XVIII. CHAP. Commonwealth1. He had now determined, in consequence of his ill success in the late battle, to remain upon the defensive for the rest of the summer. For this he thought it necessary to apologize very particularly in his dispatches to Athens. He therefore committed them to officers whom he selected as most competent to answer any questions that might be put to them, yet he scrupulously protested that his written dispatches only should be consider-. ed as having his authority. Thucyd. 1. 7. c. 11. c. 12. In these he represented, that, After having nearly attained the object of the expedition, when Syracuse was already reduced to extremity, the ' arrival of Gylippus, with a considerable reinforcement, partly Peloponnesian and partly collected in Sicily, had changed the face of affairs: that he ' had nevertheless been victorious in the first action, 'but the superiority of the enemy in cavalry and troops of missile weapons, was, under able con'duct, too much for him to resist; and, in a second 'action, he had been constrained to retreat: that it ' was in consequence now become necessary to con'fine himself within his lines, to forego offensive operations, and to consult principally how he might best insure the safety of his army against superior numbers; for, instead of besieging, it ' was rather reduced to the condition of a camp besieged that the superiority of the Syracusan cavalry rendered any communication with the country highly dangerous: that, for increase of 'evil, he not only apprehended a strong alliance 'within Sicily against the Athenian interest, but ( was assured that additional forces would arrive 'from Peloponnesus; and that, finally, he was 18 Ο γραμματεὺς τῆς πόλεως. c. 10. V. 'threatened with attack, not by land only, but by SECT. sea. The fleet,' he proceeded to observe, 'had unavoidably gone fast to decay; the ships were 'become leaky; the crews diminished; the enemy ' had not only had more ships, but, secure against attack, they could chuse when they would attack ' him: it was therefore necessary for his fleet to be ' unremittingly watchful: the guard of the naval Thucyd. camp, and convoys for the introduction of provi'sions and stores, kept the whole on constant duty: the crews, forced to go far for wood and water, were continually suffering from the Syracusan 'horse. Meanwhile not only the slaves deserted ' in numbers to the enemy, but the auxiliaries and mercenaries, who had hoped that plunder more than fighting would be their business in Sicily, now they saw the Athenian armament declining, and the enemy growing in vigor, went home with'out leave. Sicily,' continued the unfortunate general, is wide; and, wholly to prevent these 'desertions, is impossible; even to check them is difficult; and of all losses to an armament, that ' of able seamen is least easily repaired. Nor are 'these the only evils that press us: what is to me 'most distressing, both to feel and to complain of, ' remains yet to be mentioned. Your temper, Athenians, is adverse to subordination. The army is ' a part of you; a part of that soverein people on 'whom my power wholly depends; and I find my authority insufficient to control the perverse disposition, and restrain the pernicious conduct, of 'some under my command. Meanwhile the enemy abound in resources, and we are destitute; for 'Naxus and Catana, our only allies in this part of 'the world, are little able to assist us. If then, in ' addition to existing evils, the Italian cities, whence 30 VOL. III. 1. 7. c. 13. c. 14. CHAP. Thucyd. 'our supplies of provisions have been principally drawn, should be induced, by the ill state of our 'affairs and your neglect of us, to refuse farther 'assistance, we should be at once undone, and the enemy would have a complete triumph without 'the risk of a blow. I could have sent a more pleasing account, 'but I could not send intelligence which it more imports you to receive. I know your disposition to be gratified by favorable reports of your 'affairs; but then I know too the change that follows in your temper, when the event disappoints expectation; and I have therefore thought it best to explain to you, without reserve, the 'real state of things. 6 Since, then, I can affirm that neither your 1. 7. c. 15. generals, nor your army, have deserved blame 'for their conduct in your service here, since Sicily is now united against us, and reinforcements are expected from Peloponnesus, I will ' venture to declare that it is become absolutely necessary for you to determine on one of two measures either your forces now here must be 'immediately recalled; or an additional armament, not inferior in either land or naval force to the former, must be sent hither: it must be 'here early in spring, and a large sum of money 'for its use will be indispensable. For myself, I request that I may be superseded in the com'mand, for which ill health disqualifies me; and I hope I may be allowed to claim this as an 'honorable indulgence due for my past services.' The Athenians were not yet practised enough in misfortune to listen to wise advice thwarting a favorite purpose. Ambition was a popular passion, not resting on incitement from Alcibiades. The V. 1. 7. c. 16. pertinacity indeed and the vehemence with which SECT. its objects were pursued, considered together with the near prospect of success, even under the disadvantage of his removal from the execution of the vast projects which he had conceived, may indeed afford no small amount of apology for his conduct in directing the effervescence, which apparently none could still. The Athenian people would not, on the remonstrances of Nicias, give Thucyd. up their views of conquest in Sicily: they would not even allow their infirm and deserving general to retire. An additional force was immediately voted; Nicias was required to remain with the command in chief; Menander and Euthydemus, officers now in Sicily, were appointed his present assistants in the duty: Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, who had already so much distinguished himself by important services, and Eurymedon son of Theocles, who had commanded at Corcyra, at Pylus, and in Sicily, were named to lead the reinforcement. As an earnest of the resolution of the Athenian people to give the utmost support to their friends in Sicily, Eurymedon was sent forward about midwinter, with ten triremes and twenty talents of silver, while Demosthenes remained to superintend the equipment of the rest of the armament. SECTION VI. Deceleia in Allica occupied by the Lacedæmonians. Fresh Reinforcements for the Athenian Armament in Sicily. Naval Action in the Tax upon the states Naval Action in the CHAP. WHILE the Athenians were thus madly intent upon XVIII. distant conquest, a more serious attack than they had yet experienced, was preparing against their own country. The success of Gylippus, the prospect of assistance from the whole force of Sicily, the evident embarrassment of Athens, the exhortations of Corinth, the advice of Alcibiades, and the important information and assistance which he was capable of giving, now all together determined the Lacedæmonians to recommence hostilities immediately against Athens. They were farther incouragThucyd. ed, says the historian, by the consideration that 1.7. c. 18. justice (not simple justice, or a due consideration of the rights of men, which Grecian religion little taught to regard, but justice ratified by a solemn appeal to the gods) was now on their side. Their misfortunes, in the latter years of hostility, had led them to reflect that the beginning of the war had, on their part, teemed with injustice, and breach of solemnly plighted faith. Such were the refusal to submit their disputes with Athens to a judicial determination; the support of the violence committed by the Thebans against Platea; and the first invasion of Attica. On the contrary, since the truce, the Athenians had always refused to submit matters in dispute to judicial inquiry, which the Lacedæmonians had frequently demanded. The same transgression, therefore, which they thought |