may be innocent, yet they stand upon the very brink of demerit, being so proximate to injustice and cruelty. Some affections and dispositions. are contemptible; as sordid avarice, envy, malice: these are despised by all who are not under their influence. Ingenuous shame is viewed with approbation, as it indicates a consciousness of defect, united with reverence for opinion. Guilty shame, though not criminal in itself, yet being the detection of criminality, it sometimes exposes the offender to the severest contempt; as when it marks the countenance of a detected hypocrite: sometimes it will excite compassion, and prompt to forgiveness; when, for example, an offence, highly disreputable, is proved to be a total deviation from the general tenour of conduct. The blush indicates a mind not inured to vice. It sues for compassion, and proves that it is not totally unworthy of it. Again, in our search after happiness, each particular desire and pursuit is either deemed innocent, or it assumes an honourable or ignominious character, according to the nature of the object, the eagerness with which it is followed, and the means employed for its attainment. Some desires are discriminated by particular appellations, which serve to stigmatize, or do honour to the affections; while others, not marking either excellence or culpability, have no terms of discrimination. Several instances of this nature have been given under the article of Desire, by which it appears that a prevalent love of virtue and detestation of vice have, in every case where personal interest has not perverted the judgment, and alienated the affections, taught all mankind, without previous consultation or conspiracy, to invent the concisest mode of testifying approbation or disapprobation, according to the apparent degrees of merit or demerit. Similar to the plan of an universal language, which some have deemed practicable, or to pre-concerted signals, and telegraphic signs, very complex ideas are conveyed by simple terms, which immediately express satire or applause, crown with honour, or call forth abhorrence. The numerous occasions which incessantly present themselves, of expressing our opinions of human actions, and our eagerness to approve or censure, render us impatient of paraphrase, or circumlocution. It is also observable that our ideas of Character are invariably formed, according to the habitual tendency of disposition and conduct to become beneficial or pernicious; that is to promote or to destroy Good! Where conduct has no immediate relation to these, it does not call forth animadversion. In proportion as it produces and disseminates Good; as it makes exertions and consents to liberal sacrifices for this purpose, does it meet with our applause and admiration. In proportion as vice diffuses Misery, as it is the result of mean and selfish principles, indicated by pre-concerted plans and propensities, to sacrifice the felicity of others to our own narrow personal gratifications, it becomes detestable and abhorrent, Hence Compassion meets with warmer applause than the simple love of Justice, because Compassion is an actual participation in the sufferings of another; while Justice is only a due solicitude that they shall not suffer any unmerited injury from us. A merciful and forgiving disposition is still more noble, because it generously removes a very powerful impediment, which the offending party himself has raised, against the exercise of our compassion, for the distress to which his injustice towards us has exposed him. On the other side, Treachery and Cruelty are more detestable than common acts of injustice, because the one is a grosser abuse of that confidence without which society cannot subsist; and the other manifests not only inordinate self-love, but the want of that natural affection which is due to every being; substituting the affection of hatred in its place. It is further manifest from the above remarks, that both Virtue and Vice are the offspring of passions and affections in themselves innocent. The natural desires and affections implanted in our very make, are void of guilt. Respecting these, virtue simply requires a proper choice, innocent pursuits, and moderation in our enjoyments. Vice consists in an improper, or forbidden choice, in the excess or perversion, of the natural propensity of our natures. Lawless ambition is the excess of a desire to distinguish ourselves, which, under certain restrictions, is a blameless incentive to useful actions. As every species of debauchery consists in the irregular indulgence of the appetites, in themselves natural and innocent, thus are the most disorderly and malevolent affections the abuse of some affections, which in certain circumstances, may be allowable and beneficial. Envy is anger, unjust, and pettish, at the good fortune of another, mixed with a very false idea of our superior deserts. Cruelty is the excess of a severity which in itself may be justifi able; and Malice the most inveterate, is the cruelty of envy, attempting by words and actions to destroy or diminish the good we cannot participate: Thus then it appears, that Character depends upon the prevalent use or abuse of certain propensities or affections of our nature. Those who select and cultivate the most beneficial are the best of characters; those, who are habituated to the most injurious, are the worst. SECTION IV. Influence of the Passions and Affections on THOUGH the desire of Good is in reality the some, |