It rejoices in the welfare of another, unconnected with his virtues. The Capacity of enjoyment is a sufficient motive for attempting to impart it; and a state of distress is a sufficient incitement to attempt relief. In its noblest exertions, benevolence indicates itself by the communication of good, in opposition to evil deserts, and in a strong propensity to protect from misery, which the bad conduct of the offender has not been able to subdue. It becomes a desire of promoting happiness, too ardent to be extinguished, by injury itself.

Sympathy is also applicable to the Sociableness of the human character; to the nature of man as formed to live in society. This is manifested by the reciprocal pleasure and satisfaction we experience in our daily intercourse;by the eagerness with which we receive and communicate tidings that interest our fellowmen; by the love of imitation, and the readiness with which we conform to the customs, manners, and dispositions, and acquiesce in the opinions of others, without attention to the higher authority of propriety or impropriety, or weighing motives and arguments in the balance of reason. In short, it respects every act, habit, and sentiment, of which to participate in common is gratifying to our feelings,

and constitutes so large a portion of the enjoyments and seductions of life..

This sympathetic Imitation brings us by imperceptible degrees to our Second Division.

II. The Affections derived from Good Opinion.

In this class of Social Affections, the operations of the Benevolent Principle are not so immediate. Though benevolence is associated, it is not the primary agent. It is rather a consequence than a cause. It is not our benevolence which inspires us with these favourable opinions, but their good qualities which awaken and direct our benevolence. Our affections are drawn forth by an impressive sense of some species of excellence in character; and they may be placed upon objects, whose situations do not require either our sympathetic joys or sorrows. These are most properly expressed by complacential regards; for they consist both in the approbation of the mind, and feelings of the heart. They relate to conduct

and qualities, concerning which our judgment. pronounces that they possess merit, while they are rendered interesting by virtue of our social connections.

The nature of Complacency, as it refers either to ourselves, or to our most intimate connections, has already been considered.* I shall only observe in this place, that when we are rendered participants of good, from those qualities which are the proper objects of compla cency; or when we contemplate peculiar marks of mental or moral excellencies, in others with whom we are conversant, our approbation is accompanied with various degrees of affection for them, although they may not be within the sphere of our intimacy.

Of these affections the following are the most conspicuous.

Gratitude. Gratitude is a pleasant affection, excited by a lively sense of benefits received or intended, or even by the desire of being beneficial. It is the lively and powerful re-action of a well disposed mind, upon whom benevolence has conferred some important good. It is mostly connected with an impressive sense of the amiable disposition of the person by whom the benefit is conferred, and it immediately produces a personal

*See p. 69 passim.

affection towards him. When the affection operates according to the natural course of influence, it will be correspondent to the importance of the good obtained,-the distance in station between the recipient and his benefactor, the smallness of his claims,---perhaps the consciousness of deserving very opposite treatment. These circumstances unite to warm the heart into raptures. The grateful mind is impatient of a silent and passive reception of the blessing. It cannot be restrained from acknowledging its obligations, either by expressions or deeds. It considers every return in its power as an act of the strictest justice; nor is it deterred by difficulties or dangers from making the attempt. The term most familiarly employed was originally suggested by this idea. The obligation is perceived, and felt; and the person benefited considers himself as bound, in honour and justice, either to repay or acknowledge the debt, by a bond that cannot be cancelled.

We shall not wonder at the peculiar strength and energy of this affection, when we consider that it is compounded of love placed upon the good communicated, affection for the donor, and joy at the reception. Thus it has Goodness for its object, and the most pleasing, perhaps unex

pected, if not unmerited, exertions of goodness, for its immediate cause.

Thankfulness refers to verbal expressions of gratitude.

Admiration. Although there is scarcely a word in more familiar use than the term admiration, yet much ambiguity has attended its precise signification; nor have authors of the greatest celebrity, been uniform in the sense they have affixed to it. Sometimes it has been deemed synonymous with Surprise; sometimes it is used to express Wonder; sometimes it is applied to subjects, as a mark of degradation; at others, as expreseive of excellencies.

In Milton's Paradise Lost, it is more than once employed to denote wonder.

-Let none admire

That riches grow in hell.

BOOK I. L.690.

In the following passage of Shakespear, it obviously signifies wonder and astonishment. Lady Macbeth says to her husband, terrified at the sight of Banquo's Ghost,

You have displac'd the mirth, broke the good meeting, with most admired disorder.

MACBETH.