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such motions grace is actually perceived, I think it will always be found to be in slow, and, if I may use the expression, in restrained or measured motions. The motions of the horse, when wild in the pasture, are beautiful; when urged to his speed, and straining for victory, they may be felt as sublime; but it is chiefly in movements of a different kind that we feel them as graceful, when in the impatience of the field, or in the curvetting of the manege, he seems to be conscious of all the pow ers with which he is animated, and yet to restrain them from some principle of beneficence, or of dignity. Ev ery movement of the stag almost is beautiful, from the fineness of his form, and the ease of his gestures; yet it is not in these, or in the heat of the chase that he is graceful it is when he pauses upon some eminence in the pursuit, when he erects his crested head, and when, looking with disdain upon the enemy who follow, he bounds to the freedom of his hills. It is not, in the same manner, in the rapid speed of the eagle when he darts upon his prey, that we perceive the grace of which his motions are capable. It is when he soars slowly upwards to the sun, or when he wheels with easy and continuous motion in airy circles in the sky.

In the personification which we naturally give to all inanimate objects which are susceptible of movement, we may easily perceive the influence of the same association. We speak commonly, for instance, of the graceful motions of trees, and of the graceful movements of a river. It is never, however, when these motions are violent or extreme, that we apply to them the term of grace. It is the gentle waving of the tree in slow and measured cadence which is graceful, not the tossing of its branches amid the storm. It is the slow and easy winding which is graceful in the movements of the river,

and not the burst of the cateract, or the fury of the tor

rent.

SECTION VI.

Conclusion of this Essay.—Of the Final Cause of this Constitu tion of our Nature.

THE illustrations that have been offered in the course of this Essay upon the origin of the SUBLIMITY and BEAUTY of some of the principal qualities of MATTER, seem to afford sufficient evidence for the following conclusions:

I. That each of these qualities is either from nature, from experience, or from accident, the sign of some quality capable of producing emotion, or the exercise of some moral affection. And,

II. That when these associations are dissolved, or in other words, when the material qualities cease to be significant of the associated qualities, they cease also to produce the emotions, either of sublimity or beauty.

If these conclusions are admitted, it appears necessarily to follow, that the beauty and sublimity of such objects are to be ascribed not to the material qualities themselves, but to the qualities they signify; and, of consequence, that the qualities of matter are not to be considered as sublime or beautiful in themselves, but as being the SIGNS OF EXPRESSIONS of such qualities, as, by the constitution of our nature, are fitted to produce pleasing or interesting emotion.

The opinion I have now stated coincides, in a great degree, with a DOCTRINE that appears very early to have distinguished the PLATONIC School; which is to be traced, perhaps, (amid their dark and figurative language), in all the philosophical systems of the East, and which has been maintained in this country, by several writers of eminence-by Lord Shaftesbury, Dr. Hutcheson, Dr.

Akenside, and Dr. Spence, but which has no where so firmly and so philosophically been maintained as by Dr. Reid in his invaluable work ON THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OF MAN. The doctrine to which I allude, is, that matter is not beautiful in itself, but derives its beau ty from the expression of MIND.

As this doctrine, however, when stated in general terms, has somewhat the air of paradox, I shall beg leave, in a few words, to explain in what sense I understand and adopt it, by enumerating what appear to me the principal classes of this expression, or the principal means by which the qualities of matter become significant to us of those qualities of mind which are destined to affect us with pleasing or interesting emotion.

The qualities of MIND which are capable of producing emotion, are either its ACTIVE, or its PASSIVE qual ities; either its powers and capacities, as beneficence, wisdom, fortitude, invention, fancy, &c. or its feelings and affections, as love, joy, hope, gratitude, purity, fidelity, innocence, &c. In the observation or belief of these qualities of mind, we are formed, by the original and moral constitution of our nature, to experience various and powerful emotions.

As it is only, however, through the medium of matter, that, in the present condition of our being, the qual ities of mind are known to us, the qualities of matter become necessarily expressive to us of all the qualities of mind they signify. They may be the signs, therefore, or expressions of these mental qualities, in the following ways:

I. As the immediate signs of the POWERS or capaci ties of mind. It is thus, that all the works of human art or design are directly significant to us of the wisdom, the invention, the taste, or the benevolence of the artist; and the works of nature, of the power, the wisdom, and the beneficence of the Divine artist.

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II. As the signs of all those AFFECTIONS, or dispositions of mind, which we love, or with which we are formed to sympathize. It is thus that the notes and motions of animals are expressive, to us of their happiness and joy that the tones of the human voice are significant of the various emotions by which it is animated; and that all the affections which we either love or admire in the human mind, are directly signified to us by the va rious appearances of the countenance and form.

These may be called the direct expressions of mind; and the material qualities which signify such powers or affections, produce in us immediately the peculiar emotions which, by the laws of our nature, the mental quali ties are fitted to produce. But beside these, there are other means by which the qualities of matter may be sig nificant to us of the qualities of mind, indirectly, or by means of less universal and less permanent relations.

1. From experience, when peculiar forms or appearances of matter are considered as the means or instruments by which those feelings or affections of mind are produced with which we sympathize, or in which we are interested. It is thus that the productions of art are in so many various ways significant to us of the conveniences, the pleasures, or the happiness they bestow upon human life, and as the signs of happiness affect us with the emotion this happiness itself is destined to produce. It is thus also, that the scenes of nature acquire such an accession of beauty, when we consider them as fitted, with such exquisite wisdom, for the habitation of so many classes of sentient being: and when they become thus expressive to us of all the varied happiness they produce, and contain, and conceal.

2. From analogy or resemblance; from that resemblance which has every where been felt between the

qualities of matter and of mind, and by which the former becomes so powerfully expressive to us of the latter. It is thus, that the colours, the sounds, the forms, and above all, perhaps, the motions of inanimate objects, are so universally felt as resembling peculiar qualities or af fections of mind, and when thus felt, are so productive of the analagous emotion; that the personification of matter is so strongly marked in every period of the history of human thought; and that the poet, while he gives life and animation to every thing around him, is not dis playing his own invention, but only obeying one of the most powerful laws which regulate the imagination of

man.

3. From association, (in the proper sense of that term) when by means of education, of fortune, or of accident, material objects are connected with pleasing or interesting qualities of mind; and from this connexion become forever afterwards expressive of them. It is thus that colours, forms, &c. derive their temporary beauty from fashion; that the objects which have been devoted to religion, to patriotism, or to honour, affect us with all the emotions of the qualities of which they be come significant; that the beauty of natural scenery is so often exalted by the record of the events it has witnessed; and that in every country, the scenes which have the deepest effect upon the admiration of the people, are those which have become sacred by the memory of ancient virtue or ancient glory.

4. From individual association; when certain qualities or appearances of matter, are connected with our own private affections or remembrances; and when they give to these material qualities or appearances a character of interest which is solely the result of our own memory and affections.

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