V. on the present occasion, it happened that before the SECT. armies met, the Mantineians, on the right of the Argian line, had considerably overstretched the Lacedæmonian left; and, on the other side, the Tegeans, on the right of the Lacedæmonian line (the Lacedæmonian front being of greater extent) had still more overstretched the Argian left. Agis, observing this, when the armies were only not ingaged, inconsiderately ordered a movement, with a view to remedy the inconvenience which he apprehended. The Skirite and Brasidian bands (by the latter name those soldiers were honorably distinguished who had fought under Brasidas in Thrace) forming the left of the Lacedæmonian line, were directed to break away from the main body, so far as to prevent the Mantineians from taking the army in flank; and two lochi of Lacedæmonians, under the polemarcs Hipponoïdas and Aristocles, were commanded, from another part, to fill the interval. The Skirites and Brasidians instantly obeyed: but Thucyd. Hipponoïdas and Aristocles, whether the enemy 1. 5. c. 72. were so near that it was impossible, or they thought the danger of the movement to the whole army would justify their disobedience, kept their former post. The Skirites and Brasidians therefore, being presently attacked by the whole force of the Mantineians, together with a thousand chosen Argians, were cut off from their main body, overpowered, compelled to retreat, and pursued to the baggage of their army. Meanwhile the rest of the line of the Lacedæmonians had everywhere the advantage, and particularly in the center, where Agis himself took post. The Argian center scarcely came to action with him, but fled the onset. The Athenians thus, who form- c. 73. ed the left of the confederate line, were completely HISTORY OF GREECE. CHAP. deserted; the center having fled, while the right XVII. was pursuing. Their total destruction must have Thucyd. 1. 5. c. 75. followed, but for the protection given to their retreat by their own cavalry, whose services on that day were eminent. Even thus, however, they. would scarcely have been inabled to save themselves, had not the defeat of the Skirites and Brasidians called the attention of the Lacedæmonian king. The victorious Mantineians, when they found the rest of their army defeated, avoided his attack by hasty retreat. Agis, true to the institutions of Lycurgus, pursued no farther than to make victory sure. The killed therefore were not numerous in proportion to the numbers ingaged and the completeness of the success: seven hundred Argians, two hundred Mantineians, and two hundred Athenians, among whom both the generals fell, are the numbers of the confederates reported by Thucydides. Of the Lacedæmonians about three hundred were killed, principally Brasidians and Skirites; and of the allies of Lacedæmon a very small number, as they were little ingaged. After collecting the spoil of the field and erecting their trophy, the Lacedæmonians carried their dead to Tegea, and intombed them ceremoniously. The enemy's dead were restored, on the usual application from the vanquished. The other Spartan king, Pleistoanax, had advanced as far as Tegea, with an army composed of Lacedæmonians above and under the age for forein service, to be ready in case of misfortune, to support Agis. Immediately upon receiving information of the victory, he returned; and at the same time messengers were dispatched to Corinth, and the more distant allies, to countermand the march of V. their troops. The victorious army, after paying SECT. honorable attendance upon the obsequies of the slain, returned home, and the great Doric festival of the Carneia, whose period was at hand, ingrossed the public attention. The event of this battle restored the Lacedæmonian character in Greece. The advantage of numbers, indeed, had been on the side of the Lacedæmonians; but the circumstances of the action proved their superiority in discipline, and in that valor which discipline infuses, by giving individuals to confide in the combined exertions of numbers with whom they act. This discipline in the soldier, we find, was, in the late battle, of efficacy even to counterbalance defective precaution and defective judgement in the general; while the want of it in the confederate army rendered superior abilities in the commanders of no effect12. The misfortunes, the misconduct, and the apparent slackness of the 12 Thus much may be gathered from Thucydides's account of the battle. But his opinion is farther delivered in a remark upon it, in a manner sufficiently intelligible, tho in cautious and rather obscure terms: 'Αλλὰ μάλισα δὴ κατὰ πάντα τῇ ἐμπειρίᾳ Λακεδαιμόνιοι ἐλασσωθέντες τότε, τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἔδειξαν οὐκ ἥσσον sprysvάuevo. Thucyd. 1. 5. c. 72. But on this occasion, more ' remarkably than ever, the Lacedæmonians, tho in all respects 'outdone in the military art, gave signal proofs of their supe'riority in true manly valor.' Thus Smith has translated, aiming to follow the letter, and certainly missing the sense. Thucydides could not mean here to speak disrespectfully of that military art and discipline of the Lacedæmonians, which, in the preface to his account of this very battle, he has taken occasion to describe, admirable in theory, and well supported by practice; and which, in his account of the battle itself, he shows to have been not less admirable in effect. Karà závra must have been intended to relate to the circumstances of the battle, and not to any circumstances of the military art; and by Euripia has been meant the experience and science of the general, and not the skill of the soldier. A strong sense of delicacy, not less a characteristic of Thucydides than his scrupulous impartiality, has apparently prevented him from expressing his opinion on this occasion more openly. XVII. CHAP. Lacedæmonians, in the course of the war with Athens, were in consequence no longer attributed to any degeneracy in the people, but to the mismanagement of leaders, and the chance of war: a contempt, which had been gaining, for the Spartan institutions and discipline, as if hitherto respected above their worth, was done away; and the Spartan character resumed its wonted superiority. Dodw. Ann. Thu. But the Carneian festival occupied the Lacedæmonians at a very inconvenient season for a military people. Regulated, as all the Grecian festivals, by the revolutions of the moon, it began this year about the seventh of August. Its principal ceremonies lasted nine days: but the whole month, named among the Dorian Greeks the Carneian, was, in a degree, dedicated to religious festivity. In the rude ages of the Heracleids and of Lycurgus, this check to military enterprize might be salutary: but in days of more refined and extensive policy, when wars, not of choice, but of political necessity, might be to be maintained against states capable of supporting lasting hostilities, such avocations should no longer have been allowed to interrupt public Thucyd. business. The Lacedæmonians were, however, so 1.4.c. 76. attached to their antient institutions, that, till the period of the Carneia was completed, no military operations were prosecuted for profiting from the victory of Mantineia. Soon after that event, the arrival of a thousand Athenian and three thousand Eleian heavy-armed to join the Argian army, inhanced the regret and indignation of all thinking men in the Argian confederacy, at that petulant impatience and unadvised rashness, inherent in democratical government, which had superinduced their defeat. So powerful a reinforcement, seconding superior abilities in V. the generals, could those abilities have been effect- SECT. ually exerted, might have given the advantage over the ill-directed discipline of the Lacedæmonians. Offensive operations were immediately resumed ; not indeed directly against Lacedæmon, but against their allies on the other side of the peninsula. The Epidaurians, objects hitherto of unjust ambition and oppressive policy, had now made themselves objects of revenge; entering the Argian territory, while its principal force was absent, wasted the country, and slaughtered the inferior troops appointed to its protection. The siege of Epidaurus was regularly formed, and while the Lacedæmonians were supinely intent upon their festival, a contravallation was completed. Winter then approaching, a sufficient force was appointed to guard the lines, and the rest of the troops dispersed to their several homes. SECTION VI. Change in the Administration of Argos: Peace and Alliance between Argos and Lacedæmon: Overthrow of the Athenian Influence, and of the Democratical Interest in Peloponnesus. Inertness of the Lacedæmonian Administration: Expulsion of the Oligarchal Party from Argos, and Renewal of Alliance between Argos and Athens. Siege of Melos by the Athenians: Fresh Instance of atrocious Inhumanity in the Athenians. Feeble Conduct of the Lacedæmonians : Distress of the Oligarchal Argians. Transactions in Thrace. Conclusion of the Sixteenth Year of the War. VI. SCARCELY any disaster could befall a Grecian com- SECT. monwealth that would not bring advantage to some considerable portion of its citizens. The unfortunate battle of Mantineia strengthened the oligarchal cause in Argos. The fear of such another blow, and of the usually dreadful consequences of un17 VOL. III. |