less opportunity for; fince it always refpects events conceived as more or less remote in futurity. According to the virtues or vices of the party fo is this fpace improved or proftituted. The thief, the adulterer, and murderer, may abuse and proffitute it to more fully fecuring the fuccefs of their abominable intentions and refolutions: but the virtuous examine them by the maxims of wif dom, for a practical purpose.

Liberty or freedom, is applicable to purpose, that is, to the agent respecting purposes and purpofing. Liberty here is that species of opportunity, which respects our acting or refraining, according as we are inclined. By liberty, refpecting purposes, I understand opportunity for purpofing. Liberty in refpect of purpofing, is as extensive as apprehended dominion for doing or refraining when the time fhall arrive. Every man who purposes, apprehends he shall have dominion for executing. Taking the objects of purpose in greater latitude, the boundaries of liberty for purpofing, feem to be either apprehended dominion or apprehended subjection. If a man does not apprehend he shall have dominion, that is ability and opportunity for paying twenty pounds tomorrow, he does not, he cannot, purpose it: And if a man does not apprehend he fhall have capacity and opportunity for being carried abroad tomorrow, he cannot intend it. Liberty is alfo limited to events confidered probable at least, admitting

admitting our inclination: and to events conceived of under the influence of defire or averfion for where there is apparent improbability, or no defire, or averfion, there can be no purpose or refolution.

Neceffity, refpecting existence, is fully applicable to purpose. Human purposes, are, in my judgment, undoubtedly neceffary, are founded in the nature of things previous to their existence; are certainly foreknown to God, and when exifting, correspond with the approbation, or non-prevention of the Deity.

Should any demand a proof that human purpofes are neceffary, I would reply, All human purposes are actual existences; all actual exiftences must have a caufe; power, or its abfence, is effential to every caufe; and power is direct, and its absence, indirect neceffity.

This fact, the neceffity of purposes, known and acknowledged, cannot affect a fingle purpose. If any one thinks otherwife, let him admit what I call a fact, at least, in way of fuppofition, and try the experiment respecting fome of even the most common concerns of life. Does he purpose to dine to-day? Let him then suppose that this purpofe is neceffary—that it was previously founded in the nature of things, and was certainly known to the Deity previous to its existence. What will be the influence or effect? Why really nothing at all: for appetite and fuitable circum

ftances

ftances can determine his purpose with, or without reflection on the faid fact, or on those involved in it.Again, Let him fuppofe it certain to God, though uncertain to himself, whether he shall purpose to-morrow morning to ride abroad in the day. Could this affect his morning purpose respecting his riding abroad or forbearing it? Certainly in no way, for his ability, defire, and circumstances will determine him, whether he believes the divine prefcience or not. Was he himself previously certain whether he should purpose it or not; the cafe, I grant, would materially differ. Or indeed if he had apprehended knowledge of what the Deity knew refpecting this event; this apprehension might affect his purpose. Suppofe a fortune-teller, or aftrologer, fhould venture to predict that this gentleman fhould be inclined to ride abroad to-morrow, this might operate to corroborating the motive to his purpofing it, or the reverse, according as he is ill or well affected towards fuch pretenders. -Again, Suppose he should be perfuaded that God had fomehow revealed to him that he should in the morning purpose staying at home all the day. How would this operate? If well affected towards the Deity, it might have a motive influ ence on the mind to purpose agreeably with this perfuafion. If, on the contrary, he is at enmity with God, he may be influenced to purpose the contrary, through this bad temper. But would

this argue that the neceffity or the previous certainty affected his faid purpose? By no means. It would fully argue his being mistaken concerning a revelation from God, but no further, fince he must admit God might be previously acquainted with the baseness of his temper, and his consequent purpose: Indeed a God without prefcience, unlimited prefcience, is no God. The conception is an absurdity. Neither of the laft cafes can touch the original affertion, that the neceffity of purpose, known and acknowledged, cannot affect a fingle purpose.

Purposes and refolutions are direct or indirect. By directly intending a whole, we indirectly intend all the parts. By directly purposing an antecedent, we indirectly purpose its known confequent: And by directly purposing a confequent, we indirectly purpose its known antecedent. In a word, by directly purposing an action or its forbearance, whatsoever is neceffarily connected with what is directly purposed or refolved on, if known, is indirectly purpofed, also.

Events, indefinite as to time, as to place, as to manner, may yet be purposed. Thus I may purpose taking an excurfion in the country, without respect to time, place, or manner of travelling. May purpose going next May without respect to the place or manner :-May purpose going to Margate, without respect to the time, or whether by water, or land:-May purpose exercising on horseback,

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horfeback, without respect to time, or place. But let it be remembered, that the time, place, or manner, not reflected on, or indeterminately regarded, are yet, indirectly purposed.

Human purposes, that is, thoughts under the modification which occafions their taking the name purposes, intentions, defigns, or resolutions, are innumerable. The more important of them, as more eminently influential in life, are thofe which regard entering on, and persevering in, a civil calling-moral converfation-and true piety.

First, A civil calling. The acquirement of abilities for filling a lawful sphere in life, for the mutual benefit of society and the individual, whether the business be principally of the head, or of the hand, requires a moft fteady purpofe and fixed refolution, otherwife, the difficulties will not be furmounted, or habits eftablished, and the party at laft will not attain a higher epithet, than a dunce, or bungler, in his profeffion.

Secondly, A moral converfation; without this, how shall a man be acceptable, or even safely retained in fociety. But to attain habits of temperence, prudence, juftice, moderation, and benevolence, a fixed resolution is essentially requifite for breaking off pernicious attachments, lopping off the wild excurfions of depraved fancy, and cultivating the feeds of a virtuous education, This is beft effected where there is.

Thirdly,