not merely fine conceptions, but beauty of detail, the usual defect in a country which does not realize that all the noble buildings of Europe took decades, and even generations, for their accomplishment. The head architect (how one would delight in filling such a place and securing the immortality of a Michael Angelo, an Erwin of Steinbach, or a Bramante!) should, of course, have an absolutely free hand, and there should be no idea of completing the buildings before 1920 at the earliest. Immense strength for the resistance of earthquakes should be an element, and shady cloisters for a sunny clime should be another. A modification either of Spanish architecture or of the finest Romanesque of North Italy would seem to be most suitable; but there should, we think, be some variety of type within the enclosure. Why not, indeed, employ different architects, each of whom should work out his own design, but in subordination to a grand and harmonious whole? But the scheme may be marred on its intellectual, or, to be more accurate, on its spiritual, side. Institutions of great worth are not brought into being by the fiat of wealth or the decisions of a committee; they are the product of ages. There is nothing of value in the world that is not of slow growth, adapting itself, bit by bit, to new needs. "Raw haste, half-sister to delay," is the curse of our time, the curse of new countries, and it is especially fatal to the proper growth of a great seat of learning. Let the University of California grow naturally, we would therefore say; let no hard scheme be devised. Wise management and lavish expenditure may accomplish much in a comparatively brief time, as we see in the case of the University of Berlin, which, founded so recently as 1809, is now the greatest seat of learning in Europe. But then Berlin was initiated by a King, who had behind him scholars almost unrivalled in the world of learning, and California cannot boast a Fichte or Wilhelm von Humboldt. Once more, let not the "city of learning" be a mere busy hive of specializing, a mere collection of intellectual Gradgrins intent on collecting facts. The great universities of the Middle Ages were bent on real culture, on the training of the will, the intellect, the affections; their scholarship was related to life, as was that of the schools of Athens in their best days. What the modern world most needs is the systematizing of the vast body of knowledge we possess, and the utilizing it for the highest public life and the noblest spiritual ends. We do not need to add to the number of mere mathematicians, mere logicians, mere philologists, mere engineers, mere anatomists; we have enough, and perhaps to spare, of all these. What the world needs is a lofty and rounded type of character, an original intellect, a larger and higher personality, which shall guide and elevate this weltering mass of democracy, so low in its aims, so helpless in its outlook. If the "city of learning" can do that for us, who will not be eager to take a ticket thither on the first opportunity? developments which must necessarily affect all Europe, change the political centre of gravity, and produce serious international complications. The Habsburg monarchy seems to be on the verge of some such change just now, in fact certain of its most influential ethnographical elements are already taking measures to prepare for the eventuality. To-day it is a dual State, and is officially known as Austria-Hungary. To-morrow, however, it may become Austria-HungaryBohemia. At present the Empire is, politically speaking, German, in virtue of the law of vis inertia, and it forms the corner-stone of the Triple Alliance. In a short time its sympathies may become Slav and its foreign policy philo-Russian. This, however, is but one of a series of possibilities, the realization of any one of which would be equally fraught with the gravest consequences. The Empire owes its greatness—nay, its existence to the ruin of a number of other States, some of which once played a conspicuous and even glorious part in European history, just as the detrital rock known as pudding-stone is composed of the water-worn débris of other rocks which once had an independent existence of their own. The delusion which the main component elements of Austria seem to labor under, is that all the pebbles and cobbles can be removed from this political pudding-stone without affecting its character; and the danger they incur lies in their strenuous and persevering endeavor to act upon this delusion. This is the Austro-Hungarian problem in a nutshell. Home rule was conceded to Hungary in 1867; why not, they ask, extend it to Bohemia in 1898, and replace centralization with federation? Such is the question in its simplest form. The answers are numerous. Two, however, will amply suffice for the moment. The experiment is dangerous because the change to federation necessarily involves a number of other changes so far-reaching that they must inevitably affect foreign States and provoke their interference. The second reason is equally cogent: were it feasible to steer clear of international troubles, it would still be impossible to avoid civil war, for such is the peculiar ethnographical mixture which we see in Austria, that no scheme of federation can possibly be devised which would not constitute a fla grant violation of the rights of one or more of the nationalities within the monarchy itself. And heretofore this peculiarity has always been looked upon as a guarantee for the durability of the present arrangement. If the members of each different race were massed together in one district, the problem would be considerably simplified. But this is very far from being the case. The territory of each is dotted over with large ethnographical islands formed by rival races, as, for instance, Bohemia with German settlements; or else a people of the same stock is split up into tribes possessing different languages or dialects, different alphabets, different histories, and different religions. This is the weak point of the Slavs. They are racially split up and geographically scattered. We are wont to label them all with one name, which warrants the belief that they are one people. But the name is a misnomer and the belief a mistake. In a matter of this kind statistics are extremely misleading. Let us say, for instance- and the statement is quite correct-that there are nearly fifteen millions of Slavs in Austria proper,* as against eight and three-quarter million Germans. What is more natural than to conclude that, as the Slavs outnumber the Germans in the proportion of nearly two to one, they should likewise enjoy a corresponding degree of political influence? Or, put it in another form: if it be meet and just that the Magyarst should be allowed to rule a country containing seventeen and a half million persons, wherein they themselves number only seven and a half millions, why should it not be equally-nay, much just that the Slavs should govern Austria, seeing that, out of a population of twenty-eight and three-quarter millions they number fourteen and threequarter millions? more The fact is that the unity of the Slavs is hardly more than an ethnographical abstraction. For political purposes it is non-existent. Thus the Poles are not Czechs, § although both are Slavs; they * The exact number is 14,805,000. In the Austro-Hungarian Empire there are 211⁄2 million Slavs who do not control the destinies of the monarchy, as against 16 million Germans and Magyars who do. † In exact numbers 8,840,000. speak different tongues, the former possessing a rich literature, the latter a very poor one; their political history has little in common, and as late as four years ago the Poles were allied with the Germans against their brothers, the Czechs.* The Ruthenians, who are also Slavs, have no great love for the Czechs, while they utterly loathe the Poles, and their language is very different indeed from that of either of the other two peoples, as are also their alphabet (they use Russian characters) and their religion. The Czech idiom is to the Ruthenian as German is to the English, or as French is to the Roumanian. Then come the Croatians, who are not only Slavs, but the very purest specimens of the race; and they would feel mortally offended if they were confounded with any of the foregoing. The Slovenians, whose very name proclaims them to be Slavs, would be less wrathful at such a mistake, probably because their very backward state of civilization would lead them to regard it as a compliment. But they differ in many respects from Czechs, Poles, Ruthenians, and Croatians. Nothing, however, could characterize the situation more satisfactorily than the circumstance that, whenever a Panslavonic Conference is convoked, the chosen representatives of the various Slavic sections are forced to converse with each other in German! Thus the Slavs of Austria-Hungary are not united by the bond of religion, history, language, literature, or identical political aspirations. Even at the present Even at the present moment the Polish Slavs in Austria persecute their brethren, the Ruthenians, quite as ruthlessly as the Russians used to persecute the Poles. The peoples already mentioned by no means exhaust the list of ethnographical fragments in Austria-Hungary. There are about three million Roumanians, almost a million and a half Slovenians, two million Jews, and nearly three-quarters of a million Italians, etc., etc. they intersect each other everywhere. The Germans are settled in Transylvania among the Hungarians, in Moravia, in Bohemia, and in Silesia among the And *The Slavonic inhabitants of Bohemia. They form roughly about three-fifths of the population of that country. The Germans constitute the other two-fifths. The word is pronounced almost identically with the English word "checks." Slavs; the Czechs are invading Austria, and are particularly numerous in Vienna; while the Jews are migrating to Bosnia. When we say, therefore, that the Germans of Austria or the Magyars of Hungary are in a minority, we are comparing them not with one race but with various races, and the conclusion we draw is false. The Germans possess a relative majority in Austria just as the Magyars do in Hungary; and that is an essential point. Now, complicated as the problem already is, it would be relatively simple if political parties ran parallel with these national fragments. But this is very far from being the case. It by no means follows that because a man is a Czech he is also a partisan of Federalism and a hater of the Germans. He may be a Clerical, or he may be a Social-Democrat. In like manner, a German may be an enemy of the German party because he happens to be a Conservative, a Clerical, or an anti-Semite. The Serbs and Croatians are not only one and the same race, but they speak the same language; yet they hate each other because they are members of different churches. Germans, as we saw, instead of presenting a united front to the enemy, are split up into half a dozen political factions who breathe fire and flame against one another. And so on to the end of the chapter; the threads become hopelessly entangled and confusion worse confounded. The The one centripetal force in the Empire is the Emperor, Francis Joseph, who enjoys the affection of all parties in the State. The magic of his words, the chivalry of his character, the strength underlying his human weakness, and the poignancy of his suffering, irresistibly draw his subjects to him, and in the wildest political storm an utterance of his suffices to produce a profound calm, during which the voice of reason has a chance of being heard. By force of circumstances and by dint of experience he is become the most far-sighted statesman in his own Empire and, it may be, in all Europe. He can understand all parties, for he passed through most of them himself, and what is equally to the point, he can fathom motives and appreciate persons. In 1848 he was an Absolutist of the type of his friend and ally, Nicholas I. of Russia; he next became an Opportunist; after which he turned Liberal; and at one time he went so far as to adopt Federalism itself. It is highly probable that as long as Franz Josef lives the dual Empire may contrive to subsist on its present basis, but only on condition that no wild experiments are attempted. A return to Absolutism is not a whit more dangerous than a plunge into Federalism. Both would prove suicidal. The present critical condition of Austria is the logical outcome of its historical development, and in order to be understood aright, must be viewed in the light of history. This is no difficult task seeing that the most ancient of the events in question are not quite as old as the century. The wars of Napoleon I., which had acted as an irresistible solvent upon the German Empire, left the Kaiser still at the head of a powerful State, over which he ruled without Parliament or Ministry. The one branch of legislation which pointed to Liberalism was the section dealing with the relations between Church and State; the one remnant of old times which still suggested Federalism was the quasi-independence of the various provinces of which the Empire was composed. Thus, on the one hand, the Roman Catholic Church was entirely under the thumb of the government, Joseph II. having placed it upon a Procrustean bed of his own making, and there it lay till the beginning of the second half of this century. tween Hungary and Austria, on the other hand, there existed a vigilantlywatched customs cordon, and a high tariff of duties was levied on various kinds of produce. Austria at this stage was an unwieldy Empire, not a modern State. Be An it was too late. The sentiment of nationality had been already awakened in the breasts of the Magyars; it had never been extinguished among the Poles; and the philological studies which were flourishing in Germany called it into new life among the Bohemians. other method, far less efficacious and infinitely slower, would have been the creation of a code of laws for the whole Empire. But for many reasons this scheme was never undertaken. The only other way remaining was to enlist the all-powerful Church in the cause, and make it a willing instrument in the hands of the State. And this Francis Joseph set about doing. The vast majority of Austrians were members of the Roman Catholic Church. The Protestants and the Orthodox were but as dust in the balance when compared with these. The bulk of the people were uneducated, superstitious, submissive, mere clay in the hands of the spiritual potters, and nothing seemed easier than to mould and shape them politically in accordance with the Emperor's desire. The experiment was duly tried, and bade fair to justify the most sanguine hopes. A Concordat was concluded with the Vatican; the Church regained her independence, and the clergy accomplished yeomen's service in the cause of Absolutism. But "the best laid schemes o' mice and men gang oft a-gley," and the chapter of accidents thwarted the statesmanlike plans of the Emperor. Hungary, after the removal of the customs cordon, entered into commercial relations with Europe, throve, "waxed fat," and, like Jeshurun of old, began to kick. A Liberal government took over the reins of power, and in 1868 laws were passed which no casuistry could reconcile with the terms of the agreement entered into by the Austrian State and the Vatican. From this time forth the Germans were split up into factions, the Liberals and Clericals hating each other more profoundly than Germans and Slavs. And, finally, the Federalist current acquired such strength that the Emperor himself nominated a Cabinet of Autonomists. But the most fateful step of all was the concession of virtual independence to Hungary, which rendered the year 1867 the turning-point in the history of the House of Habsburg. The gifted Magyars, forming but a fraction of the entire population of the kingdom, although relatively in a majority, assumed absolute power over the whole. They at once gave the Croatians a system of restricted home rule, and then set themselves to Magyarize the other nationalities. From that day to this latent war has existed between the Magyars and the Slavs and Roumanians of the kingdom of Hungary, and from that day to this the Bohemians, Moravians, Slovacks, etc., have insisted on their right to go and do likewise. This example was partially followed in Austria proper. Four years later, the Poles of Galicia obtained home rule and the right of governing or misgoverning three and threequarter millions of Ruthenians, and immediately afterwards another bill was drafted, which Parliament would have passed by a large majority, giving to Bohemia the same privileges as those enjoyed by Hungary. The opposition of the Magyars, under Count Andrassy, hindered this bill from becoming law, and wrecked the Ministry which, with the Emperor's sanction, had drafted it. From that day to this Bohemia has played the part of Ireland in Austria, and the question of autonomy for the Czechs is at the root of most of the trouble that worries the Emperor and paralyzes the Parliament. When we speak of the Austrian Parliament, we are forced to use an expression which cannot but prove misleading to the ordinary reader unacquainted with the constitution of the dual Empire. In one sense the number of Parliaments in the monarchy is legion; in another sense, there is not one. Austria proper, as distinguished from Hungary, has seventeen legislative assemblies* and central Imperial Parliament, not one of which is truly representative of the people. Ex officio members of the seventeen Diets are the Archbishops and Bishops of the Roman Catholic and Orthodox Churches and the Rectors of the Universities. Then come the representatives of great landowners; the wealthiest class of the urban population send delegates; the boards of commerce and the *They are called Landtage or Diets, and consist of a number of members varying from 22, as in the Diet of Görz and Gradiska, to 242 as in that of Bohemia. guilds also elect a certain number. Rural districts are compelled first to choose spokesmen, who then elect a representative. Austria's earliest Imperial Parliament was the creation of her first "Liberal" Ministry, which assumed the reins of power in the year 1860. It consisted exclusively of representatives of the wealthiest classes, mainly Germans and Jews, who were not elected by the people, but chosen by the Diets. Twelve years later, the so-called "Citizen Ministry" proclaimed the principle of direct election. Like most "Liberal" Cabinets in Austria, it was actuated by a desire to forward the interests of the party, which were wholly distinct from those of the people. The electoral law was therefore based on the principle of class. Thus there were representatives of the great landed estates, of cities, market-places and industrial centres, and of chambers of commerce. A few delegates from rural districts were also admitted, but they could not be elected directly by the people. Characteristic of this state of things is the circumstance that the Chamber of Commerce of Galicia has but eighty-seven electors, and sends three deputies to Parliament; that of Styria possesses sixty-four constituents, who send two members. In Moravia nineteen landowners choose one member of Parliament, and in Bohemia nineteen wealthy landlords possess and exercise the right of choosing another. In the Parliament thus constituted there were 353 members, over twenty parties, and no majority. The late Premier, Count Taaffe, managed to govern Austria for fourteen years with the help of this extraordinary Assembly, coquetting now with one party and now with another. The feat was little less than a political miracle. The means by which he accomplished it were innumerable, but nothing stood him in such good stead as his thorough knowledge of men and motives. The Czechs, who a short time before had found themselves within sight of autonomy, were determined to take no further part in Parliamentary work, and to abstain from the Assembly altogether. Count Taaffe induced them to reconsider their decision, and things moved very smoothly until the Czech people withdrew their confidence from their representatives and replaced them with fiery hot Nationalists, who seemed amenable to no consider |