man's family, or to thofe of a pauper. May prefer my birth in my own country and own town, to being born in another country or ano. ther town. May prefer my fex, my body, my intellect, to fome, or any other.-And may prefer my existence as a man, to existence as a bird, a beast, or a fish. Now in all these cases every body must allow, that the nature of things renders it impoffible I should prefer under the influence of defire. Defire always respects future apprehended good: Nor can the events be the objects of previous defire and preference, fince this is to suppose we desired and prefered before we exifted.

Events also which exist in providence, unforefeen, unexpected, and unconceived, may be ob jects of preference. Thus our many escapes from imminent dangers by mediums previously inconceivable to us and interpofitions by unexpected friends, in circumstances of embarrassment, may be objects of preference. Unexpected friendfhip or unimagined love from another, when it becomes evident, may also be objects of preference or approbation.

Thus alfo the undefired operations of the truth and Spirit of God in converfion, may be truly prefered, and approved, when the party apprehends himself the fubject of them.

But though it may be faid with consistency, that we prefer fome objects or events, which

exift without our previous concern, yet we fhould not exprefs ourselves with precision if we should say, that we prefer their negation or the existence of their contraries. Thus the expreffion would be too general, and confequently want precifion, fhould I fay, that I prefer John and Joan for my parents, to those who are really fo. Or, that I prefer being loved by a person who does not love me. In all cafes of this nature, the preference is not preference as a species, but preference generally confidered; and to be specific the word wish is proper to be substituted in place of preference. Thus I wish I had never exifted -I wish I were annihilated-I wish John or Thomas had been my father instead of Caleb -And I with the difaffected perfon did love me; however impious or foolish, are proper expreffions. This remark occafions our anticipation of the nature of a wifh, which we are foon to contemplate and examine.

Without pretending to have given a complete enumeration of the kinds of which the objects of preference, fpecifically confidered may be, I think the foregoing fpecimen may fuffice respecting fuch a diftribution.

We obferved that preference generally con fidered, varied even in fimilar circumftances, in different men, and refpecting the fame man at different times. We may now add, that conse

quently

quently preference, as meaning a species, is also

various.

The prejudices of men vary, and hence their preferences vary. Thus one man prefers a perfon born rich, another prefers him who from poverty rofe to wealth by what is called his own merit; all other confiderations being alike. One prefers the manufactures of his own country on that account, whilst another prefers foreign manufactures, because they are foreign.

The fame objects presented to one person, do not raise always the fame emotion as when prefented to another, and our own experience proves, that we ourselves are not alike impreffed or affected by the fame objects presented at different times. We look for an inward capacity, and are led to what we call tafte, guft, relifh, or temper of mind, fo called from its analogy to animal taste and palate. Our mental taste, as well as apprehenfion varying, our operative conception of good varies, and confequently our paffions; and hence our preferences, specially considered, vary also.— Thus among students, fome have peculiar tafte for languages, and some for history and antiquities: others for science and philosophy: another clafs for mechanics: and another for the works of imagination, perhaps poetry, sculpture, or painting. Thus also, in common life we say, That one has a taste for religion, another for philofophy, and a third for mufic. That one has a

tafte

tafte for keeping birds, another pigeons, and another for butterflies: Hence the denominations of bird-fanciers, columbarians, and the curious in infects.

All these have a sensation, a something in conception, which, whether they will call their happinefs, or not, is that fatisfaction which fuits their temper, and thus influences their ideas of the goodness of objects, and ultimately all degrees of their preferences.

And in refpect to the fame perfon, how dif ferent is the operative idea of good and happiness: which, we may experiment in ourselves and ob ferve in others? Sometimes perhaps our preference fublimated by a devout afpiration, refts on nothing fhort of eternal glory: At other times it rifes no higher than the gratification of a favourite dog, or an admired walking-ftick: according to the extenfion of the prefent view of the mind.

Happinefs in conception, or operative happiness in the mind, seems no more than fatisfaction present, or fatisfaction in profpect. It is confequently, in finite minds, in ever varying circumftances, itself an ever varying thing, yet, uniform in this, that it is the poffeffion, enjoyment, and continuance of what the perfon, according to his present taste, is absorbed in, as his highest good in prefent view.

We may also remark, that fometimes the mental taste is what we will venture to call cloyed,

and

and thus the mind is rendered insensible, callous, or stupid to the objects of a former paffion and preference. In such cases, habit may stay a little, and influence a preference, but she foon becomes coy and withdraws.

SECTION IV.

Of Inclination of Mind.

INCLINATION,

NCLINATION, which is the other kind of preference, according to our divifion of preference under its general idea, may be thus defcribed An inclination of mind is a preference, under the influence of the fecondary paffions, defire or averfion, accompanied with hope or fear, joy or forrow; and which refpects events and changes of things as its object.

Inclinations of mind, differ from preferences, specially confidered, in various refpects: for the objects of preferences are things; but the objects of inclinations are events. The motives of the former are primary paffions, fuch as admiration and love; but the motives of the latter, are the fecondary paffions, defire and averfion. Also, the conceptions of poffible and impoffible, freedom or liberty, constraint and restraint, are inapplicable