the King's hands, the nobility disarmed by the destruction of tenures, and the militia not to be raised but by the king's command, there can be no force levied in any part of England, but must be destroyed in its infancy by a few regiments: for what will three or four thousand naked and unarmed men signify against as many troops of mercenary soldiers? What if they should come into the field, and say you must choose these and these men for your representatives; where is your choice? What if they should say, parliaments are seditious and factious assemblies, and therefore ought to be abolished; what is become of your freedom? Or if they should encompass the parliament house, and threaten if they do not surrender up their government, they will put them to the sword; what is become of the old English constitution? These things may be, and have been done in several parts of the world. What is it that causeth the tyranny of the Turks at this day, but servants in arms? What is it that preserved the glorious commonwealth of Rome, but swords in the hands of its citizens? And if besides this, we consider the great prerogatives of the crown, and the vast interest the king has and may acquire by the distribution of so many profitable offices of the household, of the revenue, of state, of law, of religion, and the navy, together with the assistance of a powerful party, who have been always the fast and constant friends to arbitrary power, whose only quarrel to his present majesty is, that he has knocked off the chains and fetters they thought they had locked fast upon us; a party, who hath once engaged us in an unhappy quarrel amongst ourselves (the consequences of which I dread to name) and since in a tedious and chargeable war, at the vast expence of blood and treasure, to avoid that captivity they had prepared for us: I say, if any one considers this, he will be convinced that we have enough to do to guard ourselves against the power of the court, without having an army thrown into the scale against us: and we have found oftener than once by too fatal experience the truth of this; for if we look back to the late reigns, we shall see this nation brought to the brink of destruction, and breathing out the last gasp of their liberty; and it is more owing to our good fortune, than to any effort we were able to make, that we escaped the fatal blow. And I believe no man will deny, but if Charles the First had had five thousand men beforehand with us, the People had never struck a stroke for their liberties; or if the late King James would have been contented with arbitrary power without bringing in popery, he and his black guard would have bound us haud and foot before this time: but when their ill. contrived oppression came home to their own doors, they quickly shewed the world how different a thing it was to suffer themselves, and to make other people suffer, and so we came by our deliverance ; and though the late king had the nobility, gentry, clergy, people, and his own army against him, and we had a very wise and courageous Prince nearly related to the crown, and backed by a powerful state, for our protector, yet we account this revolution next to a miracle. I will add here, that most of the nations I instanced before were en slaved by small armies: Oliver Cromwell'left behind him but 17,000 men; and the Duke of Monmouth, who was the darling of the people, was suppressed with two thousand; nay, Cæsar seized Rome itself with five thousand, and fought the battle of Pharsalia, where the fate of the world was decided, with twenty two thousand; aud most of the revolutions of the Roman and Ottoman empires since were caused by the Pretorian bands, and the court janizaries; the former of which never exceeded eight, nor the latter twelve thousand men: and if no greater numbers could make such disturbances in those vast empires, what will double the force do with us? And they themselves confess it, when they argue for an army; for they tell us we may be surprised with ten or fifteen thousand men from France, and having no regular force to oppose them, they will overrun the kingdom. Now if so small a force can oppose the king, the militia, with the united power of the nobility, gentry and commons, what will an equal power do against the people, when supported by the royal authority, and a never failing interest that will attend it, except when it acts for the public good? But we are told this army is not designed to be made a part of our constitution, but to be kept only for a little time, fill the circumstances of Europe will better permit us to be without them. But I would know of these gentlemen, when they think that time will be? Will it be during the life of King James, or after his death? Shall we have less to fear from the youth and vigour of the pretended Prince of Wales, than now from an unhappy man sinking under the load of age and misfortunes: Or will France be more capable of offending us just after this tedious and consumptive war, than hereafter when it has had a breathing time to repair the calamities it has suffered by it? No: we can never disband our army with so much safety as at this time; and this is well known by these conspirators against their country, who are satisfied that a continuation of them now, is an establishment of them for ever: for whilst the circumstances of Europe stand in the present posture, the argument will be equal to continue them; if the state of Europe should alter to the advantage of France, the reason will grow stronger, and we shall be told we must increase our number: but if there should be such a turn of affairs in the world, that we were no longer in apprehension of the French power, they may be kept up without our assistance; may, the very discontents they may create shall be made an argument for the continuing of them. But if they should be kept from oppressing the people, in a little time they will grow habitual to us, and almost become a part of our coustitution, and by degrees we shall be brought to believe them not only not dangerous, but necessary; for every body sees, but few understand, and those few will never be able to persuade the multitude that there is any danger in those men they have lived quietly with for some years, especially when the disbanding them will (as they will be made believe), cost them more money out of their own pockets to maintain a militia, and of this we have had already an unhappy experience. For Charles the Second being con nived at in keeping a few guards (which were the first ever known to an English king besides his pensioners, and his beefeaters) he insen. sibly increased their number, till he left a body of men to his successor great enough to tell the parliament, he would be no longer bound by the laws he had sworn to; and under the shelter and protection of these he raised an army that had put a period to our government, if a complication of causes (which may never happen again) had not presented the Prince of Orange with a conjuncture to assert his own and the nation's rights. And though we have so lately escaped this precipice, yet habit has made soldiers so familiar to us, that some who pretend to be zealous for liberty, speak of it as a hardship to his present Majesty, to refuse him as many men as his predecessors, not considering that the raising them then was a violation of our laws, and that his government is built upon the destruction of theirs, and can no more stand upon the same rubbish, than the kingdom of heaven be founded in unrighteousness. But the conspirators say, we need be in no apprehensions of slavery whilst we keep the power of the purse in our own hands: which is very true, but they do not tell us that he has the power of raising money, to whom no one dares refuse it. Arma tenenti Omnia dat qui justa negat. : For 'tis certain that an army will raise money, as that money will raise an army; but if this course be too desperate, 'tis but shutting up the Exchequer, and disobliging a few tally-jobbers (who have bought them for fifty per cent discount) and there will be near three millions a year ready cut and dried for them and whoever doubts whether such a method as this is practicable, let him look back to the reign of Charles the Second. And I am afraid the officers of the exchequer have not much reason to value themselves for their payments in this reign at least the purchasers of the annuities are of that opinion, and would be apt to entertain some unseasonable suspicions, if they had not greater security from his Majesty's virtue, than the justice of such ministers. But if we could suppose (whatever is the fate of other countries) that our courtiers design nothing but the public good, yet we ought not to hazard such unusual virtue, by leading it into temptation, which is part of our daily duty to pray against. But I am afraid we don't live in an age of miracles, especially of that sort; our heroes are made of a coarser allay, and have too much dross mixed with their constitutions for such refined principles: for in the little experience I have had in the world, I have observed most men to do as much mischief as lay in their power, and therefore am for dealing with them as we do with children and mad men, that is, take away all weapons by which they may do either themselves or others an injury: as I think the sheep in Boccaline made a prudent address to Apollo, when they desired, that for the future wolves might have no teeth. When all other arguments fail, they call to the assistance the old tyrant necessity, and tell us the power of France is so great, that let the consequence of an army be what it will, we cannot be without one, and if we must be slaves, we had better he so to a protestant prince than a popish one, and the worst of all popish ones the French king. Now I am of Mr. Johnson's opinion, that the putting an epithet upon tyranny is false heraldry; for protestant and popish are both alike: and if I must be a slave, it is very indifferent to me who is my master, and therefore I shall never consent to be ruled by an army, which is the worst that the most barbarous conquest can impose upon me; which notwithstanding we have little reason to fear whilst we keep the seas well guarded." After those observations on, and examples of the evil of a standing army, our author proceeds by contrasting the advantage of a militia to a regular standing army. "It's objected, that the officers of our fleet may be corrupted, or that a storm may arise which may destroy it all at once, and therefore we ought to have two strings to our bow. By which I perceive all their fears lie one way, and that they do not care if they precipitate us into inevitable ruin at home, to prevent a distant possibility of it from France. But I think this phantom too may be laid by a well-trained militia, and then all their bugbears will vanish. This word can be no sooner out, but there is a volley of small shot let fly at me: What! must we trust our safety to an undisciplined mob, who never dreamed of fighting when they undertook the service; who are not inured to the fatigue of a camp, or ever saw the face of an enemy? And then they magnify mercenary troops, as it there was an intrinsic virtue in a red coat, or that a raggamuffin from robbing of henroosts, in two campaigns could be cudgelled into a hero. Though I must confess the conduct of the court in industriously enervating this force, does in some measure justify their objections: For the detestable policies of the last reigus were with the utmost art and application to disarm the people, and make the militia useless, to countenance a standing army in order to bring in popery and slavery; and if any methods were proposed to make it more serviceable, the court would never suffer them to be debated; and such officers as were more zealous in exercising their companies than others, were reprimanded, as if they designed to raise a rebellion. And now the worthy patriots of this reign are taking advantage of the traitorous neglect and infamous policies of the last. But why may not a militia be made useful? Why may not the nobility, gentry, and freeholders of England be trusted with the defence of their own lives, estates, and liberties, without having guardians and keepers assigned them? And why may they not defend them with as much vigour and courage as mercenaries who have nothing to lose, nor any other tie to engage their fidelity than the inconsiderable pay of sixpence a day, which they may have from the conqueror? Why may not the laws for shooting in crossbows be changed into firelocks, and a competent number of them be kept in every parish for the young men to exercise with on holidays, and rewards offered to the most expert, to 447 stir up their emulation? Why may not the whole militia of England be reduced to sixty thousand, and a third part of those kept by turns in constant exercise? Why may not a man be listed in the militia till he be discharged by his master, as well as in the army till he be discharged by his captain? And why may not the same horse be always sent forth, unless it can be made appear he is dead or maimed? Why may not the private soldiers of the army, when they are dispersed in the several parts of the kingdom, be sent to the militia? And why may not the inferior officers of the army in some proportion command them? I say, these and other like things may be done, and some of them are done in our own plantations, and the islands of Jersey and Guernsey, as also in Poland, Switzerland, and the country of the Grisons, which are nations much less considerable than England, have as formidable neighbours, no sea nor fleet to defend them, nothing but militia to depend upon, and yet no one dares attack them: And we have seen as great performances done formerly by the apprentices of London, and in the late war by the Vaudou in Savoy, the Miquelets in Catalonia, and the militia in Ireland, as can be paralleled in history: And so it would be with us, if the court would give their hearty assistance in promoting this design; if the King would appear in person at the head of them, and give rewards and honour to such as deserve them, we should quickly see the young nobility and gentry appear magnificent in arms and equipage, shew a generous emulation in outvying one another in military exercises, and place a noble ambition in making themselves serviceable to their country: as anciently the Achaians and Thebans from being the most contemptible nations in Greece, by the conduct of Pelopidas, Epaminondas, and Philopemen, came to have the best disciplined troops and most excellent soldiers in the world. They object, that such a militia as this is a standing army, and will be as dangerous, and much more chargeable. I answer; that there can be no danger from an army where the nobility and chief gentry of England are the commanders, and the body of it made up of the freeholders, their sons and servants; unless we can conceive that the nobility and gentry will join in an unnatural design to make void their own titles to their estates and liberties; and if they could entertain so ridiculous a proposition, they would never be obeyed by the soldiers, who will have a respect to those that send them forth and pay them, and to whom they must return again when their time is expired. For if I send a man, I will as surely choose one who shall fight for me, as a mercenary officer will choose one that shall fight against me; and the late governments are witnesses to the truth of this, who debauched the militia more than ever I hope to see it again, and yet durst never rely upon them to assist their arbitrary designs; as we may remember in the Duke of Monmouth's invasion, their officers durst not bring them near his army for fear of a revolt. Nay, the pensioner-parliament themselves turned short upon the Court, when they expected them to give the finishing stroke |
