particular cast of mind, which renders the perception of certain qualities capable of making a more prompt, or a more durable impression upon one person than upon another. We deem that man to be irascible, who is disposed to be angry at trifles; and him we praise as humane, who is always disposed to commiserate sufferings.

It is hoped that the above explanations of the terms, Passions, Emotions, and Affections, will obtain the approbation of philosophic Readers, since they were suggested to the Author by an attention to the workings of the human mind. If approved, they cannot appear unimportant, as they will serve to indicate both mutual relations and characteristic differences, in the impressions which surrounding objects, or ideas concerning them, make upon us; and although an attention to these minute distinctions, may not always be necessary in common language, and would sometimes be absurd, yet the want of precision has always been severely felt in philosophical investigations, and is a principal cause of the obscurities in which they are too frequently involved. It will be allowed by every attentive observer, that the process which we have characterized by the above terms, does take place in the human mind, when exposed to the

sudden and powerful influence of particularly interesting objects. Such objects are irresistibly forced upon his attention, independent of a will or determination of his own; they often produce great agitations both of mind and body; and when these agitations have subsided, the mind retains some degree of predilection or aversion for them. As these distinctions are clearly and satisfactorily expressed, by the particular terms we have given to each, this is a full indication that they are the most appropriate. (Sce Note B.

The above observations are not confined to a simple process, which takes place from more simple causes. After we have supposed a passion, indicated by an emotion, to be succeeded by some correspondent affection, we may still consider this affection as the parent of new pas. sions, emotions, and affections, according to the variety of circumstances connected with it. It may inspire fear, as when the object of our af fection is in a perilous state; it may excite earnest desire, or sanguine hope. Some of these new passions and affections will arouse to action; as when the strong sense of an injury excites to revenge: others chill and depress the spirits, as sorrow and despair. Yet in the midst of all these diversities, the characteristic differences

between Passions, Emotions, and Affections, are equally obvious.

Confining ourselves, therefore, to what we deem the genuine import of the words, in opposition to the irregularities of custom, we shall, as often as it may be necessary to observe distinctions, uniformly apply the term Passion, to the violent impression made upon our minds, by the perception of something very striking and apparently interesting; Emotion, to the external marks, or visible changes produced by the impetus of the passion upon the corporeal system; and Affections, to the less violent, more deliberate, and more permanent impressions, by causes which appear sufficiently interesting. The range of affection, may be from those stronger feelings which are proximate to emotions, to the mildest sensations of pleasure or displeasure we can possibly perceive.

Most Writers on the Pathology of the mind, agree to distinguish between Appetites and Passions. The former they refer to corporeal wants, each of which creates its correspondent desire; and the indulgence of this desire is termed Gratification. The latter they ascribe immediately to the Mind. In this the Moderns differ from the Ancients. The word Appetitus, from which

that of Appetite is derived, is applied by the Romans and Latinists, to desires in general, whether they primarily related to the body or not: and with obvious propriety; for the primitive signification is, the seeking after whatever may conduce either to Gratification or Happiness. Thus Cicero observes,

motus

"animorum duplices sunt; alteri, cogitationis; "alteri Appetitus. Cogitatio in vero exquirendo " maxime versatur; Appetitus impellit ad agen"dum." By two powers of action being thus placed in contrast to each other, and the one applied to thought simply, it is obvious that the other comprehends every species of desire, whether of a mental or corporeal nature. Metaphysicians also, who have written in the Latin language, use the word Appetitus in the same latitude.

The modern distinction has the advantage of immediately pointing out a difference in the nature and character of the objects which interest us, according as they relate to the body or to the mind. But although we shall consider the appetites as confined to corporeal wants and cravings, we must still observe that they are as frequently the occasions of passions and emotions, as other objects which are peculiarly adapted to the mind. Eager hope, joy, fear, anger, are

daily manifested by the Infant, whose desires are wholly confined to animal wants: and the keenest sensations of anger, jealousy, envy, &c. are intimately connected with the carnal Appetites of maturer age. Whatever is therefore beyond the mere instinctive appetite, becomes the province of the mind; and the influence which various cravings of nature have upon its ideas and conceptions, give rise to mental affections and passions. The subject of the present discussion obviously relates to these, without requiring particular attention to the existing

cause.

SECTION II.

Plans of Arrangement examined.

So numerous and multifarious are the Passions, Affections, and Emotions, in their connections. and ramifactions, that it is difficult to propose a plan of Arrangement, which shall be, in every respect, unexceptionable. By preferring one method, we may be deprived of some advantages attending another; and in all, it may be necessary