lute Dominion and Sovereignty, that he made that noble Acknowledgment, All the Inhabitants of the Earth are reputed as nothing; and he doeth according to his Will in the Army of Heaven, and among the Inhabitants of the Earth; and none can stay his Hand, or fay unto him, What doeft thou? Dan. iv. 35. His Power over us is compared to that of the Potter over his Clay. Jer. xviii. 6. O Houfe of Ifrael, cannot I do with you as this Potter? faith the Lord. Behold, as the Clay is in the Potters Hands, fo are ye in mine Hand, O Houfe of Ifrael. And Ifa. xlv. 9. Wo unto him that striveth with his Maker: Let the Potherd rive with the Potfherds of the Earth: Shall the Clay fay unto him that fashioneth it, What makeft thou? or thy Work, He hath no Hands?

God hath a Right to do many Things towards his Creatures, which they have no Right to do towards one another. Earthly Princes are of the fame Kind of Beings with their Subjects, Flesh and Blood as well as they; and as they did not give them Existence, fo they have not a proper abfolute Right over their Lives, to take them away at their own Pleasure. But God is the abfolute Lord of the Lives and Properties of his Creatures, and can difpofe of them as feemeth fit to his infi

nite Wisdom. The Lord killeth, and mak¬ eth alive; he bringeth down to the Grave, and bringeth up. The Lord maketh poor, and maketh rich; he bringeth low, and lifteth up. 1 Sam. ii. 6, 7. As the Creature deriveth all from his Will and Pleasure, and abfolutely dependeth upon him, so no Creature can have a proper Claim against him, either for Life or Property, which it is in his Power to withdraw or to conti¬ nue, as best answereth the Ends of his Providence. And in this he tranfgreffeth no Rule of Juftice: For he is not bound by the Laws made for fecuring Mens Lives and Properties against one another. The Juftice of God's Government and Providence is of a tranfcendent Nature, and is not tied down to our fcanty Rules; but is measured by a much fuperior Rule, the Reason of his all-comprehending Mind, which will ever carry him to do what is, all Things confidered, beft and fittest upon the whole, and what becometh his own glorious Perfections, and the Relations he fuftaineth towards his Creatures.

From this abfolute and independent Do¬ minion and Sovereignty of God, it fol loweth, that there must needs be many Things in the Courfe of his Adminiftrations, which are above our Reach, and of which we cannot pretend to be competent Judges,

Judges. Even with regard to earthly Sovereigns, it would be justly looked upon as contrary to the Duty of good Subjects, and to the Reverence they owe to Authority, to find Fault with every Thing in the Princes Actings they do not know the Reason of, and to expect to be let into all the Secrets of Government. Many Cafes there are, in which it would be accounted highly arrogant to demand a Reason from an earthly Prince or Master, for his acting after this or that Manner in Matters that depend upon his own Prerogative and free Pleafure. And much more inexcufably infolent would it be for such Creatures as we are, or for any created Beings, to pretend to demand a Reason for all God's Proceedings, as if we had a Right to cenfure every Thing in the Course of his Difpenfations which we cannot precisely account for. Why doft thou ftrive against him? (faith Elibu) for he giveth not an Account of any of his Matters. Job xxxiii. 13. Who can search the Depths of his facred Counfels, or undertake exactly to define what he, in his infinite Wisdom and abfolute Sovereignty, may rightfully ordain and appoint? If we would but allow God the Rights of a Sovereign, in the free Diftribution of his Favours, in ordering the Times, Seafons, Manner, Degrees of conferring

I

Benefits,

Benefits, or of forbearing, delaying, inflicting Corrections and Punishments, and in taking those Measures which he judgeth to be the fittest and best, it would prevent many of the Objections that are made against his Providence and Government. He hath undoubtedly (as was hinted before) wife and good Reasons for acting as he doth, even in Things which feem to depend upon mere Prerogative and fovereign Will and Pleasure; but we have not the least Right to demand to know those Reasons. Or, if he should see fit at fome Time or other to let us into the Reasons of his Proceedings, yet he may not think it proper to discover them to us at present, because we cannot be rightly capable of judging of them till the whole Scheme Thall be compleated.

Fourthly, The laft general Obfervation I would make concerning God's Government towards reasonable and moral Agents, is, that the great End of it is to promote their real Happiness, in a Way worthy of himself, and fuited to their rational Na

tures.

The principal End of all good human Governments, is the public Happinefs, or the Good of the governed. And Reason and Justice require that it should be fo. For, fince those that govern, are themfelves of the fame Species of. Beings with

those

thofe that are governed by them, it is manifeft that the Good of the whole Community is, in the Nature of the Thing, of greater Worth and Advantage than the Will and Pleasure, or Intereft of a single Perfon, or of a few. This, indeed, cannot properly be faid with regard to God and his Government. As he himself is the Fountain of all Perfection, infinitely fuperior to the whole rational Creation, and hath infinitely greater Worth and Excellency than they altogether, fo it cannot be faid that he is under an Obligation to promote the universal Good of the rational Creation, on the Account of his being inferior to the whole, or comprehended in it. But though he is not, on that Account, obliged to pursue the general Good of the rational Creatures, which are the Subjects of his Government, yet he is determined to it by his own infinite Goodness and Benevolence. That Goodness which inclined him to create them, and to give them all their excellent Faculties and Capacities for Happiness, will alfo incline him to govern them so as to promote their Happiness in a Way fuited to the Natures he hath given them, i. e. in a Way suited to moral Agency. This, therefore, may be regarded as the great End to which all his Administrations towards them are uni

formly