reason as a thing of little consequence? Far from it. Reason, I am sensible, is absolutely necessary to render us capable of that information from without, by which we are enabled to make so great progress in knowledge. For want of this power entirely, or at least in the requisite degree, how little, comparatively, is the greatest knowledge which the most sagacious of the brute creation can attain? I cannot, therefore, be justly thought to derogate from a faculty which, by my hypothesis, constitutes the radical distinction between man and beast. Would a man be understood to depreciate that admirable organ of the body, the eye, because he affirmed, that unless the world, which is without the body, furnished us with light, our eyes could be of no service to us? Reason is the eye of the mind: it is in consequence of our possessing it, that we are susceptible either of religion or of law. Now the light by which the mental eye is informed, comes also from without, and consists chiefly in testimony, human or divine.

I would recommend it, therefore, to those, who are accounted the most refined rationalists in religion, to take the trouble to reflect a little, and inquire what is the method which they, and indeed all, must follow, in the acquisition of human knowledge. In natural history, for example, how insignificant would be our progress, if our conviction were to be regulated by the same maxims by which those men seem to regulate their faith in matters of revelation? If our not knowing the use of any thing were a suffi

cient reason for disbelieving its existence, how many animals, how many vegetables, how many inanimate substances, apparently useless, or even noxious, should we discard out of our systems of nature, inflexibly denying that they exist any-where, except in the disordered imaginations of men? Nor should we make greater proficiency in the other branches of science. Of nothing have we clearer evidence than of this, that by means of the food which animals swallow, life is preserved, the body is nourished, the limbs gradually advance in strength and size, to their full maturity. Yet, where is the philosopher, where is the chemist, who can explain, or will pretend to understand, the process whereby the nourishment is converted into chyle, and the chyle into blood, and the blood into skin, and flesh, and bones and sinews?

Now if, in matters of science, merely human, our ignorance of the use, in the one case, and of the manner of operation, in the other, does not preclude our belief of the fact, a belief which ultimately rests, in most cases, on the testimony of our fellow-creatures; can we think it reasonable to be more shy of admitting a fact, on the testimony of God, when, in effect, we admit that sufficient ground is given us to conclude that we have his testimony? For I do not here argue with the denyers of revelation, but with those who, professing to believe it, reject its obvious meaning. Are we better acquainted with things divine than with things human? or with things eternal than with things temporal? Our Lord, in

his conversation with Nicodemus, seemed to consider it as an acknowledged truth, that things earthly are more level to the natural capacity of man than things heavenly 3. Yet how soon would an effectual stop be put to our progress in every branch, even of earthly science, were we to lay down as maxims, that the existence of any being, however well attested, whereof we cannot discover the use, is not to be believed; and that the production of an effect, if we do not comprehend the mode of operation in the cause, is incredible? The much greater part of all human knowledge, whether of things corporeal, or things spiritual, things terrestrial, or things celestial, is originally from information. Revelation means no other than information from God; and whatever human knowledge we derive from the testimony of our fellow-mortals, which is more than ninetynine parts in a hundred of all we are possessed of, is, if I may be allowed the expression, a revelation from man. In regard to both, we ought, no doubt, in the first place, to be satisfied that we have the proper testimony: but when this point is ascertained, I think it unaccountable to reject the obvious meaning of the divine testimony (which is indirectly to reject the testimony), on grounds which no judicious person would think sufficient to warrant him in rejecting the testimony of a man of character. If ye have not satisfactory evidence, that what claims to be the testimony of God is really such, ye

3 Jo. iii. 12.

are no doubt entitled to reject it. But do not first admit the testimony, and afterwards refuse your assent to what it manifestly implies; and that for such a reason as would prove no obstacle to your assent, on the information of a fellow-mortal. This is surely the reverse of what might be expected from a humble pious Christian. For if we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater ‘.

Besides, this conduct, in rejecting the obvious sense of the divine testimony, is the more inexcusable, as the circumstance on which the rejection is founded, is such as the whole analogy of nature leads us to expect, in all the works of the Creator. If, in every part of the creation, we find that there are many creatures, the purpose of whose existence we cannot investigate; and that there are hardly any natural productions, in which, though, from experience, we may discover the cause, we can trace its operation; it is but just to conclude, that this unsearchableness to human faculties, is a sort of signature impressed on the works of the Most High, and which, when found in any thing attested as from him, ought to be held, at least, a presumption in favour of the testimony.

But, though nothing can be more different from an implicit adoption of all the definitions, distinctions, and particularities of a sect, than the general disposition of the rationalist; there is often a great

41 Jo. v. 9.

resemblance in their methods of criticising, and in the stretches which they make for disguising the natural interpretation of the sacred text. Each is, in this, actuated by the same motive, namely, to obtrude on others that interpretation which suits his favourite hypothesis. And, if we may say of the one, that he is too foolish to be improved by teaching; we may, with equal justice, say of the other, that he is too wise to attend to it. Revelation, surely, was never intended for such as he. Our Lord said to the Pharisees, that he came not to call the righteous, but sinners, to repentance. We may, with like reason, say, he came not to instruct the learned, but the ig. norant. Nay he, in effect, says so himself. It was to babes in knowledge, not to sages, that the things of God were revealed by him. The disposition of children, so often recommended as necessary for our giving a proper reception to the Gospel, and obtaining admission into the kingdom, refers as clearly to the teachable temper of children, free from prepossessions and self-conceit, as to their humility and innocence. How strongly is this sentiment expressed by the Apostle : If any man among you seemeth to be wise in this world, let him become a fool, that he may be wise! The judicious and candid will not mistake me, as, in matters of religion, decrying the use of reason, without which, I am sensible, we cannot proceed a single step; but as pointing out the proper application of this faculty.

Mat. ix. 13.

6 Mat. xi. 25.

7 1 Cor. iii, 18.