expansive principle, but also the negative or restraining one is admitted, until then, Schelling tells us, it is the duty of scientific sincerity to deny the personal existence of the Godhead, since he considers it as impossible to conceive a God without a negative principle as it is to conceive a circle without a central point.

In later times (1830-'40) Schelling published his philosophical views under the title of "Positive Philosophy or Philosophy of Mythology and Revelation." The views are much the same as those already detailed, but are placed in various, and in other lights. We must, however, decline entering into closer inquiry on that subject before having sketched the outlines of the Hegelian philosophy so as to point out at the same time the positive views of German Philosophy in general, or at least in the four masters whose opinions we have attempted to illustrate. All these philosophers, as indeed all theologians who attempt to reason on the Nature of God,-all finish in Pantheism. In order to admit of the existence of a human intelligence as a something distinct from Divine Intelligence man must not reason on God, but Trust in God, and that Trust constitutes, according to the view we adopt, Divine Faith.

Thus we have seen that Kant, denying all metaphysical conclusjons, conceives the mind as the centre around which all human thought revolves as does the planetary system round the Sun. We have seen that his conclusions tend to cancel all idealism, all dogmatism, and even empiricism and Pyrrhonism in favor of the empirical laws of the human mind, which, proceeding from an unknown source, knows nothing and can know nothing of itself or of its source, and must follow certain given roads or elementary beliefs in all perception and reasonings, without knowing, however, the

true nature of that which it perceives and of which it reasons. Therefore those primary beliefs, those absolute forms, those absolute and necessary à priori laws of the mind merely guide mankind, according to Kant, in the exploration of the sensible world or of the object.

Fichte, we have shown, follows up the notion of Kant respecting the superiority of the Mind over Matter. But we have seen that if at first he only admitted of the Subject or the Mind as all in all, he, at a later period, although still maintaining that the Ego or Self constitutes the only positive ground which the mind possesses, yet he deduces from the Ego or Self the Existence of a superior, unlimited and absolute principle, a something that serves to limit the Self, and causes it, as it were, to rebound upon itself. That principle is God, who, with Fichte, is a creation of the mind, a psychological phenomenon.

Now, Schelling sees God in the History of Man or of Mankind, of the human race and in that of Nature. He admits of the analogy of the laws of nature and those of mind. With him the mind is not paramount, but is only a link in the vast chain of being. Intelligence penetrates Nature in every pore, but only awakens by degrees, so that the Mind may be considered itself in the light of a superior degree or of a higher step of Nature in the march of Intelligence towards Absolute Wisdom. These degrees, we have seen, are conceived by Schelling to be themselves united in one Supreme degree, which is the Absolute, in which is found and in which resides the harmony of all things. Nature and Mind he considers as united in Intelligence, which is to them as the union of two tendencies, a definite and an indefinite, or of attraction and repulsion, and continually varying to be perpet

ually forthcoming. This identity, this Unity of the Subject and the Object or Nature in Thought was, however, a mere hypothesis, and the issue of these speculations was, that Schelling began to be looked upon as a dreamer. Compared to Fichte, these views of Schelling threw the former into comparative obscurity-such an unbounded horizon was opened to Thought by the identification of Mind to Object. This Identity, this pure Subject-Object or Mind-reflecting Nature, became the principle of all duality, of all plurality, and may be likened to an ever-varying scale, ever inclining on one side or the other according as the real or the unreal preponderate for a time. This duality is, however, according to our author, merely apparent, for the relative Totality of each is identical, and the balance is always restored or equipoised. Nature and Mind identified and united in Reason or Intelligence (Vernunft), was indeed a most poetical view of things in philosophy, but that view when compared to the more positive (relative) conceptions of Hegel, who now appeared upon the stage of philosophical discussion in all the pride of strength, seemed unworthy of the name of Science.

The scientific, logical and close reasoning character of the à posteriori philosophy of Hegel routed the light, conjectural à priori reasonings opposed by Schelling in the very first encounter. The latter, it is true, aimed far more at proving that what Hegel said had been taken from himself, than at proving him to be in the wrong. Thus, after having long maintained that the Absolute or Reason was the result of the unity of Mind and Nature, we find Schelling at last abandoning that position and admitting that the Absolute was distinct from Reason or Intelligence. The difference between the primary views of Schelling and those of

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Hegel respecting the Absolute, was that the former conceived the Absolute as the Identity of the Object and Subject, whilst the latter understood by that term the Identity of the Subject and Substance, so that the absolute Substance of Hegel united both the views of Fichte respecting the absolute Subject, and those of Spinoza on absolute Substance or Existence. The issue of the struggle was that Schelling gave up Philosophy for Mysticism. He sought after something higher than Spirit, or Mind, or Absolute Intelligence, and he imagined to have discovered the object of his search in Love, and in the God of all Love.

The logical à posteriori method of Hegel stands in formal contrast with the loose à priori intuitive admissions of Schelling even when occupying the very same ground, or taking up the same subject. Hegel considers all things as possessing fixed relations of a peculiar nature which constitute the absolute and necessary law thereof. The struggle between the two philosophers arose on a field that will ever prove a ground of strife. The admission of Hegel that the finite Being termed Man can comprehend and embrace Infinity or the Infinite in logical rule, is an attempt as irrational, we believe, as the pains which Schelling took to prove that his à priori opinions possessed any real or positive (relative) value. Hegel, it is true, asserted that if we reason at all of the Infinite, it must be done closely; and that the strictest logical rules are there altogether indispensable.

HEGEL.

Since the perfect identity of Mind and Nature or of Thought and Being constitutes the main principle of Schelling's philosophy, Hegel maintains that if such is really the fact, it ought to be adequately expressed and not in the varying loose manner adopted by his predecessor. Absolute knowledge is therefore conceived by Hegel as requiring absolute expression or identical form, and he aims, not at setting aside the philosophical views of Schelling, but at rendering them practical or available by means of the absolute method. This method is very like that of Fichte, so that Hegel may be said to combine in himself both of his predecessors. With Fichte, he admits that all proceeds from the Subject, the Mind or Ego, and there lies the basis of his method; but, with Schelling, he admits of the Absolute, but not as intuitive. Schelling, he remarks sarcastically, brought forth the Absolute "as if he shot it out of a gun." Hegel likens that conception, as Schelling presented it, to Night in which all things are equally dark, and compares him to a painter who should only know of two colors, red and green. Hegel avoids the first fault by proceeding with gradual well co-ordinated steps, arriving at last by a long concatenation of reasonings to the point which lies beyond the depth of all human knowledge, and not plunging headlong therein as does Schelling. The sec