them, in case they retain the grace of justification conferred upon them unto the end, and do not make shipwreck of that faith upon which it was conferred.

That these decrees or purposed acts of God here specified are to be understood in their successive dependences, with such a condition or proviso, respectively, as those mentioned, and not absolutely, peremptorily, or without condition, appears,

1. By the like phrase or manner of expression frequent in the Scripture elsewhere; I mean, where such purposes or decrees of God the respective executions whereof are suspended upon such and such conditions, are notwithstanding simply and positively, and without any mention of condition expressed and asserted. "Wherefore," saith the man of God sent unto Eli, "the Lord God of Israel saith, I said indeed that thy house, and the house of thy father, shall walk before me," meaning in the office and dignity of the priesthood," for ever; but now the Lord saith, Be it far from me: for," &c., 1 Sam. ii. 30. "I said indeed," i. e. I verily purposed or decreed, or I promised according to my real purpose or decree. Understand it either of purpose or promise, it comes much to one, a promise always including or presupposing a purpose answerable to it. (See Chap. xi.) When God made the promise, and so declared his purpose accordingly, that Eli and his father's house should walk before him for ever, he expressed no condition as required to the execution or performance of it; yet here it plainly appears that there was a condition understood, viz. the regular and worthy walking of Eli and his father's house in that office. In the same kind of dialect Samuel speaketh to Saul: "Thou hast done foolishly, thou hast not kept the commandment of the Lord thy God, which he commanded thee; for now the Lord" (stabiliverat) "had established thy kingdom upon Israel for ever: but now thy kingdom shall not continue," &c. 1 Sam. xiii. 13. "The Lord had established," i. e. had verily purposed or decreed to have established it for ever, viz. in case thou and thy posterity had walked obediently with him; not that his purpose itself, considered as an act or conception of the mind of God, depended upon this or upon any other condition whatsoever, (all God's purposes and decrees, without exception, are in such a respect absolute and independent, as hath been said formerly,) but that the actual establishment of his kingdom according to such a purpose depended hereupon. Thus God's purpose of preserving the lives of all that were with Paul in the ship, is expressed unto him in positive and absolute terms: "And lo, God hath given thee all them that sail with thee," Acts xxvii. 24; yet evident it is, afterwards, that there was a condition tacitly included in this purpose or decree, viz. the continuance or stay of the mariners in the ship until the rest had opportunity to shift for themselves as well as they: "Except these abide in the ship," saith Paul to the centurion and soldiers, "ye cannot be saved," ver. 31. In like manner, God's purpose or decree concerning the destruction of Nineveh

within forty days was signified unto Jonah in a positive and assertive tenor of words: "Yet forty days and Nineveh shall be de-. stroyed," Jonah iii. 4; yet it is well known that God purposed not the execution of this his purpose, but only in case of the obduration and impenitency of the inhabitants thereof. And most frequently the purpose and decree of God concerning the punishment of wicked and ungodly men, is expressed by the Holy Ghost absolutely and assertively, without the least mention of any condition of relaxation or reversal, (see Matt. iii. 10; v. 19; Mark xvi. 16; 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10; John iii. 36, &c. ;) yet from other passages of Scripture it is fully evident that this decree of his is conditional in such a sense which imports a non-execution of the punishment herein decreed, upon the repentance of the persons against whom the decree is bent. In like manner, though the purpose and decree of God for the justification of those who are called, and so for the glorifying of those that shall be justified, be, in the Scripture in hand, delivered in an absolute and unconditionate form of words, yet is it no ways necessary to suppose (the most familiar, frequent, and accustomed expression of Scripture in such cases exempting us from any such necessity), that therefore these decrees must needs bring forth against all possible interveniences whatsoever, so that, for example, he that is called by the word and Spirit of God, must needs be justified whether he truly believeth or no; and he that is justified, must needs be glorified, whether he persevereth

or no.

If it be objected and said, Yea, but he that is called, in the sense here meant, must needs believe, and consequently be justified; and so he that is justified must needs persevere, and so be glorified. I answer, that whether either the one or the other of these assertions be so or no, it must be judged of by other Scriptures; certain it is, by what hath been argued concerning the frequent usage of the Scripture in point of expression, that it cannot be concluded or determined by the Scripture in hand.

If it be yet further objected concerning all the places mentioned, wherein the conditional decrees of God, commonly so called, are positively and without condition expressed, that the conditions respectively included in them, and left to be understood in such expressions, are plainly enough mentioned in Scripture elsewhere; whereas no such conditions as I would obtrude upon the decrees of God so positively and peremptorily expressed, as we have heard, in the Scripture in hand, can be proved from any other Scripture to relate or appertain unto them,-to this I also answer, 1. That by the tenor of this objection it is granted that the peremptoriness and absoluteness of the said decrees cannot be inferred from the Scripture now under debate, but that recourse must be had to other places for the proof hereof: therefore no perseverance of saints is concludable from this Scripture. 2. For other Scriptures, we have already in part, and shall, God so pleasing, further show in due time, that none of those which are counted pillars of such a doctrine have any communion at all with it. Nay, 3, and lastly, we

shall, I doubt not, be able to show that there are other Scriptures ⚫ from which the conditions specified as relating to the said decrees, may be undeniably evinced to relate unto them accordingly. In the meantime, that the decrees or purposed acts of God expressed in the Scripture in hand, as viz. his justifying those that are called, and so his glorifying those that are justified, have no such peremptory or essential connexion between them, but that the former, in reference to particular persons, may be put in execution, and take place, without the latter, I demonstrate,

2. By this reason. If the apostle should frame this series or chain of divine acts, with an intent to show or teach the uninterruptibleness of it in what case or cases soever, he should fight against his general and main scope or design in that part of this chapter which lieth from about verse 17 to the end; which clearly is this, to exhort, strengthen, and encourage them to constancy and perseverance in suffering afflictions. For to suggest any such thing unto them as that being called and justified, nothing could possibly interpose to hinder them from being glorified, was to furnish them with a plain motive or ground on which to neglect his exhortation in that kind. For who will be persuaded to suffer tribulation, or things grievous to be endured, for the obtaining of that which they have sufficient assurance given that they shall obtain, whether they suffer such things or no? Therefore certainly the apostle did not intend here to teach or imply the certainty of perseverance in those which are once justified unto salvation, against all carriages and miscarriages of these persons whatsoever.

3, and lastly, I demonstrate the same thing yet further, by this consideration. If God should justify all without exception whom he calleth, and that against all bars of wickedness and unbelief possible to be laid in his way by those who are called, then might ungodly and unbelieving persons inherit the kingdom of God and of Christ. But the Scripture speaks aloud the impossibility, or, however, the non-futurity hereof. Ergo, The reason of the connexion in the major proposition is evident, it being a known truth that persons justified are in a condition or present capacity of inheriting the kingdom of God.

If it be objected that the said connexion is tardy in this, that it supposeth that which ought not to be supposed, viz. that persons called by God, in the sense of the word "calling" here meant, may lay such bars of wickedness or unbelief in the way which shall hinder God from justifying them; I answer, Judas, Demas, Simon Magus, and others were called, and yet they laid such bars as we speak of in the way, and by which their justification, at least their final justification, was obstructed and prevented. If it be replied, But these were not called by God, in the sense of the apostle's "called," in the place under question; I answer, 1. It hath not yet been proved by any man, nor, I believe, ever will be, that the calling here spoken of imports any such act or work of God, whereby the called are irresistibly necessitated savingly to believe.* If it Οὐ γὰρ ἡναγκασμένη γέγονεν ἡ κλῆσις, οὐδὲ βεβιασμένη.—Chryeost, in locum.

imports no such thing as this, what hinders but that the persons mentioned might have been called with or by that very kind of calling which is here spoken of? 2. Suppose it should be granted that the calling here spoken of is that kind of calling which is always accompanied with a saving answer of faith, yet neither doth this prove but that even such called ones may obstruct and prevent, by wickedness and unbelief, their final justification, and consequently their glorification. If so, then the chain of divine acts or decrees here framed by the apostle, is not indissolvable in any such sense which imports an infallible and universal exertion or execution of the latter, wheresoever the former hath taken place. That Judas was called with such a calling as this, is Chrysostom's collection from Matt. xix. 28, from whom Peter Martyr knows not well how to dissent in the point; and how probable, at least, it is that the other two mentioned, Simon Magus, and especially Demas, were partakers of the like calling with him, may be considered in due time. But that they all three, with wickedness and unbelief, barred up the way against their final justification is, I suppose, every man's hypothesis and grant, or conjecture, at least.

But some, it may be, will yet further object against the interpretation given, and plead, 1. That the connexion between these two links of this chain, predestination to a conformity with Christ, and calling, is simply and absolutely indissolvable, so that, for example, whosoever is thus predestinated by God, never fails of being called by him. 2. That it is altogether unlikely, that in one and the same series or concatenation of Divine actions, there should not be the same fixedness or certainty of coherence between all the particulars, so that, for example, there should be as much certainty that he that is called, shall be justified; and again, that he that is justified shall be glorified, as there is that he that is predestinated shall be called. To this I answer,

1. By a demurrer upon the former of these pleas, which was, that the connexion between the predestination of God mentioned and his calling, is uninterruptible by any interveniency whatsoever. Somewhat doubtful to me it is, whether a person, who by means of the love of God, which is in him at present, falls under his decree of predestination, and consequently by virtue of this decree is predestinated to be conformed to the image of Christ, may not possibly before the time appointed by God for his calling be changed in that his affection, and consequently pass from under that decree of predestination, and fall under another decree of God opposite thereunto, and so never come to be called. But,

2. To the latter of the said pleas, I answer, by denying the unlikelihood therein asserted. For in one and the same concatenation of Divine acts, the aspect and manner or kind of dependence between act and act, may vary according to their different natures, or the different tenor of God's decrees concerning them. As for example. God may decree to create or give being unto a man ; * Vid. Pet. Martyr. loc. class 3, cap. 13. sect. 4.

again, he may decree to give unto this man a sufficiency of means and power, whereby to maintain himself in this being given unto him. Again yet further, he may decree to give unto this man not only a sufficiency of means and power, to make good his possession of that being thus given him, but further, to improve his present being first given unto him into a better and more desirable being. Fourthly, He may yet further decree to promote and advance the condition of this his creature, man, above the line of his first being. In this subordinate concatenation of Divine acts, all decreed by him, there is not the same aspect or relation, I mean in point of necessity and contingency, between every former act and that which followeth. As for instance; the second act of the four now mentioned may, partly by reason of the tenor of the decree by which it was decreed by God, partly by reason of the nature of it, I mean in reference to some Divine projection or end, have an absolute and uninterruptible dependence upon, or connexion with, the first; so that in case God creates a man, he is absolutely and against all interveniences whatsoever resolved to confer upon him that sufficiency of power which was mentioned, neither man himself, angel, or devil could prevent or hinder God from conferring such an endowment upon man, being created by him. But it doth not follow from hence that there must needs be the like aspect of necessity between this second act and the third; or between the third and the fourth. For though God as well decreed the third act as the second, viz. to bestow upon his creature, man, a sufficiency of power and means whereby to improve his first being into a better, yet he did not decree it, i. e. the doing of it, simply and absolutely, but only provisionally, and upon the supposal of such an interveniency, one or more, which very possibly might not have intervened, as viz. either the fall of this creature, man, by sin, and the gift of Jesus Christ upon it to die for his redemption; or else the continuance of man for a time in the honour of his creation, and entireness of his obedience unto God. First, that the fall of man was contingent, there being no cause either within him or without him necessitating him hereunto, is unquestionable; that the foreknowledge of it by God did no ways prejudice or hinder the contingency of it hath been formerly shown. 2. That the gift of Jesus Christ to die for the redemption of man depended in this sense upon his fall, viz. so as that he should not have been given in such a way, or upon such terms, I mean to die, had not man fallen, is, I suppose, the sense and apprehension of every man. 3, and lastly, That that act of God, in giving unto man power, means, and opportunity to better himself in point of condition, above the line of his creation, or first being, depends (his fall supposed, which was contingent also, as was lately said) upon the gift of Jesus Christ, so as never to have taken place in case he had not been so given, is sufficiently evident without proof. So that evident it is, that this act of God hath only an accidental or contingent dependence upon, or coherence with, the former; whereas this former hath an essential and necessary con