If foreknowledge were properly and formally in God, then might predestination, election, reprobation, and many other things be, properly and formally in him also; inasmuch as these are, in the letter and propriety of them, as competible unto him as foreknowledge. Nor can there be any reason given for a difference. But impossible it is, that there should be any plurality of things whatsoever, in their distinct and proper natures and formalities, in God, the infinite simplicity of his nature and being, with open mouth gainsaying it. Secondly, If foreknowledge were properly or formally in God, there should be somewhat in him corruptible or changeable. For that which is supposed to be such a foreknowledge in him to-day, by the morrow, suppose the thing or event foreknown should in the interim actually come to pass, must needs cease and be changed; inasmuch as there can be no foreknowledge of things that are present, the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge, in the propriety of it, being res futura, somewhat that is to come. Thirdly, and lastly, There is nothing in the creature univocally and formally the same with any thing which is in God. The reason is, because then there must either be somewhat finite in God, or somewhat infinite in the creature; both which are impossible. But if prescience or foreknowledge, being properly or formally in the creature, should be properly or formally also in God, there should be somewhat in the creature, univocally and formally the same with somewhat which is in God. Therefore certainly there is no foreknowledge, properly so called, in God.*

If it be objected, that this argument lieth as strong against the propriety of knowledge, as of foreknowledge, in God; inasmuch as knowledge is every whit as properly and formally in the creature as foreknowledge; I answer,

True it is, there is no knowledge neither in God, according to the precise and formal notion of knowledge, or in such a sense wherein it is found in men; and this the first and last of the three reasons mentioned do infallibly demonstrate. Knowledge in the creature is a principle or habit, really and essentially distinct from the subject or soul where it resideth: yea, and is capable of augmentation and diminution therein, and of separation from it. Whereas that which is called knowledge in God, neither differs really or essentially from his nature, or from himself, but is really one and the same thing with him (as will further appear in the following chapter), nor is it either capable of growth, or of decay, or of separation. Only in this respect, knowledge, of the two, is more properly attributable unto God than foreknowledge, viz. because foreknowledge, in the proper notion, or formal conception

Quid est præscientia, nisi scientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum est Deo, qui omnia super graditur tempora? Si enim in scientia res ipsas habet, non sunt ei futuræ, sed præsentes; ac per hoc, non jam præscientia, sed tantum scientia dici potest.-Aug. 1. ii. ad Simpl. vide plura. ib.

Nec zelus, nec ira, nec pœnitentia, nec proprie misericordia, nec præscientia esse potest in Deo. Greg. Moral, 1. ii. c, 23.

of it, includes, or supposeth, a liableness to a change or expiration, viz. upon the coming to pass of the thing foreknown, which must of necessity come to pass in time; whereas knowledge imports nothing but what may be permanent and perpetual, and so is of the two more appropriable unto him who changeth not.

But though neither knowledge, nor foreknowledge, can in strictness and formality of notion be ascribed unto God, yet since both the one and the other are frequently in Scripture attributed unto him, necessary it is that we make inquiry into the grounds and reasons of such attributions. For it is no ways credible but that the Holy Ghost in all such expressions did intend to inform the world of somewhat, and that according to truth, concerning God. Now the method and way, in general, whereby to discover, upon what grounds or reasons the Holy Ghost attributeth such things unto God, which yet are not formally or properly competible to him, and consequently what it is in God, of which by such expressions he desireth to impart the knowledge unto us, is this, to consider the respective natures, the different manners of operation, the divers effects, or ordinary consequences of those things in the creature, whether they be actions, passions, habits, parts, or whatsoever, which are upon such terms attributed unto God. For still we shall find something or other proceeding from God, or done by him, which holds proportion and correspondeth with some or other, one or more, of the ordinary effects or consequents of those things in the creature which are so attributed unto him; and the intent of the Holy Ghost in ascribing such things unto God, which are proper only to the creature, is to make known to us that the Divine Essence, or God himself, hath that eminently, after a transcendent and most perfect manner in his nature or being, which always enableth him, and in respect of some particulars upon occasion rendereth him actually willing to express himself in such kind of actions or effects, wherein the creature is wont to express itself upon occasion, out of and by means of such principles or instruments of action, being in the propriety or formality of their respective natures in them, which are ascribed unto God. As for example, to give the world knowledge, that the Divine nature can, and upon just occasion will, yea, and doth many times, express itself after such a manner, and with such a kind of effect, as men use to express themselves out of anger, as, viz. by reproving, expostulating, withdrawing themselves, striking, punishing, and the like, the Holy Ghost oft ascribeth the passion, or impression of anger, unto God. There is the same consideration of all those other creature affections, as of love, zeal, grief, sorrow, repentance, delight, mercy, compassion, &c. And so also of all those organical parts or members of a human body, as eyes, ears, hands, heart, &c., which are so frequently in the Scriptures attributed unto God. These respective attributions give the light of this knowledge of God unto the world, that the Divine nature, though most singly, simply, most undividedly and indivisibly one,

is yet able, out of the infinite perfection of it, to act all that variety and diversity of action and effect which the creature is wont to act out of such affections, and by means of such organs or members respectively.

To come in to the particular in hand. The Scripture is wont to ascribe knowledge unto God, to inform the world, that what kind of contentment soever men reap, or receive, by means of any knowledge of things which they have, and that what regular use or advantage soever they make, or are capable of making in any kind of such knowledge, God receiveth the like contentment by, maketh, when and as he pleaseth, the same or the like use of the infinite perfection of his nature or being. For example: men of knowledge and of understanding, so far as their knowledge extendeth, are free from errors, mistakes, and other inconveniences, in reference to the things known, whereunto men that are ignorant are exposed. Again, men that have knowledge of things are hereby, according to the measure and extent of this knowledge, enabled to manage and order their affairs to their best advantage, either in a way of profit, or of repute and honour; yea, and being otherwise furnished with opportunity and means for such a purpose, to communicate and impart the same light of knowledge unto others, which shineth in and to themselves. In like manner knowledge, yea, the "knowledge of all things," 1 John iii. 20, is in Scripture asserted unto God, not because he knoweth them after the same specifical manner, or upon the same specifical terms, upon which men know or understand the things known by them, (for as "the Lord seeth not as man seeth," 1 Sam. xvi. 7, so neither doth he know as man knoweth,) but because, from and by means of the infinite perfection of his nature, 1. He enjoyeth himself with a scientifical contentment; (I mean, with such a kind of contentment as knowing men enjoy, or might enjoy, by means of their knowledge;) and, 2. Because by the same means he is enabled to manage, order, and dispose of all things, to the best advantage and improvement for his own glory, and for what other end besides he pleaseth; and, 3, and lastly, Because he hath an opportunity also thereby to impart the knowledge of what things soever he pleaseth, unto his creature.

By what hath been said, it is no matter of difficulty either to conceive or to declare in what sense, or upon what ground, one or more, the Scriptures attribute prescience also, or foreknowledge, unto God. For look what regular conveniency, opportunity, or advantage in any kind, the foreknowledge of things in men affordeth unto them, the like doth the infinite perfection of the Divine nature exhibit and afford unto him. Men who have the certain foreknowledge that such and such things will come to pass at such or such a time, if they any ways relate unto them, or be capable of being wrought to such a relation, besides the inward contentment of such knowledge, have an opportunity thereby, not only of making known beforehand unto their friends or others, that at such a time such things

will come to pass (for this they may do, whether the things foreknown do any ways concern them or no), and by this means gain the repute of being prophetical, or otherwise very understanding and discerning men; but also of contriving and ordering other things in the meantime so and after such a manner, that the things foreknown, when they come to pass, shall come to pass with more conveniency or advantage unto them, than otherwise they could have done. Upon such considerations as these, the foreknowledge of things, yea of all things that are future, is by the Scriptures ascribed unto God; viz. because through the infinite perfection of his essence and being, he, 1. Enjoys a delight or contentment answerable to that of foreknowing men, by means of this their knowledge. 2. He is able to impart beforehand at what distance of time he pleaseth, either to his saints (his friends) or others, such particularities of what is hid in the womb of time, as himself judgeth meet to be upon such terms as these revealed; 3, and lastly, He is able also providentially to dispose of all such things to the best advantage, both for his own glory, and the benefit of those who shall be found worthy of this great interest in him.

From the rule that hath been given, and the explication made according thereunto, for a right understanding how and in what sense, and upon what grounds, both knowledge and foreknowledge - are in Scripture transferred unto God, a clear light shineth whereby to discover how, and upon what grounds also, desires, purposes, intentions, or decrees in one kind or other, are by the same authority vested in God, as likewise how they differ both from his knowledge and foreknowledge. That desires, intentions, purposes, and decrees, as well as knowledge, or foreknowledge, are only anthropopathetically ascribed unto God, not formally, the former part of this chapter, I presume, hath given the tantamount of many demonstrations. So that clearly and distinctly to understand, how, and in what sense they are in Scripture attributed unto him, inquiry must be made, and consideration had, how they are wont to affect or engage men; after what manner, and upon what terms men are usually acted and drawn forth by them. Only before we come to the explication hereof, this is to be remembered by way of caution, that though there always be, as hath been said, a ground or reason, one or more, for that attribution of human actions, affections, members, &c. which the Scriptures so frequently make unto God, which reason is still founded in a certain proportion or similitude* found between the nature of God and the nature of man, in respect of the things so attributed unto him, yet is it not necessary that all things accompanying, or relating unto these affections or impressions in men, which are attributed unto God, should be paralleled in him, or have something in his nature corresponding to them.

Similitudo non currit quatuor pedibus. Neque illa quæ important intrinsecam perfectionem, sunt tribuenda Deo proprie et formaliter, nec debemus consuetum modum loquendi omnino cavere, cum de Divinis loquimur, si seclusis imperfectionibus, et non aliter, humana transferamus ad Deum.-Arrib. Op. Concil. 1. iii. c. 9.

It is a sufficient ground or reason for the attribution, if the human affection, or impression attributed unto him, be in respect of any one particular appertaining to it in men, paralleled or analogised in the nature of God; the proverbial maxim well admonishing, that "similitudes are not wont to run on all four," no, nor always on three, nor yet on two; they do service enough if they stand well on one. To exemplify our caution in a particular or two: anger, as it is incident unto, and sometimes as it is inherent in man, is obnoxious to be attended with unseemly behaviour, inconsiderate and unjust actions, &c., yet it doth not follow from hence, that because God is said to be angry, therefore there is that in his nature which renders him obnoxious in either of these kinds. It is a sufficient ground of the attribution of this passion or affection unto him, that out of the perfection of his simple essence, or nature, he doth any thing upon occasion, which is proper or frequent, for men being angry, to do; as that he sharply expostulates, or reproves, that he smites those who provoke him, with any severe stroke of judgment, or the like, &c. So again, expectation in men is always attended with an apprehension that the thing expected will indeed come to pass; no man expecting that which he knows certainly will never come to pass; yet it doth not follow from hence, that because expectation is ascribed unto God, therefore he must not know but that the thing expected by him will come to pass. It is a sufficient ground of ascribing expectancy unto him, that out of the perfection of his simple essence, or nature, he sometimes deporteth himself, as men under expectation are wont to do, though it be but in some one particular; as that he apprehendeth a probability or likelihood, in respect of means, motives, and engagements, that the thing which he is said to expect will come to pass; notwithstanding he certainly knoweth withal, that what he is said in this kind to expect, will, all that probability or likelihood notwithstanding, never come to pass. Instances hereof we have, Esa. v. 2, 4, 7; Matt. xxi. 37-39, &c. Take yet one example more for the better understanding of the premised caution. Purposes and intentions, where they are in the letter, and in their propriety, as in men, are always found in conjunction with a supposal, that the things purposed or intended shall or will be effected; no man ever intending or purposing that, which he certainly knows beforehand never shall or will be effected. But it doth not follow from hence, that when purposes or intentions are attributed unto God, they must needs be thus attended; I mean, with a supposition or expectance, that the things said to be purposed or intended by him shall or will come to pass. Therefore that saying of Mr. Rutherford, Exercit. p. 224. "Tenentur omnes credere Deum omnipotentem sua intentione excidere non posse," i. e. All men are bound to believe, that God being omnipotent, cannot fail of his intention, is less considerate, yea, and defective in truth, without the help of some further explication. If instead of intention, he had said decree, thus: all men are bound to believe, that God, being omni

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