possibly exist between any two things. This we can the more easily understand, when we remark that O means one, and that I means one also. But O is round, is a circle, and I is a straight line? They must, however, be equal, or the wisdom of the ancient world would not have made the one stand in apposition to the other. But we have already seen something which may serve to account for this apparent impossibility.

Thus this

"the head

I have, in the analysing of words, discovered that the dot which we put over the i is an o. word, when analysed, makes it id o, head o," that is, "the very high o," or 66 very small o;" for diminutiveness is, as we have already seen, signified in this way, for the reason that what is very high appears small. The same word in French (point) makes it-ip-oin, which is, literally, "the tip one," but still more literally, "head up one;" which is equal to "head head one," or "up up one," or still," the first first one," that is, "one in the extreme," "the least one," "the head of the head." But this meaning is very clearly rendered in English by the above analysis (it-ip-oin), of which the two first words, from the first i being dropped, become tip. As to the oin, it is, when analysed, o-in, or in-o, that is, an o: so that point, when followed up, is, after all, found to be an o. Thus, too, the English word stop, which has still the same meaning, makes est-o-ip, "it is the o up: " here ip not only means what is high up, but also what is little, because, as I have just stated, what is high up

appears to be little, from its being distant. But as I is equal to O, hence it is that the one character is as clearly meant as the other in those definitions. An analysis of the same word in Greek (σyun) renders this very evident: is-ig-in-e, which, when e is made to take its primitive place, becomes eis-ig-in, and this means, "being the first one;" for eis is here equal to Be, as, when analysed, it becomes, first, eB, and then Be. But eis, in Greek, means one? so does eB or Be mean one, since it is also equal to oio, which is equal to ten, or the Divinity; and eis is still, in Greek, another form of the verb to be.

It were, however, in this instance very correct to explain eis by the English word the, and then the meaning of the above analysis will be "the first one," or "the one one;" for ig is equal to I, as I have several times shown; thus, from knowing that the dot put over the i is both a one (1) and an o, it follows that a one or a straight line, is an o or a circle. But will not mathematicians admit that this figure, I, is composed of dots or points added to one another, thus (), and so allowed to meet, and become this straight line (1)? And will they not also admit that a circle is composed of the same materials? Now what is this little figure (·), which we put over the letter i, and by means of which these other two figures, O and I, are formed? I do not here mean any thing imaginary, but what is real; and of this there can be no doubt, since I show the figure of which I desire to have a definition. Is it a straight line? If so, this figure O

must be a straight line, since, in this case, it is composed of straight lines added together; for if we join several things of the same kind together, so that they all make but one, how are we to name this one thing? If we have, for instance, several books bound in one, what is every body in the world likely to name this one thing? Will they not name it a book, and admit that it differs only in size from any one of the books of which it is composed? And must not the same thing happen with regard to all other things that become one? We may, for the sake of distinction, give them sometimes, whilst appearing under this single form, another name than that which each one of them bears whilst standing apart from the others; but this name can, after all, be only an augmentative of the other.

Now what is this little sign which we place over an i? Is it a straight line? If so, it is evident that this figure O is composed of straight lines, and that a circle is nothing more than a compound of straight lines, and that it is, after all, a certain straight line; just as a book that has been made by the addition of several others is, after all, but a certain kind of a book. Or is this little sign we put over the ia circle? If so, it differs only in size from this figure O; and hence what is commonly called a circle is a compound of many other circles. And as this figure I, which is named a straight line, is made in the same way, that is, by the addition of dots or points, it follows that it must also be a

compound of many circles, and, consequently, one great circle.

But the analysis in several languages of the word straight goes to prove that a straight line is composed of circles. In the Teutonic language this word is stracke, and analysed, it becomes est-ro-ic, which means, "it is the double o," "it is ic." The word ic is equal to the two halves of the o, or to only one of them; and hence it means "each," or "both," as has been already shown. We have also seen that it is equal to ig, and that it must, like this word, consequently be the same as the pronoun I, which is a straight line. The account given of the letter R shows that it indicates what is double; hence ro, in the present analysis, must mean the double o, that is, o and o: from which we are to infer, that a straight line is formed by the addition of one o to another, thus, . The Saxon word strace, since it is, when analysed, est-ro-ic, does not in any way differ from stracke. The analysis of the Greek word oplos is os-o-ir-it-iv, "the o double," "the head life," or "the head one." The Latin word rectus gives us-ir-ec-it, "the double ec it," that is, "the two halves of the o:" for ec is the same as ic, and it is also here for oc, which means "the double 0." Hence rectus may be also analysed thus, ir-ocit-us, which, by giving to us its primitive form of o-is, and by making is take its place before ir, will become is-ir-oc-to, and of this the literal meaning is, "the thing eight," in which we have still the double o, since o and o put one over the other, make 8

(eight). The French word droit is, when analysed, id-ro-it, that is, "the double o it;" but literally, "the double o high, or ahead;" meaning still the one o placed over the other; and this is so evident, that when we analyse droit thus, id-er-oit, and remark that this id-er is the same as it-er or être (the thing), and that oit is literally "eight," not only in meaning, but even in sound, as many persons with whom the ancient pronunciation of Great Britain has remained do still pronounce this number as if written oït, we shall have for droit "the thing eight," that is, an o and an o (8). When droit means "rectitude," it is still "the thing eight," "the double high life;" that is, "the Divinity".

"He who ever was, and who is"-for we must not forget that the o means "life." The English word straight may be analysed thus, estre-aight; and as aight differs neither in value nor sound from eight, these two words (estre-aight) mean, also, "the thing eight," that is, 8 or 8.

The analysis of the word circle in Greek, Latin, French, and English, does not, like that of the word straight, add to our knowledge of this figure, since we are ever told that it is composed of the double ic, or of all the ic, meaning by this the double C. But it is evident from what we have seen, that these two figures, I and O, are of equal import, and that each means one, and that they are both compounds of the same materials, and that they do not, though they appear as different figures, and bear different names, and have attributed to them