was so marked that it attracted the admiring attention of the defenders. He was in the assailing column led by Benedict Arnold, and when that officer was wounded and was being carried from the field, Morgan took the lead. Rushing impetuously forward, he broke with his men through the first and second barriers of defence. Victory seemed almost within his grasp. But the fall of Montgomery at this critical moment changed the aspect of affairs, the garrison took advantage of the confusion that followed to repel the assailants, and Morgan was among those who fell into their hands as prisoners.

Morgan's gallantry during the siege won him respect and not a little distinction as a prisoner. One British officer, indeed, sought to win his valuable services for the royal army by offering him the position of colonel, but the patriot rifleman hotly repelled the tempter, bidding him "never again to insult him in his misfortunes by an offer which plainly implied that he thought him a villain." After that, no one ventured to tempt him to treason.

Morgan was exchanged in 1776 and rejoined the army, being now, on Washington's recommendation, raised to the rank of colonel. He was placed at the head of a select rifle corps, in command of which, on various occasions, he attacked the enemy with terrible effect. His men, skilled sharpshooters, were the most dangerous in the American service, and to confront them in the field was sure death to many of the British officers.

He was especially active in the campaign against General Burgoyne, his exertions and the brilliant services of his men aiding effectively in the overthrow of the Burgoyne expedition. To him and his men

much of the glory of the capture of the British army belonged, but General Gates was so grossly unjust that he did not even mention him in his despatches. The cause of this is said to have been the following:

It is well known that Gates, intoxicated by his success, began to intrigue for the removal of Washington. He broached the subject to Morgan in a private conversation, telling him that the army was greatly dissatisfied with Washington's leadership, that his reputation was rapidly declining, and that several prominent officers had threatened to resign unless a new commander-in-chief were appointed.

Morgan's impatience barely permitted Gates to reach the end of his remarks, and he immediately broke out with stern indignation: "Sir, I have one favor to ask. Never again mention to me this hateful subject. Under no other man than General Washington, as commander-in-chief, will I ever serve."

This ended all intimacy between Gates and Morgan. The general gave a dinner a few days later to the principal British officers and to some of the American, but Morgan was left out of the list of guests. While the dinner was proceeding official business required Morgan to communicate with Gates, but as soon as he had completed his business he withdrew. His name was not announced, but some of the British officers, perceiving from his dress that he was of high rank, inquired his name. When told that he was Colonel Morgan, commander of the rifle corps, a number of them left the table, followed him from the room, and introduced themselves to him, expressing warm appreciation of his skill and valor.

From Saratoga Morgan made his way to Washington's camp at Valley Forge, and continued with him

till June, 1779, when, his health being greatly shattered, he resigned his command and sought his family and farm. Here he remained until after General Gates had been appointed to the command of the Southern army. Gates called upon him and requested his services in his new duty, but Morgan's indignation still rankled deeply and he spoke his feelings very plainly in regard to the treatment he had received. Motives of public good might influence him, he said, but friendship could not exist for one from whom he had experienced only neglect and injustice.

A few weeks later Congress promoted Colonel Morgan to the rank of brigadier-general, and at their request he set out to join the army of General Gates. He was not obliged to serve under his enemy. When he reached the Carolinas there was nothing that could. be called an army to join. The battle of Camden had been fought, the army was scattered like leaves before the wind, and Gates was a fugitive without a soldier to keep him company.

It was not until after General Greene took the place of Gates and brought the scattered soldiers together again that the patriot forces made any show in the South, beyond the work of Marion and other partisan commanders and of the brave Tennesseans at King's Mountain. But early in 1781 Morgan had an opportunity for the greatest deed in his career, the exploit which has made him famous in American history.

General Greene dispatched him with four hundred Continentals, Colonel Washington's force of dragoons, and a small number of militia, amounting to about six hundred men in all, to take position on the left of the British army under Lord Cornwallis, he taking post himself about seventy miles to the right.

The movement of Morgan seemed to Cornwallis directed against the British posts at Ninety-Six and Augusta, and he sent Colonel Tarleton against him with a force of horse and foot nearly a thousand strong. He was ordered, if possible, to bring Morgan to battle, a command much to the taste of the warlike Tarleton, especially as he knew that he had much the stronger force. When aware of his menacing approach Morgan fell back rapidly. But retreat was not to his taste, and, being reinforced by a body of militia, and full of confidence in the valor of his regulars, he halted on the night of January 16 at a place called Cowpens, resolved to give Tarleton a chance to fight, if he wished.

Tarleton was following with the utmost speed, and was doubtless highly gratified in finding the Americans at bay. With his well-trained infantry and strong body of cavalry, he fancied that it would be a light task to dispose of Morgan and his men, half militia as they were. On the morning of January 17 the two armies came face to face. The chances seemed sadly against the Americans. Tarleton had every advantage, in point of ground, cavalry, and numbers, and of the two pieces of artillery he had brought. But Morgan faced him undauntedly and drew up his men in a position which military critics look upon as masterly. Two light parties of militia were posted in front, with orders to feel the enemy and fall back, firing as they did so, to the main line of militia under General Perkins. Back of this was a strong line of Continentals and militia, under Colonel Howard. The cavalry, under Colonel Washington, were held in reserve.

The conflict took place as Morgan had designed, the light troops and front line delivering their fire

and falling back when heavily pressed on the Continentals, who held their own with unyielding firmness. But a chance event threatened the Americans with defeat. Colonel Howard, his flank being threatened, ordered his right company to change its front. Mistaking the order, the company fell back and the whole line began to retire. The moment was critical but Morgan proved equal to the situation. He ordered the men to retreat to the cavalry, which was successfully done, and a new position was thus taken up in the midst of the battle.

The British, thinking that their foes were breaking up in dismay, rushed forward in disorderly haste, but were greeted as they drew near by a murderous fire from Howard's new formed troops. The unexpected volley staggered them and caused them to recoil in confusion, and Howard seized the opportunity to charge with the bayonet, while the militia on the wings poured a sharp shower of bullets into their ranks. This was far more than they had bargained for and they broke and fled.

Colonel Washington saw that the moment to act had come, and charged the British cavalry, more than three times his number, so impetuously, that they, too, broke and sought safety in flight. The whole British force was now in disorderly retreat, closely pressed by the victorious Americans, Tarleton himself receiving a wound from Colonel Washington's sword as he rode hastily away. The pursuit continued for twenty miles, nearly all the British infantry being killed or taken, the cavalry badly cut up, the artillery and nearly all the arms and wagons captured. Tarleton burned his own baggage to save it from capture. In this brilliant exploit Morgan lost only ten men killed