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cise of mind is not produced, the emotions of taste are unfelt, and that when it is increased, these emotions are increased with it, we seem to possess sufficient evidence to conclude, that this pleasure exists, and forms a part of that peculiar pleasure which we receive from objects of sublimity and beauty.

The pleasure, therefore, which accompanies the emotions of taste, may be considered not as a simple, but as a complex pleasure; and as arising not from any separate and peculiar sense, but from the union of the pleasure of SIMPLE EMOTION, with that which is annexed, by the constitution of the human mind, to the exercise of IM

AGINATION.

IV.

The distinction which thus appears to subsist between the emotions of simple pleasure, and that complex pleasure which accompanies the emotions of taste, seems to require a similar distinction in philosophical language. I believe, indeed, that the distinction is actually to be found in the common language of conversation; and I apprehend that the term DELIGHT is very generally used to express the peculiar pleasure which attends the emotions of taste, in contradistinction to the general term pleasure, which is appropriated to simple emotion. We are pleased, we say, with the gratification of any appetite or affection-with food when hungry, and with rest when tired-with the gratification of curiosity, of benevolence, or of resentment. But we say, we are delighted with the prospect of a beautiful landscape, with the sight of a fine statue, with hearing a pathetic piece of music, with the perusal of a celebrated poem. In these cases the term delight is used to denote that pleasure which arises from sublimity and beauty, and to distinguish it from those simpler pleasures which arise from

objects that are only agreeable. I acknowledge, indeed, that this distinction is not very accurately adhered to in common language, because, in most cases, either of the terms equally expresses our meaning; but I apprehend, that the observation of it is sufficiently general, to shew some consciousness in mankind of a difference between these pleasures, and to justify such a distinction in philosophical language as may express it.

If it were permitted me therefore, I should wish to appropriate the term delight, to signify the peculiar pleasure which attends the emotions of TASTE, or which is felt, WHEN THE IMAGINATION IS EMPLOYED IN

THE PROSECUTION OF A REGULAR TRAIN OF IDEAS OF EMOTION.

ESSAY II.

OF THE SUBLIMITY AND BEAUTY OF THE

MATERIAL WORLD.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTORY.

Ir the illustrations in the preceding Essay are just, if that exercise of mind which takes place when the emotions of beauty or sublimity are felt consists in the prosecution of a regular train of ideas of emotion, and if no other objects are in fact productive of the emotions of taste, but such as are fitted to produce some simple emotion, there arises a question of some difficulty, and of very considerable importance, viz. What is the source of the SUBLIMITY and BEAUTY of the MATERIAL WORLD?

It cannot be doubted, that many objects of the material world are productive of the emotions of sublimity and beauty: some of the fine arts are altogether employed about material objects; and far the greater part of the instances of beauty or sublimity which occur in every man's experience, are found in matter, or in some of its qualities.

On the other hand, I think it must be allowed, that matter in itself is unfitted to produce any kind of emotion. The various qualities of matter are known to us

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only by means of our external senses; but all that such powers of our nature convey, is sensation and perception; and whoever will take the trouble of attending to the effect which such qualities, when simple and unassociated, produce upon his mind, will be satisfied, that in no case do they produce emotion, or the exercise of any of his affections. The common language of mankind upon this subject, perfectly coincides with this observation. Such qualities, when simple, are always spoken of as producing sensation, but in no case as producing emotion; and although perhaps the general word feeling (as applied both to our external and internal senses) may sometimes be used ambiguously, yet if we attend to it, we shall find, that, with regard to material qualities, it is uniformly used to express sensation, and that if we substitute emotion for it, every man will perceive the mistake. The smell of a rose, the colour of scarlet, the taste of a pine-apple, when spoken of merely as qualities, and abstracted from the objects in which they are found, are said to produce agreeable sensations, but not agreeable emotions. In the same manner, the smell of assafœtida, or the taste of aloes, when spoken of as abstract qualities, are uniformly said to produce unpleasing sensations, but not unpleasing emotions. If we could conceive ourselves possessed only of those powers which we have by means of our external senses, I apprehend there can be no doubt, that, in such a case, the qualities of matter would produce only sensation and perception; that such sensations might be either pleasing or painful, but that in no case could they be attended with any emotion.

But although the qualities of matter are in themselves incapable of producing emotion, or the exercise of any affection, yet it is obvious that they may produce this effect, from their association with other qualities; and as

being either the signs or expressions of such qualities as are fitted by the constitution of our nature to produce emotion. Thus, in the human body, particular forms or colours are the signs of particular passions or affections. In works of art, particular forms are the signs of dexterity, of taste, of convenience, of utility. In the works of nature, particular sounds and colours, &c. are the signs of peace, or danger, or plenty, or desolation, &c. In such cases, the constant connexion we discover between the sign and the thing signified, between the material quality and the quality productive of emotion, renders at last the one expressive to us of the other, and very often disposes us to attribute to the sign, that effect which is produced only by the quality signified.

That such associations are formed with material qualities, every man has sufficient evidence in his own experience; and there are many causes which may be assigned, both of the extent and of the universality of such associations. I shall remark a few of these, without pre- . tending to an accurate enumeration.

1. All those external objects, which, from their nature or constitution, are productive to us, either of use, of convenience, or of pleasure, or which in any other way are fitted to produce emotion, are known and distinguished by their qualities of form and colour. Such qualities, therefore, are naturally, and even necessarily expressive to us of those uses, or conveniences, or pleasures. It is by them that we become acquainted with the subjects from which such utilities arise; it is by them that we learn to distinguish such subjects from one another; and as they are the permanent signs of these several utilities, they affect us with the same emotion which the utilities signified by them are fitted to produce. The material qualities, for instance, which dis

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