have the intention of expressing the outward words materially, and for greater security; when the person begins, for instance, by saying, I swear that to interpose in a low voice the mental restriction, to-day-and then to add in a loud voice, "I did not eat this or that;" or, "" I swear that "then interpose, "I say that"-then finish in a loud voice, "I did not do this or that" for so the whole speech is most true. The second way is, to have the intention of not completing the speech merely by external words, but, at the same time, with a mental restriction; for a man is at liberty to express his mind wholly or partially. But for the untaught, who cannot understand ambiguous expression in the particular, (pro rudibus qui nesciunt in particulari concipere amphibologiam,) it is sufficient if they have the intention of affirming or denying in the sense which in reality contains truth; for which it is necessary that they should know, at least in the universal, that they can deny in some true sense, otherwise they could not speak in

a true sense.'

He then says that this mode of expression by ambiguous words, especially where the restriction is mental, is not to be used without a 'just cause ;' otherwise a fault is committed, and if with an oath, a grave fault; and proceeds to inquire what sort of fault. Is it a lie? and, if sworn to, perjury? He answers, that it is probable that it is, and gives reasons why; but more probable that it is not:

'I say, in the second place, that it seems more probable that in strictness it is not a lie, or perjury. The principal reason is, that he who so speaks and swears has not the intention of saying what is false, or swearing to it, as is presupposed; and what is expressed, in strictness has some true sense, which the person intends; therefore he does not lie (from Navarr. cap. Humanæ Aures, 22, 9, 5). For the intention characterises (discernit) the action. It is confirmed from S. Thomas, 2. 2. 9, 55, Art. 3, where cunning (astutia) is said to be the vice contrary to prudence; but he who uses "amphibologia" is, at the utmost, astute; therefore, &c. . . But it is not repugnant to human truth and good faith, because it is not opposed to it by a defect of truth, but by an excessive occultation of truth. Hence it is that to confirm this by an oath is not strictly perjury, but a certain want of religiousness (irreligiositas quædam), and if there be scandal, from the outward semblance of perjury, it will be brought to the evil of that; which [evil] has most place in ambiguous expression with mental restriction, as Suarez rightly teaches.'-Fill. Moral. Quæst. Tr. xxv. cap. xi. nn. 325–331.

Such is Filliucci's statement, little more than copied, as is the wont of these writers, even to the illustrations, from a predecessor-in this case, one of the greatest of the Casuists, Suarez. M. Maynard thus excepts to Pascal's use of it :

'We have nearly the same thing to say of Filliucci as of Sanchez. This principle, that "the intention regulates the quality of the action," has been quoted by Pascal in a very dishonest way. It means merely that we must never, even in case of mental restriction, have the intention to deceive, but only to hide a truth which our neighbour has no right to know. Such is also the sense of the general rule, " to have the intention to give to our words the sense which a clever man (un habile_homme) would give them." This rule is for the ignorant who may use ambiguous terms (cette règle est pour les ignorants qui useraient d'amphibologie). As it is never allowed to speak

contrary to our thought, then, if they do not understand the expedient which they use, (s'ils ne comprennent pas le tour dont ils se servent,) they ought to have the intention in general of giving to it the sense which a clever man would give it.'-Vol. i. p. 425.

There is something delightful in the simplicity with which M. Maynard disposes of the matter, by merely tacitly translating the restriction which Filliucci thinks sufficient. We must add, as we have so often had the distinction between speculation and practice, that Suarez, the original authority, assures us that this doctrine, so stated, is 'practice securissima."

These are the sort of subjects on which, according to M. Maynard, men cannot be expected to be of one mind-the subjects to which the doctrine of Probabilism applies. ‘If there ' are in morals some points which are certain, there are others which are not, which come into the domain of the probable, and of opinion. Do what we will, take up what system we 'please, there will always be controverted principles, embarrassing cases, through which we cannot guide ourselves by a certainty and evidence which do not exist, but only by the glimmering twilight of reasons or authorities more or less 'plausible.' The men whom Pascal accuses of such diversity of sentiment, are, he says, agreed, first on all the principles 'which are certain or defined by Scripture, tradition, and the Church; then on all the doctrines commonly received in the 'Catholic schools. As for controverted opinions, whatever 'system of morals we embrace, we shall never be agreed.'"

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But he treats with scorn the idea that these open questions, and, as he allows very often, singular solutions of them, could have the smallest effect on feeling, opinion, or practice. He coolly parallels them to the books of medical and legal science,an analogy which might perhaps do for the questions, if they had not the answers to them. We must oppose to M. Maynard's opinion, one which on this point is at least as 'probable.' On a matter of fact, at least, the authority of the famous Caramuel may be of weight. An injudicious director may yet be a fair witness, especially against himself; and so great was his confidence in his favourite science, that he could afford the admission that M. Maynard shrinks from. Caramuel attests the fact, that 'inconvenience' did result from many of the most probable opinions of the schools; only he thinks it a very paltry argument to infer, that therefore they are not probable:

You will say that from this doctrine,' [he is speaking, we may observe, of the famous conclusio conclusionum of Pascal's seventh Letter,] 'many inconveniences arise, and therefore it is to be rejected. And I answer, that

'Suarez de Rel. tom. ii. tr. 4. lib. iii. c. 10. n. 4.
2 Vol. i. p. 199.
3 Vol. i. p 241.

to say, "From such and such an assertion great dangers and mischiefs arise, therefore it is false," is not a good consequence.' [He then instances, e. g. an assertion which might throw a whole kingdom into a revolution, yet would not be the less true, and proceeds-it will be observed that we are quoting him only as a witness to fact.] Hence it is that I judge that the highest inconveniences (summa inconvenientia) follow from many opinions, which are at this day in vogue in the schools, yet that these opinions are not therefore improbable. For many inconveniences arise from mental restrictions; many from secret compensations; many from the permission to kill an unjust judge or witness, which some grant; many also from the opinion which teaches, that of secret things the Church judges not; many from others: notwithstanding which inconveniences, these opinions, in the terms in which they are at this day delivered in the schools, are at the very least most probable, and may not be condemned by any (sunt ad minimum probabilissimæ, et a nemine damnari possunt).'-Theolog. Fundam. No. 1150. Ed. Franc. 1652.

To this we are quite aware that there is a summary and specious answer. It is, that the Popes, in spite of Caramuel, have condemned these discreditable opinions, and banished them for ever from the teaching of the Church. Whatever might be said inconsiderately in 1650, yet when Alexander VII. and Innocent XI. spoke, a few years later, Jesuits and all submitted with absolute reverence to the decision of Rome, and no theologian can be cited who has since then said these things.

To this a rejoinder might be supposed, that it was but a make-believe condemnation, or one brought about accidentally by the policy or revenge of the moment; that when Rome meant to condemn in earnest, as in the case of the Jansenists, there was no mistake in her way of doing it; that here, though she happened to fix on most of the propositions quoted by Pascal, she simply condemned them in their bare literal sense, and said nothing as to why and how she condemned them; that Casuists might still treat the censures as sullen lawyers do an Act of Parliament,-maintain that their method was unrebuked, and that the propositions were condemned, not as morally shocking, but merely verbally inexact, and might still hold others next door to them with impunity. It might be urged, that apparently they had only become wrong, since and because the Popes condemned them, and their previous tolerance indicates that it was little more than a formal stigma.

On the other hand, it might be said, that it is unfair thus to explain away the obvious purport of the Popes' act; that we ought to take it for what it looks like-the condemnation of a dangerous mode of thought or expression in certain palpable samples of it, as Jansenism was condemned in the Five Propositions, or in the 101 of the Bull Unigenitus; that the propositions are nearly the same as those which Bossuet got condemned by the Assembly of 1700, and we know that he condemned in them the spirit and system which had produced them.

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Now how does M. Maynard deal with this? For it is obvious that for him, in proportion as it removes one difficulty, it brings in another. Apparently, at least, if it clears the Popes, it compromises the Casuists; and in proportion as we give weight and significance to the condemnation, it seems to fix on them. the load of a mischievous and at length intolerable teaching,intolerable even to that very authority of which they were the champions. The fact, of course, he more than admits. Long before 1679,' he says, the Jesuits had been able to cite more than thirty of their theologians, anterior even to the Provinciales, on the necessity of the love of God in penitence. With much stronger reason, then, did they abstain, ' after the pontifical sentence, to teach any of the propositions condemned by Innocent XI.'1 Whether the mistake was practical, these men, who were led astray by benevolent and pure intentions, to impose on weak men the least burden possible, renounced their error as soon as it was pointed out to them by their superiors, and especially by the Holy See; and 'thus the evil was dried up at its source;' or whether it was but mere speculation, they renounced even their abstractions, as soon as any point of doctrine had been prescribed by the Holy See. Thus it would be impossible to cite a single theologian who has permitted the murder of the unjust judge, or of "the false witnesses, since the censure of the 18th proposition of " the decree of Alexander VII.; and the most celebrated authors,' it is added, with some boldness of assertion, had not waited till then to condemn it in their works.' We do not for a moment doubt the submission; yet M. Maynard seems to make more of a merit of it than is quite intelligible. The sacrifice of submitting to be debarred from such propositions as that 'the love of God is not necessary for penitence,' or that we may seek occasions of sin for our own good or that of our neighbour,' does not seem so very hard, any more than the glory very singular of not having maintained them.

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2

But we should, it appears, be grossly mistaken, if we saw in these censures any such condemnation, or even discountenancing, of principles, or methods of arguing or stating, as the Bull Unigenitus is of Jansenism as a whole. The decrees of Alexander and Innocent are, we are told to observe, censures, not of doctrines, but of propositions. The propositions are given up, of course; and there is an end of the matter. But the authors are not named, and are therefore untouched. What the Church has decided upon is nothing but certain extreme and lax applications of a recognised way of treating moral questions. The 3 Vol. i. p. 304.

1 Vol. i. p. 183.

2 Vol. i. p. 210.

propositions are to be taken one by one, as separate, isolated, for the most part trifling, or accidental mistakes, each to be set down to the account of him who made it: and who does not make mistakes? And as we are not to gather from the censure that the Church meant to notice them as an aggregate and significant phenomenon, such as Pascal sees in them; so, on each subject touched by the propositions, beyond the strict letter of the proposition censured the condemnation does not reach.

It was, for instance, as M. Maynard tells us, a common doctrine at the time in the schools-by no means confined to the Jesuits, and, indeed, not accepted by several of them-that it is lawful to kill beforehand false witnesses against us. 'Speculatively, indeed,' says M. Maynard, it will be legitimate, for it 'flows logically from natural right, general principles, and analogy with permitted cases;' and it is difficult to see in what this horrible consequence' differs from the case of unjust aggression and lawful self-defence.' And the theologians added almost always,' that speculatively only was it lawful. Turned into practice, it would involve an almost inevitable sin.' Therefore, and so far only, it was condemned. The practical dangers (which for once M. Maynard admits) caused to be absolutely condemned by the Popes a certain number of pro'positions on this subject, certainly admissible in principle and in theory. But the theologians who confined themselves within 'the limits of pure abstraction and metaphysical precision are not touched by these censures.' The general doctrine on homicide, which Pascal imputes to the Jesuits, is not merely unjustly made peculiar to them, but has never been condemned by the Church.' So with the 'systéme des équivoques,' which we have already alluded to:

3

6

6

The adversaries of this system,' says M. Maynard, object to the propositions condemned by Innocent XI. and the Clergy of France in 1700. It would be singular enough,' he proceeds, that if the system of equivocations was absolutely condemned, it should continue to be taught by a great number of theologians with the full cognizance of the Church, and by theologians, too, very little suspected of relaxed moral opinions. We must suppose, therefore, that it is only the abuses and excesses of the system which are touched by the censure. That this answer is founded in reason may be seen by the examination of the condemned propositions. The 26th of Innocent XI. permits, without distinction, every restriction, even purely mental, under every circumstance, with or without reason; the 27th measures the use of it only by the private advantage of him who uses it, without regard to the public interest, often opposed to private, or to the exceptions laid down by theologians; the 28th authorizes reservations in cases where the public good, law, and morality require a plain and straightforward oath, by a culpable abuse of the principle, that a man is 3 Vol. i. p. 310.

' Vol. i. p. 327.

2 Vol. i. pp. 303, 304.