Europe, and threaten to stifle all undergrowth. We allude to German philosophy. We do not say that metaphysical "anticipations" did not exist before Leibnitz, but only that through this doctrine a kind of Mythology was created in Science, where it too often still obtains. A doctrine so void of materialism; one of which immaterialism is indeed the very essence, might appear, and did and did appear at first sight, as one conducing powerfully to the belief of man in God, in immortality, and in the clear distinction between soul and body. Such was the foliage, but the fruits of the tree were of a different kind. The fallacies of the doctrine -fallacies easily pointed out-recoiled on the more sacred tenets they were presumed to support, and the Deity, classed as a Monad, was soon absorbed in the vortex of natural Theology as a mere force of Nature. And all this from what Leibnitz terms an imaginary thing!

We repeat, that it is with monads, as with forces, far easier to say what they are not, than what they are. They are not to be confounded with "atoms" of Democritus and Epicurus. These were identical and material, although utterly impalpable. Their form was the cause of their quality. Now, no two monads are similar or alike. The atoms were considered as infinitely divisible, whilst the monads, being merely metaphysical, immaterial points, were indivisible. themselves atoms are nothing, whilst Monads constitute all the activity of the universe. Each monad contains also, as it were, reflected in it all that takes place in the universe, barring that the reflection is no passive state, but is a real activity. Each monad thus represents a kind of Divinity, (parvus in suo genere Deus.)

In

Here a natural question arises: How did this doctrine stand in relation to the ideas of Matter, of God,

and of the Soul? With Leibnitz, monads composed the whole universe; every existing thing was an aggregate of them; therefore, there could exist no simple substance, every thing being composed of Monads, in greater or less number, forming thus a complicated machinery in which are found wheels running within wheels: so that what appeared as Matter or Substance was, in reality, an accumulation of Monads, which alone constituted the elements thereof. Did, then, Leibnitz deny the existence of body or matter? He conceived it, as we have just mentioned, because, according to his view of things, Space was a mere conception. But among these monads were various kinds, according to the degree of perfection of these simple powers; and more especially there existed two classes, the indistinct (confus) and the distinct or definite. The indistinct were of the simplest nature, (monade toute nue;) these are compared to the indistinct thoughts which pass across the mind in slumber. These constitute the inorganic world, and may be likened to what is termed Matter. Monads of higher rank form vegetable life, and Sensation and Intelligence exist in those which represent animated being. Thus some are, as it were, asleep, others are dreaming, whilst others are actively employed. All this is carried on harmoniously, for the unity of difference is harmony. All these changes take place according to a pre-established scheme; they are parallel and never confused, and thus when the monads which constitute the body, and the monad which is the soul, come to act, their action is so ordained, that they correspond as do two clocks when pointing to the same hour; each is impelled by a distinct impulsion, and yet the same thing is pointed out.

But what part does the Supreme Monad perform? That of attending to the past, present, and future state

of every single monad, of which myriads of myriads form the universe. This Monad is self-existent; it is the primary substance; it is pure action, (actus purus,) whilst the effort (appetitio) belongs to the monads. But evidently the monads could do without; and so it occurred with those who simply termed natural Forces the powers of nature, instead of Monads. In fact, this system was no less than that of Spinoza-but on quite opposite grounds-a perversion of the religious idea of the Almighty.

It is barely doing justice to Leibnitz to add that in his celebrated work, entitled "Theodicea, or a Dissertation on the Goodness of God, the Liberty of Man, and the Origin of Good and Evil," his views are far more worthy of a religious mind. Indeed, the views of Leibnitz, which are the same as those of Malebranche, only covered over with a philosophical varnish these views are generally adopted even at the present day by those who aim at explaining what it is not given to man to explain. Their evil effect seems to us to be that of causing men to lose sight of the deep sense attached to the primary Revelation, that which told Man of the Almighty.

It is trust in the attributes of the Almighty that constitutes divine Faith, and not trust in any rational explanation. When Leibnitz attempts to prove that God had an aim in creating the world, and that that aim was His glory, or when he maintains that the world being created as it is, therefore it is the best of all possible worlds, it is certainly as to that deepest of mysteries, the origin of evil, an easy way to get rid of the difficulty by denying that evil exists. It is at the same time in complete accordance with Christianity and with the most simple experience to admit that Evil prevails on Earth, and no philosophical maxim of

optimism, such as "all is for the best," is of such practical worth as trust or faith in the Almighty, when His having been revealed as such is clearly established on proofs of which rational faith or human judgment is fully competent. This is no blind submission of Reason to Faith; it is the rational belief or Faith in that great event termed Revelation of the Existence of God, rational faith which is the consequence of the certitude acquired that that eventful circumstance in the existence of the human race is a matter of fact. Divine Faith is then the upshot, the highest point of human Reason, which goes no further, which does not aim at understanding the attributes revealed as Supreme, as Almighty, but demands rational evidence of the fact. Supreme Power, and Wisdom, and Goodness are thus admitted by Reason, by rational judgment on rational evidence of the fact of their having been revealed. It is then in submission to this eventful fact that human reason admits of Power, of Wisdom, and of Goodness very different from the mere rational finite notions that man possesses of such attributes. Divine Faith thus becomes rational insomuch as Reason has admitted the grounds thereof, and because in this world Reason is the means accorded to man to carry out the dictates of the Almighty, and thus the link between human reason and the Almighty is trust in Him as the Almighty, as a being perfectly incomprehensible, but in whose attributes Reason trusts because they are not the result of human judgment, but a result acquired in another manner.

The evidence of Reason, according to the ratio of the development of Intelligence, proves, in our view, that the attributes revealed are indeed above human comprehension, although they serve as an unerring guide, strengthened as Divine Faith has been by sub

sequent Revelation. Thus the great eventful fact of Revelation is supported by Reason, because human intelligence really finds good motives for perceiving something superior when, diving into the nature of things, wonders are heaped on wonders; but if the direction be reversed, if the notion of the Almighty be merely the result of the mind's perceiving Cause and Effect, purpose and design, then it is no more divine Faith: it is rational faith in a Being created by human fancy, and to such a divinity we refuse to bend the knee.

Optimism and Divine Faith, or Trust in the Almighty revealed as such, stand therefore in direct opposition. The first denies the existence of Evil, of moral evil; the other admits the fact, but refers to the Almighty, in whom Reason trusts, for He was revealed, and that revelation told of the Almighty. Let the existence of the Almighty dwindle to a mere psychological or mental intuitive fact, it could not require a faith superior to its source, and even that diminutive faith would be a lie, for the mental or psychological fact would be surreptitiously admitted, no such instinctive belief existing. And, again, let the Existence of the Almighty be considered as the result of human judgment, of human philosophy, the discrepancy between the adherents of that opinion is so enormous as to render quite irrational a notion which claims precedence before all other consequences of human judg ment. Men calling themselves philosophers tell us that the unity of God was never taught before Egypt existed; that Monotheism only appeared about a thousand years before Christ, when the most positive proof can be adduced that Monotheism is coeval with all that we know of the first steps of man on earth, and that quite independent of the Scriptures, for we do not aim at "proving Scripture by Holy Writ."

VOL. I.-9