of the human race; a government which holds under its sway a large portion of the whole habitable globe; a government whose soil is susceptible of infinite improvements, and whose population is but just beginning to be in some reasonable proportion to its natural abundance. The voice of Sclavonic poetry has already been heard, and the lessons of the Russian bards, as far as known to us, are full of the noblest moral truths. The Russian press is now exceedingly active. Works on domestic history are fast multiplying. The spirit of the nation is aroused by the recollections which go back for so many centuries. The pride of national feeling is deep and strong, and arts, and letters, and learning are fast making their way into the heart of a country, which from its earliest ages has possessed an aptitude for learning.

Nor should it be left out of view, that while the general administration is autocratic, the municipal regulations are not so; that local customs, constitutions, and religious peculiarities, are respected, and that while there is no legitimate guarantee of civil liberty, and no exact limit to check the infringement of the imperial authority on particular privileges, yet practically the local institutions are respected; and in an autocracy, of which the territory is immense, the hand of the sovereign is not felt in its rudeness except in his personal vicinity. It is in a small kingdom, that a tyrant is the most dreaded monster. In a large state the personal vices of the sovereign extend in their direct influence hardly beyond his immediate train.

They who limit their attention in Russian history to anecdotes which illustrate the debauchery of the court, the ignorance of the nobles, or the superstitions of the vulgar, seem to us to close their eyes on one of the greatest spectacles in universal history. The reception of the Russians into the pale of civilized christendom may almost be said to form an epoch in the annals of human civilization, so wide are its influences, so powerful, grand, and beneficent the results to which it has led and may lead. What if the Russian state with its present power had adopted the manners and the religion of the east? What safety would there now be to Christian Europe? What increased dangers would not hang over its liberties? He that can neglect such results in the delineation of strange and uncouth manners, or in the scandalous chronicles of the licentiousness of an immoral court, gives up the contemplation of the great revolutions in national destinies, to the unworthy office of analyzing the vices of individual debauchees. One of the noblest of the branches of knowledge, the history of nations, loses its dignity and value.

One word before we close: on the present war between the Turks and Russians. We are told by those who would place

* We may take opportunity to recur to the work of Karamsin, which deserves especial notice. A translation of it exists in the French as well as the German.

the affairs of Turkey in an advantageous light, that the Russians have been entirely worsted; that they have made an unsuccessful campaign; that they have in their turn suffered a defeat like that of the French* on their retreat from Moscow. An unsuccessful campaign!—Is it nothing to have gained complete possession of two of the largest and finest provinces of European Turkey? Is it nothing to have the undisputed control of the Danube for a great extent of the last part of its course, the mouths of the second river in Europe, the natural outlet of Hungarian commerce? Is it nothing to have taken several places of importance to the south of the Danube, and to have gained one fortress of the very first importance within less than two hundred miles of Constantinople itself? Is it nothing to have gained two fortresses on the eastern shore of the Black sea? Never was a first campaign of a Turkish war so pregnant with results. Has the siege of Silistria, or of Chumla been attended with unheard of losses? The siege of Oczakow lasted nearly six months, and the place was finally taken only by a most bloody storm. The siege of Ismail had lasted more than seven months, and little impression was made; Potemkin was playing at cards with his women, while they amused themselves with drawing cards and telling fortunes. "I predict," said one of them to Potemkin, playfully interpreting his destiny, "you will take Ismail in ten days."-"I know an oracle much nearer than that," said Potemkin, and issued an order to Suwarrow to take it within three. On the evening before the storming Suwarrow addressed the troops in these words, "to-morrow early, an hour before day, I shall get up, shall say my prayers, wash myself, dress myself, then I shall crow like a cock, and do you storm according to my directions." And in truth he did so; Suwarrow crowed like a cock, and the soldiers stormed. Every body knows the result. The Russians lost 15,000 men, and avenged their loss in the blood of 35,000 Turks. The emperor Nicholas may not have soldiers to lose by tens of thousands; his mode of warfare may be less reckless than Potemkin's; his generals less intrepid than the bold, crafty, daring, bloodyminded Suwarrow. Yet he has secured advantages of the greatest moment.

But we have been repeatedly told by the British journals, which almost all give ex parte statements of Russian power and policy, that the Turks will yet turn, or have turned, the fortunes of war, and will appear in the aspect of pursuers. Imagination figures the Russians as fleeing in confusion before the impetuous onset of Moslem enthusiasm, and retreating beyond the

• We were amazed at finding this comparison in the London Quarterly. Misstatements so gross necessarily impair confidence in the general accuracy of that work. If passion is to take the place of judgment and party interests be pursued instead of truth, all truth, even in historical details and political intelligence, is at an end.

Danube, the Pruth, or who knows if not beyond the Dniester itself. The experiment has been tried already, in a former war. In 1811, Turkey, compared with Russia, was vastly more powerful than at present; for, in the French contest, Russia learned how to use her resources, as well as acquired vast increase of them. Now, in the campaign of 1811, the Turks, flushed by their successes in holding the Russians in check, and driving them across the Danube, engaged in pursuit. And, to their utter discomfiture. The Russians won new victories out of their own reverses.

It requires but little of the gift of prophecy to see, that the Turks in the present war cannot become the attacking party. Their modes of warfare consist in defending fortresses, and their most famous deeds of recent valour in the vigorous sallies on the besiegers. We are equally convinced, that peace will never be restored, but by means of concessions on the part of the Porte. It is now more than a century since the opposing interests of the two powers have led to perpetual collisions. The dominion and free navigation of the Black Sea, have been pursued as important objects by the Russian government, with undeviating consistency. And every war, except the unfortunate one terminated by Peter on the banks of the Pruth, has ended in securing decided advantages to the Russians, in respect to purposes so intimately connected with the prosperity of the whole southern portion of the empire. The subversion of the Ottoman throne is hardly threatened. The great interests of Russia do not require it, and we may therefore believe the emperor to be sincere in denying any such attempt. The other objects are of vital importance to the whole country south and south-east of Moscow, to the vast regions of the Caucasus, and, remotely, to the Persian provinces of Russia. We do not believe, that, in any event, the interests of Russia require, or would permit, conquests beyond the Danube, though Moldavia and Wallachia may be retained.

It is the history of former wars, between the great eastern empires of Europe, which must guide us in forming our opinions on the present contest. The arrondissement and commercial independence of the southern portion of Russia, have been pursued with the same zeal as the conquests on the Baltic. It is from history also, that we are led to believe that Prussia will not exert itself to stay the progress of Russian ambition. The geographical position of Prussia, necessarily establishes its relations to the court of Petersburgh, and those relations are now drawn more closely by treaties and family alliances. Even in the early wars of Catharine against the Turks, the wise and daring Frederick condescended to pay subsidies for the prosecution of it, and did not refuse the assistance, which was to advance successes, remotely injurious to himself. The aspect in which

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