by the opportunity of that candle which their parents allow them for their studies and books. Yea, men generally do not only misspend those talents of light we speak of, about the impertinencies of this present world, but partly through an unmanlike oscitancy and inconsiderateness, partly out of an inordinate propensity to comport with the world without any fear or sense of danger hereby, suffer their judgments and understandings to be corrupted, adulterated, imbased and abused by many false and foolish principles and notions, which turn them quite aside from a regular and due prosecution of that life and salvation which is in Christ for them, and might have been obtained by them; yea, and subject them to a sad incapacity of the things of their peace, when they are proposed with the greatest evidence and power unto them. Insomuch that though the life which was in Christ is said to be "the light of men," yet it immediately followeth, that "the light shineth in darkness," (i. e. the doctrine of life and salvation is clearly preached to an ignorant world,)" and the darkness comprehended it not," i. e. that ignorance, or incapacity rather, of the things of eternal life, which men have voluntarily contracted and brought upon themselves, is so exceeding great and strange, that they understand little or nothing of this doctrine so preached unto them. But this occasionally only, and by the way. As to the work in hand, doubtless there was never any man touched with any competent sense, or enlightened with any tolerable notion of a deity, that ever put it to the question in himself, whether God was perfect or no. "All men," saith Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, without any demur or delay, ascribe that unto God which they conceive to be most perfect." And indeed that very sense and notion of God which nature prompteth her children with, though many of them are dull of hearing in this kind, doth not admit of any thing looked upon as defective or imperfect within the verge of it.

Therefore having so firm, and so generally-approved a foundation to build upon, as the perfection of God, let us see what it affordeth unto us by way of evident deduction, toward the advancement of our great design, the magnifying of God in his gracious intendments of salvation unto all men, without exception, in or by the death of Christ.

First, if the nature, essence, and being of God be most perfect, then must it needs be most simple, most entirely, absolutely, and perfectly one, not admitting any plurality or composition whatsoever. The reason of this is plain, because all plurality and composition, whether of parts or of natures, suppose imperfection. For if any one of these parts or natures were perfect, absolutely or infinitely perfect, it were able to do whatsoever is necessary, yea, or possible to be done, (for without this there is no simple or absolute perfection,) and then what need were there of any thing more to be added unto it, or joined with it? That a man hath ears as well as eyes, and eyes as well as ears; and so, hands as well as feet, and feet as well as hands, clearly proves, that no one of these

members is simply and absolutely perfect, i. e. can do or perform, and this with a like comeliness and conveniency, whatsoever is necessary to be done and performed by man; for then all the rest should be superfluous. They may all be perfect in their kind, i. e., with a determinate and limited perfection, and in order to such or such a particular action and service, and yet one stand in need of another, as the apostle speaketh; but if any one of them were simply and absolutely perfect, i. e., could do all things whatsoever upon the same terms of convenience which both itself and all the rest can do together, certainly all the rest were needless. So if an angel could understand by his mere essence or substance of his nature, without any endowment or gift of understanding distinct therefrom; or could perform any other action, or do any execution immediately by his essence, without the intervening of those natural endowments or qualities of strength, power, activeness, &c., all these endowments and appendices to his nature and essence would be merely superfluous. The necessity which the angels have of wisdom, knowledge, reason, strength, &c., over and besides their mere essences and beings, plainly declareth and showeth these essences and beings of theirs to be imperfect, (I mean in respect of a simple and absolute perfection,) and that they stand in need of such additional properties and endowments, as we speak of, to make them perfect even in their own kind. Nor is it indeed possible for God to make any such creature, or to speak somewhat more properly, no such creature can possibly be made, which shall be able to act or work immediately by its essence, or otherwise than by the mediation of some virtue, property, or quality, in one kind or other, inherent therein; it being the glorious and incommunicable property and prerogative of the Divine essence or Being itself so to work. So then this absolute and infinite simplicity of the nature of God supposed, as without which he cannot be absolutely and infinitely perfect, it plainly followeth,

First, That all those attributes of God, commonly so called, as wisdom, knowledge, justice, mercy, goodness, power, &c.; and so all those passions and affections, as of anger, grief, repentance, love, hatred, &c.; and again, all those parts or members, as eyes, ears, hands, feet, mouth, &c., which are so frequently attributed unto him in the Scriptures, are all one and the same thing in God, though they be very different things in men; nor is any one of them, nor all of them together, any other thing but only his single, simple, and pure essence. But therefore all this variety and diversity, both of attributes, affections, and parts, is attributed unto him, because by means of this one simple and single essence being infinitely perfect, he can, when he pleaseth, and pleaseth, when he judgeth meet, give forth himself, and act all that variety and diversity of action which these different principles are wont to produce

Deo idem est esse, et fortem esse, vel sapientem esse, vel, justum esse; et si quid de illa simplici multiplicitate, vel multiplici simplicitate dixeris, quo substantia ejus significetur.Aug. de Trin. 1. vi. c. 4.

in men. As for example; a man that hath wisdom is able to act, and doth act when he pleaseth, in a regular proportion, or due order unto his ends. So a man that hath knowledge, whether of things past, present, or to come, being wise withal, manageth and disposeth his affairs according to the exigency of such knowledge, and with the best advantage that such knowledge affords unto him. A man that is just, doth things that are just and equal; and so he that is angry, frowns, threatens, or strikes. He that loves, doth good unto and kindly by those who are loved of him; he that hates, acts to the prejudice or hurt of the person hated when he hath opportunity; and so in the rest. Now because God, out of the infinite perfection of his nature, though it be, as hath been said, most singly and simply one, is yet able to act, and doth act, when he pleaseth, all this variety of action, acts as wise men act, as men that have knowledge of things act, as men that are angry, as men that love, as men that hate, are wont to act, &c. Therefore all these principles of action, as wisdom, knowledge, anger, love, hatred, &c., are by the Holy Ghost ascribed unto him. Suppose there were in physic such a simple, as, for example, an herb, root, drug, mineral, or the like, which had such a precious or sovereign virtue in it, that the use of it were a certain cure of all diseases, as gout, stone, fever, apoplexy, &c.; and further, that there were particular medicines or receipts besides appropriated to every disease respectively, and were all of them sufficient to cure their appropriated diseases; in this case that simple we speak of, might be said to have the several virtues of all those other medicines or receipts in it, because it is able to do alone as much and as many things, in a medicinal way, as all those taken together; yet can it not be said to have the virtue of any one of them in the specifical or formal nature of it, but only eminently, i. e., in respect of that sovereign property, which, though it be simply and formally but one, yet answereth in value, worth, and variety of operation, unto all the several virtues, and healing properties in all those other receipts. In like manner, all that great variety of faculties, powers, properties, virtues, endowments, excellencies, and all principles of action whatsoever, that are scattered in their proper and distinct natures amongst the creatures, may be attributed unto God, though not so much as any one of them be properly and formally in him, viz., because there is that sovereign and supertranscendent perfection in his nature, being but simply and most singly one, which for power and variety of action in every kind, answereth them all, yea, and far exceedeth them also.

Secondly, From the simplicity of the nature of God, as it hath been argued and explained, it clearly followeth, that love and hatred, and so mercy and justice or severity in God towards his creature, do not argue any different affection or inclination in him towards it, (the simplicity of his nature not admitting of any such difference,) but only a different dispensation, answerable to the different effects or expressions of such principles in men. So that

there is no inconvenience nor untruth in it at all, to affirm that God at one and the same time, may both hate and love, and so again, love and hate the same person, viz., in respect of several dispensations of a contrary nature and import. As, for example, when he severely punisheth a godly person for some sin or sins. committed, and yet withal continues such a measure of his grace or good Spirit unto him, whereby he is enabled still to believe in God and to love him, his sore affliction notwithstanding; in respect of this latter dispensation, God may be said to love; and in respect of the former, to hate him.

If it be demanded; but can God in any sense be said to hate a person that is godly? I answer, that hatred in God, importing not matter of affection, but of dispensation only, agreeable to the effects of hatred in men, to deny that God can in any sense be said to hate a godly person, is to deny that he can punish him for sin, or act to the prejudice of his comfort and peace in any kind, howsoever he provoketh him.

If it be yet said; But the Scripture will not justify or warrant any such assertion as this, that God hateth a godly person. I answer, 1. By concession, that the Scripture doth not indeed, to my best. remembrance, justify or warrant such a saying, by way of example or sameness of expression. But,

2. By way of exception, I answer, that the Scripture warranteth many things by way of reason or ground, which it doth not warrant either by example, precept, or otherwise than by ground, as is famously known in the case of infant baptism, and of women's admission to the Lord's table. Now wherever either the perfection or simplicity of God is asserted in the Scriptures, whether expressly, or by way of consequence, as both the one and the other frequently are, there is a sufficient ground laid to warrant both truth and also aptness enough of expression in such a saying as this, that God may be said both to love and to hate the same person; yea, and both these at one and the same time, as hath been sufficiently explained.

Thirdly and lastly, from the simplicity of the nature of God, the truth of that common maxim in divinity, quicquid est in Deo, Deus est, i. e., whatsoever is in God, is God, is fully demonstrable and consequently that neither from eternity was there any thing, neither for the present is there any thing, nor ever shall be any thing in him to eternity, inferior to himself, any thing which is not God. And if so, then both the justification of men from eternity, and so the condemnation of men from eternity, are but idle fancies, with which some men, partly through weakness, partly through inconsiderateness, commit spiritual fornication. Yea, though I will not say that any of the persons who hold either of these opinions do blaspheme, yet the opinions themselves, narrowly examined, will not be found innocent from this great offence: inasmuch as both the one and the other do apparently give the honour of the glorious God in his incommunicable attribute of eternity, a parte

ante, as divines call it, to weak and contemptible creatures, men: they make these co-eternal with God, and to subsist from eternity. For that which is not can neither be justified nor condemned.

If it be demanded, in favour of these opinions, but had not men some kind of being or subsistence from eternity? were they not in the mind of God, and present with him, after some such manner as the idea or model of a house is in the mind of the architect, before there be so much as a stone of it laid?

To this I answer, according to the tenor of what hath been lately argued and proved concerning the simplicity of the Divine essence, that if they had any being from eternity, it could be none other than the Divine Being itself; for there were no plurality of beings from eternity. All beings without beginnings may be numbered by the figure of one, and this unmultiplied. Therefore, if God justified any from eternity, it must be himself; if he condemned or reprobated any from eternity, it must be himself likewise. Nor can men be said to have been in the mind of God from eternity after any such manner as the idea or platform of a house is in the mind of the artificer, before he begins to build; because such an idea is no part of the artificer, nor yet of his mind, but is clearly separable from both; whereas there was nothing in God from eternity but his own essence, and that which is altogether inseparable from him. Or, if it should be granted that men were in God, or in the mind of God, from eternity, after such a manner as is contended for, yet could it not be said that men, men themselves, i. e. those creatures which consist of bodies and souls, and have sinned on earth, were either justified or condemned from eternity, but only their ideas or representations in the mind of God. Yet how, or in what sense or notion, these should be said to be either justified or condemned, whenas they never sinned, nor are capable of sinning, is out of the reach of my understanding to conceive.

If it be yet further demanded, But were not men (and all things besides) in some consideration or sense in God from eternity; and may it not be said, that in this sense, whatever it be, they were some justified and some condemned? I answer,

1. By concession, that men, and all things besides, were in God from eternity tanquam in fonte, seu radice, vel causâ productivâ, i. e., as in the fountain, root, or productive cause of their respective beings. There is nothing capable of receiving an existence, or actual being, but what had a potential or seminal being in some productive cause or other, one or more, before. Therefore, if this universe, with all the parts and members of it, had not been in God, as in the productive cause, doubtless they had never been produced, or received being. But

2. I answer further, by way of exception, that men, considered in that being which they had in God from eternity, were no ways capable either of justification, or of condemnation, or of any such difference or distinction between them, as these two acts or conditions infer. For as God himself, the common root or producent