IV. dominion. The Argian administration accused the SECT. Athenian of contravening this article, by permitting the Lacedæmonians to pass by sea to Epidaurus. This may seem to have been dictated by Alcibiades, and to mark the extraordinary extent of his influence in Argos; for, under the semblance of a remonstrance, it was reälly an acknowlegement that the Grecian seas, even to the very shores of Peloponnesus, were the dominion of Athens. The reparation which they required for this injury would appear, in modern times, scarcely less extraordinary than the accusation: it was, that the Athenians should withdraw the Athenian garrison from Pylus, and replace there the Messenians and Helots who had been removed to Cephallenia. Apparently this requisition was concerted with Alcibiades, or perhaps suggested by him; for he was the mover of the measures which followed in Athens. A decree of the people directed, that, on the column on which was ingraved the late treaty with Lacedæmon, a clause should be added, declaring that the Lacedæmonians had broken the treaty. This being taken as the ground, it was then commanded, by the same decree, that the Messenians and Helots, lately removed to Cranë in Cephallenia, should be reëstablished in Pylus. In the course of the winter many skirmishes passed between the Argians and the Epidaurians, but no important action; and an attempt toward spring, to take Epidaurus by escalade, failed. XVII. 1. 5. c. 17. SECTION V. War of Lacedæmon and Argos: Battle near Mantineia: Siege of CHAP. THE Lacedæmonians could not, without extreme uneasiness, consider the present state of things in Thucyd. Peloponnesus, not only as their own command and influence were diminished, but as what they had lost had accrued to their rivals of Athens and ArB.C. 418. gos. By midsummer of this year, the continued Ol. 90.3. pressure of the Argian arms, however defectively P. W. 14. conducted, had reduced the Epidaurians, old and still faithful allies of Lacedæmon, to great distress. Some effort must be made, or all command and influence in Peloponnesus, beyond their own territory, would be gone. It was only to sound the trumpet, and the whole Lacedæmonian people were at any time assembled, ready for service. The allies yet remaining to the state were summoned; and the Lacedæmonian army, strengthened with the greatest force of Helots that could be trusted, marched under the command of king Agis. They were presently joined by the Tegeans, and all those other Arcadians who had not, with the Mantineians, renounced the Lacedæmonian alliance: Phlius was the appointed place of junction for the allies, equally those within and those without Peloponnesus. No less than five thousand heavy-armed, as many light, and five hundred horse, with a foot-soldier attending every horseman, marched from Boeotia'; Corinth sent two thousand heavy-armed; Sicyon, Pal 7 What those attending foot-soldiers were, whom Thucydides distinguishes by the name of autos, we are informed only by late writers, whose authority seems very doubtful. lenë, Epidaurus, and Megara, all they could spare, and the Phliasians were prepared to join with their whole strength. SECT. V. 1.5. c. 58. The Argians, quickly informed of these move- Thucyd. ments, dispatched to their allies urgent requisitions of assistance. Accordingly the Mantineians joined them with their whole force, the amount of which Thucydides does not specify the Eleians sent three thousand heavy-armed. Thus in consequence of the successful treachery of Alcibiades, Peloponnesus was divided at arms within itself; while Athens, preparing indeed assistance for her ally, but risking little, looked on, and injoyed the storm. The Argians, being joined by the Mantineians and Eleians, proposed to prevent the junction of the Lacedæmonians with their northern allies; and with that view took a position near Methydrium in Arcadia. It was evening when Agis incamped on a hill overagainst them, as if intending to ingage next morning; but moving silently in the night, he passed on unperceived so as to secure his way to Phlius. The Argians had then to expect the invasion of their country by the whole combined force of the enemy. To prevent this, they moved to a position on the road of Nemea; the only way by which a numerous army could conveniently pass the mountains, which divide Argolis from Phliasia and Corinthia. Agis, by apparently a very able disposition, rendered this measure fruitless. Leading the Lacedæmonians by a rough and difficult mountain-road, he entered the Argian plain unopposed, and placed himself between the Argian army and Argos. The Corinthians, Phliasians, and Pallenians, by another road, also difficult and CHAP. little practised, entered another part of the plain, XVII. equally unresisted. The Boeotians, Megarians, and Sicyonians only were sent by the Nemean road, with orders to avoid ingaging, unless the enemy should move against either of the divisions in the plain. In that case the Boeotian horse, more numerous than that of the enemy, if indeed the enemy had any, might find opportunity to attack with advantage. These well-judged movements being all successfully executed, the Argian army was surrounded by a force so superior, that its destruction seemed inevitable. Thrasyllus, one of the five generals of Argos, saw the peril of his situation: he communicated upon it with Alciphron, an Argian of rank, connected by hospitality with Lacedæmon, and they determined together upon a measure which would appear very extraordinary in itself, and scarcely credible in its success, if we were not already somewhat familiarized with Grecian politics. They went privately to Agis, and, pledging 1. 5. c. 60. themselves to lead their state to alliance with Thucyd. Lacedæmon, upon terms that should be satisfactory, they prevailed with him to grant upon the spot, of his sole authority, a truce for four months; and, to the astonishment of the Lacedæmonian army, orders were immediately issued for retreat. By this negotiation, fortunate as it was bold, Thrasyllus and Alciphron hoped to acquire such favor among the Argian people as might inable them to promote at the same time their two objects, the oligarchal interest and the Lacedæmonian alliance. They were, however, utterly disappointed. The Argian people, and even their commanders, totally unpractised in war upon any extensive scale, were so unaware of the danger from which they had V. been rescued, that they imagined they had been SECT. deprived of a most favorable opportunity for crushing the Lacedæmonians; inclosed, they imagined inadvertently, between the allied army and the garrison of Argos. The public indignation, stimulated apparently by the democratical leaders, rose so high, that Thrasyllus saved his life only through the protection of an altar to which he fled, and a decree of the people declared all his property confiscated. 1.5. c. 61. 11th July. Presently after the retreat of the Lacedæmonians, Thucyd. the auxiliary force from Athens arrived at Argos; a thousand Athenian heavy-armed and three hundred horse, commanded by Laches and Nicostratus. The oligarchal party in Argos, tho unable to protect After Thrasyllus against the momentary rage of the people, were nevertheless strong; and they would immediately have dismissed the Athenian forces, as no longer wanted in Peloponnesus for any purpose of the confederacy. But Alcibiades was too watchful a politician to suffer his purposes to be so baffled, and the important alliance of Argos to pass from him. Quickly informed of all circumstances, he went to Argos in quality of ambassador, and, in conjunction with the two generals, demanded an audience of the Argian people. The oligarchal Argians very unwillingly consented, and not without a degree of compulsion from their Mantineian and Eleian allies, who were still present. The eloquence of Alcibiades then prevailed. The Argian people felt his reproaches for breach of faith with Athens, gave credit to his representations of the strength of the confederacy, and of the circumstances now peculiarly favorable for prosecuting the war; and, a proposal being suggested for striking an important stroke with little risk, it was summarily resolved upon. Hostages had been taken by |