adjoining alley. Into this alley he meant to have conveyed his prisoner, aided by his companion, one of two associates who had been introduced by the friend to whom Champe had been originally made known by letter from the commander in chief, and with whose aid and counsel he had so far conducted the enterprise. His other associate was with the boat prepared at one of the wharves on the Hudson river, to receive the party.'

"Champe and his friend intended to have placed themselves each under Arnold's shoulder, and to have thus borne him through the most unfrequented alleys and streets to the boat; representing Arnold, in case of being questioned, as a drunken soldier whom they were conveying to the guard-house."

"When arrived at the boat the difficulties would be all surmounted, there being no danger nor obstacle in passing to the Jersey shore. These particulars as soon as known to Lee, were communicated to the commander in chief, who was highly gratified with the much desired intelligence. He directed major Lee to meet Champe, and to take care that Arnold should not be hurt. The day arrived, and Lee with a party of dragoons left camp late in the evening, with three led accoutred horses; one for Arnold, one for the sergeant and the third for his associate, never doubting the success of the enterprise, from the tenor of the last received communication. The party reached Hoboken about midnight, where they were concealed in the adjoining wood,-Lee with three dragoons stationing himself near the river shore. Hour after hour passed,-no boat approached. At length the day broke and the major retired to his party, and with his led horses returned to camp, when he proceeded to headquarters to inform the general of the much lamented disappointment, as mortifying as inexplicable. Washington having perused Champe's plan and communication, had indulged the presumption that at length the object of his keen and constant pursuit was sure of execution, and did not dissemble the joy such conviction produced. He was chagrined at the issue, and apprehended that his faithful sergeant must have been detected in the last scene of his tedious and difficult enterprise.

"In a few days, Lee received an anonymous letter from Champe's patron and friend, informing him that on the day preceding the night fixed for the execution of the plot, Arnold had removed his quarters to another part of the town, to superintend the embarkation of troops, preparing (as was rumoured) for an expedition to be directed by himself; and that the American legion, consisting chiefly of American deserters, had been transferred from their barracks to one of the transports; it being apprehended that if left on shore until

the expedition was ready, many of them might desert. Thus it happened that John Champe, instead of crossing the Hudson that night, was safely deposited on board one of the fleet of transports, from whence he never departed until the troops under Arnold landed in Virgina! Nor was he able to escape from the British army until after the junction of lord Cornwallis at Petersburg, when he deserted; and proceeding high up into Virginia he passed into North Carolina near the Saura towns, and keeping in the friendly districts of that state, safely joined the army soon after it had passed the Congaree in pursuit of lord Rawdon."

"His appearance excited extreme surprise among his former comrades, which was not a little increased when they saw the cordial reception he met with from the late major now lieutenant colonel Lee. His whole story soon became known to the corps, which reproduced the love and respect of officer and soldier (heretofore invariably entertained for the sergeant), heightened by universal admiration of his late daring and arduous attempt."

"Champe was introduced to general Greene, who very cheerfully complied with the promises made by the commander in chief, as far as in his power; and having provided the sergeant with a good horse and money for his journey, sent him to general Washington, who munificently anticipated every desire of the sergeant and presented him with his discharge from further service,* lest he might, in the vicissitudes of war, fall into the enemy's hands; when, if recognized, he was sure to die on a gibbet."

We intended to make some additional extracts which would, we believe, have had a strong attraction for our readers, but the foregoing narrative has occupied so much space, as to render it necessary for us, to deny ourselves this gratification. Many very sagacious, and important general observations are scattered throughout these Memoirs, in relation to the insufficiency of militia for the public service in war;-to the indispensable necessity of an ample accumulation of munitions, &c., and of a thorough knowledge of localities, before the commencement of hostilities;-to the selection of able and experienced officers, particularly for the management of raw recruits, &c.

"When general Washington was called by president Adams to the command of the army, prepared to defend the country from French hostility, be sent to lieutenant colonel Lee to inquire for Champe; being determined to bring him into the field at the head of a company of infantry.

"Lee sent to Loudon county, where Champe settled after his discharge from the army; when he learned that the gallant soldier had removed to Kentucky, where he soon after died."

-Not only the narrative of general Lee, but the history of our Revolutionary struggle at all times, and in every part of the Union, furnishes the most direct and awful lessons of experience on all these points: And yet how incomprehensibly, how lamentably,-have they not failed to produce their natural,-one would have thought necessary, effect, with the present administration of this country, in the conduct of the unhallowed war, which they have undertaken. The transactions on our frontiers for the few months, past, argue a degree of improvidence, and of rashness, that looks like a sudden and wrathful visitation of Divine Providence, rather than the consequence of native imbecility of mind, united to the most blind and intemperate passion.

The Appendix to this work, contains some well written, and highly entertaining biographical notices. Among the number, those of major general baron de Kalb, and general Morgan, deserve to be particularly mentioned. There is another name, prominent, too, in almost every page of the work, to which our attention was particularly attracted; that of colonel John Eager Howard. The career of this officer in the South has, we think, a character, even of more usefulness, and brilliancy, than that of any one of his associates in arms. He may be said to have decided, in one instance, the cause of independence. He is to be found in almost every action of any importance, pressing into the thickest of the fight with his intrepid corps, and rendering the most important service both by his courage and judgment. There is now no individual of the surviving revolu ionary officers, to whom the United States owe such heavy obligations. This gentleman is, however, one of those, who are now stigmatized as tories;who, would not, if they were so disposed, be permitted, to serve their country once more, in that elevation of military rank, to which their experience and capacity entitle them. In the same class is the author of these Memoirs. We do not wish, in tenderness to the American name, to revive the recollection of the horrid catastrophe at Baltimore, in which he was so conspicuous a victim; but we cannot refrain from the reflection, how far he must have been from expecting, when he fought by the side of Greene, that he would ever be proscribed as a tory, or ever bear the mark of wounds inflicted by an infuriate mob, in the land which he then served, with such entire and generous devotion. To call up a blush into the cheek, of every American not absolutely callous to the national disgrace, he has but to produce these Memoirs. They will, we trust, soon be, on every account, in the hands of all his countrymen.

231

Observations on the Report of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, which prefaced the Decrees concerning the New Organization of the National Guard, published in the Moniteur of the 16th of March 1812.

[WE have recently obtained from abroad, a small pamphlet, with the foregoing title, ascribed upon good authority, to the pen of Mr. Gentz, who is so deservedly classed, among the first political writers of his time. As it treats of matters, in which the American people have an immediate interest, and is written with considerable ability, we shall present them with a translation, (the original being in French) of the sections of it, to which we attach most importance. The Despot of France has so often appealed to the treaty of Utrecht, as the basis of his pretensions in favour of maritime rights, that it has become of some consequence for the world, to ascertain the true character, and force of this celebrated treaty. Mr. Gentz has, in the following pages, investigated and determined the question, in a manner fitted to convince every understanding, and to deprive the French government, of all colour of defence, for the imposition it has attempted in this instance. The French Ministerial Report, to which the author refers, throughout his pamphlet, and which must be familiar to most of our readers, will be found in the appendix to our present number.]

THIS Report, which may be considered, as the introductory Manifesto of the terrible war, now about to be commenced, is but an exposition of the pretended encroachments of England on neutral rights, in maritime hostilities, and of the measures successively adopted by France to avenge and protect those rights. The author of the Report begins by asserting, "that the rights of maritime neutrality, were solemnly "regulated, by the treaty of Utrecht become the common law "of nations," and "that this law has been re-enacted verbatim "in all subsequent treaties." He thence proceeds to a recital of the "arbitrary and tyrannical edicts," by which England has violated the principles of the treaty of Utrecht, and of the acts of reprisal with which France had combated those edicts; and the general result is the urgent necessity, of employing all the disposable forces of France, to exclude neutrals from certain ports at the extremity of the continent, into which they might introduce a few bales of English merchandize.

The French government must imagine, that its cotemporaries reduced to a state of the most pitiable stupidity, have lost, together with the desire, or the power of resistance, even the remembrance of all that has happened in their own time;

even the last vestige of the history and ancient public law of Europe; or at least, the faculty of reading, comparing, and reflecting. Otherwise, it would not hold out to them as diplomatic oracles, fables so clumsily put together, that the most credulous reader, must regard, in the light of an insult, the attempt to impose them on his belief.

A satisfactory refutation of each part, or rather of every phrase, of this Report, would not be a difficult task. I shall restrict myself, however, at present, to a succinct examination of the questions of right. My object will be accomplished, if I succeed in proving,

1st. That the treaty of Utrecht, at the very period of its signature, was not,—could not be,—and was never pretended to be, "the common law of nations with respect to maritime rights."

2dly. That this treaty, far from acquiring afterwards, an extension, or force other than that which it originally possessed, had not the most remote connexion, with any of the subsequent events, and political relations.

3dly. That, in the strife in which France and England have, since the year 1806, been engaged, to lay the commerce of all countries of the world under reciprocal interdiction, France must be considered as the real agressor.

4thly. That the principles asserted in the Manifesto of the 16th March, to justify the new war, with which the continent is about to be desolated, are the same,-carried indeed to an unprecedented height of atrocity,-which have distinguished the march of the French government, in every stage of the present contest,

I. For the establishment of a common law of nations, regulating the limits between belligerent, and neutral rights in maritime war, it would seem indispensable, that all independent powers, duly represented in a general congress, should have consulted together, on the principles to be followed in this department of public law, and have produced a code recognized and sanctioned by all the parties interested.

I need not dwell here, on the inadmissibility, and the absurdity even, of a supposition to this effect. It is sufficient, for us to know that no such enterprise has ever been achieved,

nor

even attempted, and particularly, that the treaty of Utrecht, such as it is, bears no mark of resemblance whatever, to a code of public law, or a common rule of nations.

What is generally styled the treaty of Utrecht, is, as all the world knows, merely a collection of separate treaties, con