than Providence, which is jealous of human pride, is wont to allot to man. And this natural suspicion is not without grounds. Pascal was by no means always fair, especially in the detail of his proof.

Pascal's Letters have the exaggeration, inseparable from an able, earnest, passionate attack,-the exaggeration of a clear statement and lucid arrangement of the case on one side; the exaggeration of ridicule and irony; the exaggeration of strong and indignant feeling. Further, they leave unsaid how the system which they attacked grew up; how long custom, and a general use not confined to the Jesuits, if it had made this system dangerous, had also in all probability, in a measure, corrected it, as it certainly in a degree excused it: and they leave the impression, that that was a distinct intention, which was mainly a result, not very coyly accepted and followed up. Further, he leaves unsaid, for he did not on principle acknowledge them, the practical necessities of a popular, and much more, of a fashionable religion-much the same under all circumstances, whether resisted as temptations, or accepted as facts.

As to his quotations, the Letters, we think, will bear favourable comparison with any work that deals as largely in controversial citations. He solemnly declares that he had looked into text and context of every passage that he used; and we can see no reason to doubt his belief that he was dealing fairly. Still it is undeniable, we think, that he is at times really, and still oftener, apparently, unfair in his use of passages. We say, apparently, where in quoting, he omits restrictions and conditions which in the context accompany some startling decision, because he feels them to be mere surplusage. Where the point of a passage really remains unaltered by qualifications, which seem put in simply for verbal show, Pascal makes little ceremony in sacrificing limitations which he thinks unmeaning or trifling, to the convenience of his own statement. And besides, it must be confessed, that it was an unlucky chance for his victims, clumsy writers, singularly confident in their formal methods and their own authority-coarse and technical about refinements which almost defy words, and not dreaming of any opposition but that logical one which was the delight and business of their lives,-to fall into the hands of Pascal. The skilfully chosen, and skilfully exhibited passage, which looks so monstrous in his-pages, not seldom subsides in their own into mere grotesque absurdity; often too, what really illustrates the mischief of the whole system, seems to bear hard in each separate instance when pointed against individuals. But there are cases where he is substantially unfair; we will give an instance

or two.

NO. LXXVII.-N. S.

The following is a case which has been more than once quoted against Pascal. He is speaking of the jolies questions which Escobar and others have framed on the subject of fasting: it may be remembered how, as they proceed, they become more and more delicate and thoughtful for the penitent, who wishes to have a good conscience and not to fast. These questions and answers are not disputed by M. Maynard. He only sneers at Escobar, or else backs him with S. Thomas. As to the man coming of age an hour after midnight, and thus having a right to be let off, he dismisses it with 'c'est subtil, ridicule, si 'on le veut, mais c'est vrai. Puis, en quoi cela va-t-il à la corruption de la morale ?-there being no harm apparently in a director of conscience, or his penitent, being shufflers. At length, Pascal comes to the following climax :

"O que cela est divertissant!" lui dis-je. "On ne s'en peut tirer," me repondit-il; "je passe les jours et les nuits à le lire; je ne fais autre chose." Le bon père, voyant que j'y prenais plaisir, en fut ravi; et continuant: "Voyez," dit-il, "encore ce trait de Filiutius, qui est un de ces vingt-quatre Jésuites, Celui qui s'est fatigué à quelque chose, comme à poursuivre une fille, ad insequendam amicam, est-il obligé de jeûner? Nullement. Mais s'il s'est fatigué exprès, pour être par là dispensé du jeûne, y sera-t-il tenu? Encore qu'il eût ce dessein formé, il n'y sera point obligé."—Vol. i. p. 233.

On this M. Maynard begins his note with a triumphant chuckle :

Oh! pour le coup, voilà Pascal pris en flagrant délit de falsification. D'abord, Filiuci n'est point l'inventeur du problème. La question avait été traitée bien avant lui par S. Antonin, Sylvestre, Médina, Sancius, et beaucoup d'autres auteurs étrangers à la Compagnie. De plus, la question n'était pas oiseuse. "Si vous vous souvenez," dit à ce propos M. Sainte Beuve, (Port-Royal, tom. iii. p. 59,) "qu'il se présentait souvent au tribunal de la confession des pénitents bien étranges, comme Louis XI. par exemple, ou Philippe II., ou Henri III., (je parle des plus connus,) pour qui c'était une affaire sérieuse de jeûner le lendemain d'un meurtre ou d'une course libertine, vous trouverez moins étranges les précautions et distinctions que Filiutius préscrivait à la date de 1626, et qu'on rétrouverait plus ou moins chez les autres Casuistes de ce temps." Et maintenant abordons le texte de Filiuci, et traduisons-le littéralement. Ce sera moins joli que chez Pascal; mais dans toute cette longue discussion, ayons le courage de prendre pour adage le vers de Boileau:

"Rien n'est beau que le vrai, le vrai seul est aimable."

"Vous demanderez en second lieu," dit-il, "si celui qui se fatiguerait à mauvaise fin, comme à tuer un homme ou à poursuivre une fille, ou à quelque chose de semblable, serait tenu au jeûne. Je réponds, qu'il pécherait, il est vrai, par la mauvaise fin qu'il se propose; mais que la fatigue en étant resultée, il serait exempté du jeûne: à moins, disent quelques-uns, qu'il n'eût agi en fraude de la loi; mais les autres répondent mieux, que la faute consisterait à apporter une cause de rupture du jeûne, mais que, la cause posée, il n'y serait pas tenu." Qu'a fait Pascal? Il a arraché au texte de Filiuci le milieu et la fin, pour faire croire que le Jésuite exemptait de toute faute dans les singulières circonstances qu'il décrit.

Mais non, le Jésuite, comme tout le monde, enverrait bien un pareil homme en enfer; seulement ce ne serait pas pour n'avoir pas jeûné, ne le pouvant faire, mais pour sa crime, et pour s'être mis dans l'impossibilité de jeûner, Et il a raison, le bon Filiuci; car Pascal nous dira-t-il qu'un homme qui se serait fait saigner aux quatres membres pour ne pas jeûner, y serait obligé encore, malgré son épuisement complet? Allons donc, ce serait absurde! et il faut avoir un front Janséniste pour chercher à excuser Pascal comme a voulu le faire Nicole en répondant aux accusations du P. Nouet.'1-Vol. i. pp. 233, 234.

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We will not excuse Pascal. He has left out what le bon Filiuci' could ill afford to spare; the worthy man certainly does admit that this strange penitent' would sin, though not about fasting, and Pascal takes no notice of the admission. But the considerateness, which remembered that to such very strange penitents as Louis XI., Philip II. and Henry III. it was a serious affair' to fast after a murder, or a day of debauchery, and the precaution' which anxiously guarded against laying on their conscience under such circumstances one sin more, and was so careful to clear the murderer from the guilt of fast-breaking, is passed over by M. Maynard too lightly.

We will give another instance. In the Seventh Letter, Pascal quotes Lessius, (de Just. l. ii. c. 9. dub. 12, 19,) as saying that a man may resent a blow with the sword, not from vengeance, but to clear his own honour. He makes Lessius responsible for this doctrine. He does not say that Lessius qualifies it, doubts about it, puts it as a matter of any question whatever, or does anything but lay it down simply as a safe and practical rule of

1 We give another specimen of the very subtle distinction between what leads to a necessity, and what follows from a necessity, or quasi-necessity. Lessius says, 'adulter se debito moderamine defendens, maritum interficit; non est reus homicidii, sed occisio illa censetur fortuita.' For he says, the original crime is only the remote cause and occasion; and every man when he is hard pressed, is not bound to let himself be killed, but may defend himself. Then after maintaining his view, he proceeds in the following, in which we cannot help thinking of the bonté and douceur of Père Bauny's bruleur des granges :-' Adverte tamen, si suspicabatur adulter, talia incommoda [i. e. that he should kill the husband,] ex adulterio secutura, tenebatur ex charitate abstinere. Unde volendo adulterium committere, peccat non solum peccato adulterii, sed etiam contra charitatem proximi, quatenus per adulterium constituit se in necessitate damni proximo inferendi,... quando tamen constitutus est in tali periculo, non peccat, etiamsi se defendendo, occidat alterum; quia jus habet se defendendi. Idem dicendum, si imminente marito poterat fugere; tenebatur enim ex charitate, si videbat inde marito periculum: unde non fugiendo peccat contra charitatem proximi. Non tamen peccat, si postquam non potest amplius fugere, se defendendo, occidat invasorem occisio enim illa, non est peccatum, sed effectus per accidens secutus ex peccato.'-Lessius, de Just. 1. ii. c. 9. dub. 15. pp. 106, 107.

The sin lasting on till a certain moment, and then metaphysically vanishing, is singular enough. Still it may be taken as a philosophical analysis, whether right or wrong, yet purely speculative, of the action. On the other hand, we are told that these were not questions oiseuses,' that they were practically necessary for delicate cases, for strange penitents' like Louis XI. and Philip II.

action, as Escobar may be fairly said to do. But in fact it turns out that the real state of the case is this:-1. Lessius quotes it from some one else. 2. He gives arguments, by which it, and some other maxims of the same sort, may be supported. 3. He ends by saying, in the scholastic formula, that though it is speculatively probable, it does not seem to be easily allowed in practice.' That is, whether mildly or not, he does distinctly condemn the maxim; first, from the danger of hatred or vengeance in the agent; second, because likely to lead to other bloodshed.

Certainly, no one reading Pascal's account would imagine that Lessius had said anything of the kind. Accordingly the Jesuits made the most of it against Pascal's good faith, and Pascal answers them in his thirteenth Letter. They said that Lessius quoted it from some one else, and quoted it to 'combat' it; Pascal, that he quoted it to 'follow' it. Lessius's style of combating' is of a very mild order: but Pascal is unfair nevertheless. His reply to the Jesuits, who quote certain words of condemnation, is that these words refer not to this case, but to another; which is true. But Pascal himself persists in shutting his eyes to the fact that Lessius had spoken against it, in some words, and in refusing him the benefit of what he did say :-' Il ne 'se trouve pas,' he maintains, une seule parole de condamnation 'en ce lieu-là; mais il parle ainsi: "Il semble, qu'on n'en doit 'pas facilement permettre la pratique: in praxi non videtur FACILE PERMITTENDA." This he will not admit to be any sort of real condemnation.

He further suppresses the fact, that he himself had originally taken no notice, except in a general way, of this limitation. And he tries very unfairly to weaken the force of the words themselves, a technical form of disapproval. Thus he begins with charging Lessius with inventing and maintaining a maxim, and he ends by really proving against him only that he discountenanced it in too mild language.

This is unfair. But in this, as in most other instances, if we criticise the accuser's fairness, the case of the accused is not much mended. An inspection of the text only conveys more vividly the cool way in which Lessius entertains and has difficulties about the doubt, whether we may kill a man for a blow. M. Maynard is still better, and gives us the reason for Lessius' hesitating and faint rejection,-videtur non facile permittenda. 'If,' says he, Lessius does not speak more expressly, it is out of ' respect for Victoria (from whom he quotes); when he treats of 'murdering for calumny, he absolutely condemns the practice, 'n'étant géné-là par aucune autorité.' (Vol. ii. p. 135.)

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We will add a third case, where unfairness seems to arise from

the two parties being at cross purposes. The Roman system is a great system of external legislation, yet bearing intimately on conscience. On the one hand, it must wear the technical form of ordinary law. The crimes it denounces have to be defined; the rules which apply to all penal enactments must govern and abridge its severity. But, on the other hand, it appeals to more than outward obedience; it claims the submission of the Christian in his conscience, as it is meant to provide for the good direction of his religious life; its penalties are assumed to touch his soul, even though applied by the rules of human punishment. This was the long-established system in the Church to which Pascal, as well as the Jesuits, belonged. But in several of the questions between him and his answerers, each drops one side of this double system. He assumes solely its practical object; that Pope's Bulls, for instance, when they denounce, and enact punishment against, some particular crime, are to be taken in a broad and common-sense view, as intending as hard a blow as can be given against the crime in all its forms; and so he quotes, as specimens of explaining away authorities, in order to favour crime, cases where terms are defined, or penalties restricted. The Jesuits and their friends bring for answer, the necessary method and practice of such a system as the Canon law. Thus Pascal shows from Escobar, that a man who murders, not for money, but to oblige his friend, is not to be called an assassin :

'Le Pape Grég. XIV. a déclaré que les assassins sont indignes de jouir de l'asile des églises, et qu'on doit les en arracher. Cependant nos vingtquatres vieillards disent, que tous ceux qui tuent en trahison ne doivent pas encourir la peine de cette bulle. Cela vous paraît être contraire; mais on l'accorde, en interprétant le mot d'assassin, comme ils le font par ces paroles. "Les assassins ne sont-ils pas indignes de jouir du privilége des églises par la bulle de Grég. XIV. Mais nous entendons par le mot d'assassins ceux qui ont reçu de l'argent pour tuer quelqu'un en trahison. D'où il arrive que ceux qui tuent sans en recevoir aucun prix, mais seulement pour obliger leurs amis, ne sont pas appelés assassins.' Lett. VI. vol. i. p. 254.

Now the result of this interpretation certainly is, either that real assassins get off, or that people may with truth think that he who is not canonically an assassin, is not a real assassin. Yet it is fair to remember, as M. Maynard reminds us, that it is primarily a question of legal definition. The privilege of sanctuary,' he says, has always been regarded in Italy as very important." Abuses occurred, and were restrained by

1 'Idem pontifex refert, quod Innoc. X. et Innoc. XII. excommunicationem inflixerunt, in eos qui in Ecclesia Vaticanâ tabacum sumerent; et eandem imposuit Urban. VIII. pro ecclesiis Hispanicis: sed Bened. XIII. omnes istas prohibi tiones abstulit.'-Liguori, Hom. Ap. Tr. xv. p. iii. No. 38.

2 Vol. i. pp. 254, 255.