June the governor general and council may not revert to the plan of April. They speak of that plan as likely to be (or make a part of one that shall be) permanent. Many reasons are alleged by its authors in its favour, grounded on the state of their affairs; none whatever are assigned for the alteration. It is, indeed, morally certain, that persons who had money to remit must have made the same calculation, which has been made by the directions of your committee, and the result must have been equally clear to them; which is, that instead of realizing two shillings and two pence the rupee on their subscription, as they proposed, they could never hope to see more than one shilling and nine pence. This calculation probably shook the main pillar of the project of April. But on the other hand, as the subscribers to the second scheme can have no certain assurance that the company will accept bills so far exceeding their allowance in this particular, the necessity of remitting their fortunes may beat them back to their old ground. The Danish company was the only means of remitting which remained. Attempts have been made with success, to revive a Portuguese trade for that purpose. It is by no means clear, whether Mr. Hastings and his colleagues will adhere to either of the foregoing plans; or, indeed, whether any investment at all to that amount can be realized; because nothing but the convenience of remitting the gains of British subjects to London can support any of these projects.

The situation of the company under this perpetual variation in the system of their investment is truly perplexing. The manner in which they arrive at any knowledge of it, is no less so. The letter to Lord Macartney, by which the variation is discovered, was not intended for transmission to the directors. It was merely for the information of those who were admitted to a share of the subscription at Madras. When Mr. Hastings sent this information to those subscribers, he might well enough have presumed an event to happen, which did happen; that is, that a vessel might be despatched from Madras to Europe; and, indeed, by that and by every devisable means, he ought not only to have apprized the directors of this most material change in the plan of the investment, but to have entered fully into the grounds and reasons of his making it.

It appears to your committee, that the ships which

brought to England the plan of the 8th of April, did not sail from Bengal until the 1st of May. If the change had been in contemplation for any time before the 13th of April, two days would have sufficed to send an account of it, and it might have arrived along with the plan which it affected. If, therefore, such a change was in agitation before the sailing of the ships, and yet was concealed when it might have been communicated, the concealment is censurable. It is not improbable that some change of the kind was made or meditated before the sailing of the ships for Europe; for it is hardly to be imagined, that reasons wholly unlooked for should appear for setting aside a plan, concerning the success of which, the council general seemed so very confident; that a new one should be proposed; that its merits should be discussed among the monied men; that it should be adopted in council, and officially ready for transmission to Madras in twelve or thirteen days. In this perplexity of plan and of transmission, the court of directors may have made an arrangement of their affairs on the groundwork of the first scheme, which was officially and authentically conveyed to them. The fundamental alteration of that plan in India might require another of a very different kind in England; which the arrangements taken in consequence of the first might make it difficult, if not impossible to execute. What must add to the confusion is, that the alteration has not the regular and official authority of the original plan, and may be presumed to indicate with certainty nothing more than that the business is again afloat, and that no scheme is finally determined on. Thus the company is left without any fixed data upon which they can make a rational disposition of their affairs.

The fact is, that the principles and economy of the company's trade have been so completely corrupted by turning it into a vehicle for tribute, that whenever circumstances require it to be replaced again upon a bottom truly commercial, hardly any thing but confusion and disasters can be expected as the first results. Even before the acquisition of the territorial revenues, the system of the company's commerce was not formed up, on principles the most favourable to its prosperity; for whilst, on the one hand, that body received encouragement by royal and parliamentary charters, was invested [8]

VOL. VI.

with several ample privileges, and even with a delegation of the most essential prerogatives of the crown; on the other, its commerce was watched with an invidious jealousy, as a species of dealing dangerous to the national interests. In that light, with regard to the company's imports, there was a total prohibition from domestic use of the most considerable articles of their trade; that is, of all silk stuffs, and stained and painted cottons. The British market was in a great measure interdicted to the British trader. Whatever advantages might arise to the general trading interests of the kingdom by this restraint, its East India interest was undoubtedly injured by it. The company is, also, and has been from a very early period, obliged to furnish the ordnance with a quantity of saltpetre at a certain price, without any reference to the standard of the markets, either of purchase or of sale. With regard to their export, they were put also under difficulties upon very mistaken notions; for they were obliged to export annually a certain proportion of British manufactures, even though they should find for them in India none, or but an unprofitable want. This compulsory export might operate, and in some instances has operated, in a manner more grievous than a tax to the amount of the loss in trade. For the payment of a tax is in general divided in unequal portions between the vender and consumer, the largest part falling upon the latter. In the case before us, the tax may be as a dead charge on the trading capital of the company.

The spirit of all these regulations naturally tended to weaken, in the very original constitution of the company, the main spring of the commercial machine, the principles of profit and loss. And the mischief arising from an inattention to those principles has constantly increased with the increase of its power. For when the company had acquired the rights of sovereignty in India, it was not to be expected that the attention to profit and loss would have increased. The idea of remitting tribute in goods naturally produced an indifference to their price and quality; the goods themselves appearing little else than a sort of package to the tribute. Merchandise, taken as tribute, or bought in lieu of it, can never long be of a kind, or of a price fitted to a market which stands solely on its commercial reputation. The indifference of the mercantile sovereign to his trading advantages naturally relaxed the diligence of his subor

dinate factor-magistrates, through all their gradations, and in all their functions; it gave rise, at least so far as the principle was concerned, to much neglect of price and of goodness in their purchases. If ever they showed any extraordinary degrees of accuracy and selection, it would naturally be in favour of that interest to which they could not be indifferent. The company might suffer above, the natives might suffer below; the intermediate party must profit to the prejudice of both.

Your committee are of opinion that the company is now arrived at that point when the investment, from surplus revenue, or from the spoil of war ceasing, it is become much more necessary to fix its commerce upon a commercial basis. And this opinion led your committee to a detailed review of all the articles of the Indian traffick upon which the profit and loss was steady; and we have chosen a period of four years, during the continuance of the revenue investment, and prior to any borrowing, or any extraordinary drawing of bills, in order to find out how far the trade, under circumstances when it will be necessary to carry it on by borrowing, or by bills, or by exportation of bullion, can be sustained in the former course, so as to secure the capital, and to afford a reasonable dividend. And your committee find that in the first four years the investment from Bengal amounted to 4,176,525l.; upon 2,260,2771. there was a gain of 186,3771. and upon 1,916,248!. a loss of 705,5661.; so that the excess of loss above gain, upon the whole of the foregoing capital, was in the four years no less than 519,2291.

If the trade were confined to Bengal, and the company were to trade on those terms upon a capital bor rowed at eight per cent. Indian interest, their revenues in that province would be soon so overpowered with debt, that those revenues, instead of supporting the trade, would be totally destroyed by it. If, on the other hand, the company traded upon bills, with every advantage, far from being in a condition to divide the smallest percentage, their bankruptcy here would he inevitable.

Your committee then turned to the trade of the other factories and presidencies, and they constantly found, that as the power and dominion of the company was less, their profit on the goods was greater. The investments of Madras, Bombay, and Bencoolen, have, in the foregoing four years, upon a capital of 1,151,1761. had a gain

upon the whole of 329,6221. The greatest of all is that of Bencoolen, which, on a capital of 76,5711. produced a profit of 107,7601. This, however, is but a small branch of the company's trade. The trade to China, on a capital of 1,717,463l. produced an excess of gain, amounting to 874,0961. which is about fifty per cent. But such was the evil influence of the Bengal investment, that not only the profits of the Chinese trade, but of all the lucrative branches taken together, were so sunk and ingulfed in it, that the whole profit on a capital of 7,045,1641. reached to no more than 684,4891. that is, to 189,6071. less than the profit on the Chinese trade alone; less than the total profits on the gainful trades taken together, 520,7271.

It is very remarkable that in the year 1778, when the Bengal investment stood at the highest, that is, so high as 1,223,316l. though the Chinese trade produced an excess of gain in that year of 209,2431. and that no loss of moment could be added to that of Bengal (except about 45,000%. on the Bombay trade) the whole profit of a capital of 2,040,7871. amounted only to the sum of 9,480l.

The circumstances of the time have rendered it necessary to call up a vigorous attention to this state of the trade of the company between Europe and India.

INTERNAL TRADE OF BENGAL.

THE internal trade of Bengal has next attracted the inquiries of your committee.

The great and valuable articles of the company's investment, drawn from the articles of internal trade, are raw silk, and various descriptions of piece goods made of silk and cotton. These articles are not under any formal monopoly; nor does the company at present exercise a declared right of pre-emption with regard to them. But it does not appear that the trade in these particulars is or can be perfectly free; not so much on account of any direct measures taken to prevent it, as from the circumstances of the country, and the manner of carrying on business there. For the present trade, even in these articles, is built from the ruins of old mo