesbos, on the XIX. CHAP. other side of the gean. But the Boeotians, the most powerful of the allies of Lacedæmon, had a strong partiality for the Lesbians, whom, as of Æolian race, they considered as kinsmen; while the Lesbians, tho connected by no political interest, revered the Boeotians as the chiefs of their blood. Agis, whether considering the interest of Lacedæmon or his own interest, desirous of gratifying the Boeotians, resolved to postpone the business of Euboea to that of Lesbos. Accordingly, without any communication with Lacedæmon, he ordered Alcamenes to conduct to Lesbos that very force, which had been sent by the Lacedæmonian government for the express purpose of assisting the revolt in Eubœa. SECTION II. New Implication of Grecian and Persian Interests. Death of Arta xerxes, and Succession of Darius II. to the Persian Throne. Effect Isthmian Athenians in the Saronic Gulph. Nor all the sounding vaunts and ingenious pane- historian's simple narrative of the consequences of the Athenian defeat in Sicily. That event in the west presently set the east in motion, and the affairs of Greece became in a new way implicated with those of Persia. Darius had succeeded his farther Artaxerxes in the throne. Artaxerxes, tho an able prince, and interrupted by no considerable forein wars, had exerted himself, through a long reign, with very incomplete success, to restore vigor to the unwieldy mass of the empire. While his cares were employed in composing the disorders, which troubles, preceding his accession, had produced in the central parts, the connection with the distant provinces remained loose and imperfect; insomuch that, independently of any effort of the satraps for the purpose, a more independent power accrued to them, than could consist with the good government of the whole. Thus, upon the appointment of Tissaphernes to the satrapy of Caria, Amorges, natural son of the late satrap Pissuthnes, was incouraged to revolt; not perhaps in professed opposition to the soverein of the empire, but to the new satrap only. Regardless, however, of the mandates of the prince, and in defiance of the arms of his officers, he maintained himself in the Carian mountains. But the wants of the Persian government pressed upon those to whom its powers were delegated, in proportion as its weakness incouraged opposition to them. The satraps were required to remit from their provinces, not only the accruing tributes, but the arrears. From the time of the victories of Cimon, most of the Grecian towns in Asia had been tributary to Athens, and many of them since those of Xanthippus and Leotychidas. The jealousy of the Athenian government allowed few to SECT. II. |