III. garrisoned and well provided, and the whole SECT. strength of Boeotia prepared to oppose him. It appeared afterward that not only the design had been betrayed to the enemy, but through mistake of the day on which it was to be executed, Hippocrates had not moved from Athens to make the expected diversion in the east of Boeotia. To attempt anything at Siphæ therefore appearing useless, Demosthenes, after an unsuccessful de- Thucyd. scent upon the Sicyonian coast, reconducted his 1.4. c. 101. armament to Naupactus. The Boeotians, in giving security to Siphæ, c. 90. seem not to have been aware of what was intended against the opposite side of their country. Hippocrates therefore, marching with the whole force of Attica, citizens, metics, and foreiners, to Delium, on what he conceived to be the appointed day, found nothing there to oppose him. The object was to fortify the post in all haste, so as to render it tenable by a garrison.. A ditch was therefore excavated, and a wall of earth raised, with wooden towers at intervals. The antient manner of fortification requiring height and perpendicularity, the wall was strengthened with piles, formed of the timbers of some neighboring houses, and faced with interwoven vine-branches, cut near the spot. The work was begun on the morning of the third day after the army marched 4 —Αθηναίους πανδημεί, αὐτὸς, καὶ τὰς μετοίκους καὶ ξένων ὅσοι wapnav-Omni Atheniensium populo, civibus, incolis et peregrinis quotquot aderant. Duker. The whole force of Athens, as well citizens as sojourners, not excepting even the foreiners who chanced at that time to be there. Smith. These translations are not satisfactory; and we find no assistance from notes. The precise distinction, however, between péroixos and gévos, tho we should be glad to know what it was. is not particularly important here. VOL. III. XVI. CHAP. from Athens; and being nearly finished by noon of the fifth, the general then ordered the army to move homeward, while he should give final directions to the garrison, for the disposition of their guards and the completion of the works. The irregulars and all the light-troops immediately pressed their march the heavy-armed halted, a little more than a mile from the place, to wait for the general. Thucyd. 1. 4. c. 91. c. 93. c. 96. In consequence, meanwhile, of intelligence communicated through Boeotia, the forces of all the towns of the province had been assembled, under the eleven Bootarcs, at Tanagra. There information came to them that the Athenian army had begun its march homeward; upon which a council of war was held, and the majority determined not to seek a battle. Pagondas, however, one of the two Theban Bootarcs, whose turn of command it was for the day, dissatisfied with the determination of the council, addressed his eloquence to the troops, and so efficaciously, that he excited a general ardor for ingaging. Having thus provided for obedience to his orders, in opposition to his collegues in office, tho it was already late in the day, he would not lose the opportunity, but immediately led the army against the Athenians. Where an intervening hill prevented them from seeing him, while the distance was small, he halted to form his order of battle; and then marching up the hill, rested upon the top. Hippocrates was yet at Delium, when information was brought of the unexpected approach of the Baotians. Leaving a body of three hundred horse, who attended him, to watch an opportunity for attacking the enemy in the rear, he proceeded himself with all speed to join the main body of III. his army. When he arrived it was already formed SECT. for action. He rode along the line, making a short speech of incouragement; but scarcely had reached the center when the Baotians moved down the hill, giving the shout of battle. Upon this he ordered immediately to advance, according to the usual practice of the age, it being esteemed disadvantageous to remain stationary and receive the onset. 1. 4. c. 94. The heavy foot on each side were about six thousand. The Baotians had, besides, a thousand horse, five hundred targeteers, and above ten thousand light-armed. The Athenian light-armed, Thucyd. whose march, it appears, had been stopped in time, were more numerous, but less disciplined and worse appointed, the regular light-troops of the republic being mostly on forein service. The Thebans of the Baotian army, if we may trust and can understand our copies of Thucydides, were formed no less than twenty-five deep; the other Boeotians variously, according to the practice of the several towns, or the opinions of the commanders. The Athenian army was disposed in files of eight The horse of both armies were placed in the wings. The extremes, however, of neither could come into action, being prevented by the intervention of deep water-gullies. The field was well disputed between the rest; in action so close, that they joined opposing shields; and where weapons could not avail against the compact arrangement of defensive armor, they endevored to break each other's line by force of pushing. With their right wing the Athenians obtained the advantage, so that the extremity of the enemy's left retreated toward their own right. Next in the Boeotian line to the troops which gave way, were the Thespians, XVI. CHAP. whose left flank being thus exposed, they were surrounded, and suffered greatly. But in this evolution the conquerors fell into disorder, and, meeting in action, ingaged one another. Meanwhile Pagondas, with the Thebans, in the right of the Boeotian line, was gaining advantage against the Athenian left. Information reaching him of the distress of his own left, he sent two squadrons of horse around the hill, who came unawares upon the victorious wing of the Athenians, while they were yet in the confusion which they had themselves created. Panic seized them, and they fled: the rest of their line, already severely pressed, finding themselves thus deserted, quickly joined in the flight, and the rout became complete some made toward Delium, some to the port of Oropus, some to mount Parnes, others variously as hope of safety pointed the way. Plat. Laches, p. 181. t. 2. & Con viv. p. 221. 1. 3. Plut. vit. A reinforcement of Locrian troops joined the Boeotian army in the moment of victory. Being comparatively fresh, they undertook pursuit, together with the Baotian cavalry; and the event would have been very fatal to the Athenians, if approaching night had not favored their escape. It was upon this occasion that the philosopher Socrates, who served among the Athenian infantry, pressed by the pursuing enemy, was in imminent danger of being put to the sword, when his pupil Alcibiades, coming up with a body of cavalry, gave such effectual protection, that Socrates, with those about him, made good their retreat. Near a thou 5 Δύω Τέλη. 6 Strabo relates that Socrates saved his pupil Xenophon in this battle. Athenæus, as is observed by Casaubon, in his note on the passage, has shown that this could not be, (Athen. 1. 5. c. 15.) and he deduces his proof from Plato. Yet Barthelemi, in his Anacharsis, not only tells the story from Strabo, but has been so careless as to refer to Plato for authority for it. In the passage of Plato to which he refers) Conviv. p. 221. t. 3.) not a syllable is to be found to the purpose. III. 4. c. 101, sand, however, of the Athenian heavy-armed fell, SECT. with Hippocrates, the commanding general, and a much greater number of the light-armed and irre- Thucyd.1. gulars. When pursuit had been pushed as far as circumstances would permit, Pagondas raised his trophy, collected the spoil, and, leaving a strong c. 97. guard over the enemy's dead, retired with the main body of his army to Tanagra. Next day a herald was sent by the surviving commanders of the Athenian troops, to request the accustomed leave for burying the slain. On his way he met a Boeotian herald, who assured him that his labor would be vain, and that he would do best to accompany him back to the Athenian camp, whither he was going. The Athenian complied; and audience being given to the Baotian herald by the principal officers, he represented, that the 'Athenians had violated the common law of the Greeks, by which it was established, that, in any 'invasion of each other's territories, no temple 'should be profaned: that in fortifying Delium, 'they had made the sacred precinct a habitation for men, and whatever men usually do in a profane place was done there; particularly the water, 'which the Baotians had always held it unlawful 'for themselves to touch but for holy ablution", was drawn for all common uses: that the Boeotians therefore, in their own name and in that of the god, invoking the gods of the country and Apollo, ' warned them to quit the temple, and clear it of 'whatever belonged to them.' Amid the most serious political concerns, with the utmost disregard of all moral obligations, we find such matters of meer religious ceremony often deeply ingaging the 7 Πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ χέρνιθι χρῆσθαι. |