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human being to the present time," or bringing to repentance one sinner more than he has," "would not result in a vast increase of sin in the system," instead of being the ultimate point which it was his effort to sustain, was simply the proof which he offered to show that it could not be demonstrated from facts, that God could have prevented all sin, or the present degree of sin. In place of a just exhibition of his reasoning therefore, he has in his pretended quotation of it, mistaken his evidence for his conclusion, and substituted the proof of the inference, which he was labouring to support, for the inference itself, which that proof was employed to sustain !

A still more perplexing objection to his representation is, that in place of exhibiting the reasoning in the passage as an argument, ex concessis, or of any other species, it converts it into a piece of sheer tautology, without either logic or sense; the inference deduced from the concession, being a mere repetition of the concession itself, instead of a relative proposition. The position conceded by his opponents, from which he professes to reason is, that "God prefers sin to holiness in its stead," because it is "the necessary means of the greatest good;" for he admits that they regard that as the ground on which "sin entered the system." But the inference also which he deduces from this position is, that "then" God may "have chosen to admit the existing sin into the system as the best means of securing his obedient kingdom in perpetual allegiance ;”— that is, because it is "the necessary means of the greatest good ;"—a mere repetition of the conceded position itself, in place of a different one obtained from it by logical deduction; an argument ex concessis truly!

But his final step in the reasoning is still more extraordinary. "May not this," he says, "be the good in view of which

he chose not to prevent sin? If so, then the reason of the choice is a different one from that which you assign:" that is, if the reason of the choice is in truth what you allege; then instead of being that, it " is a different one from that which you assign!" "And until you prove that this was not the reason, you cannot affirm that sin entered the system, as 'the necessary means of the greatest good :' that is, in other words, until you prove that the reason which you assign, is not the true reason of its admission into the system, you cannot affirm that it is the true reason of its admission! or more succinctly still-you cannot affirm your theory to be true, until you have proved it to be false! The argument at large is thus equivalent to the following. A being conceded to be A, it follows that A is A. Wherefore, until it is proved that it is not, it cannot be affirmed that it is! By most who "deserve the praise which our admiration confers on the highest intellectual attainments," this would probably be thought to be a non sequitur. Not so, however, with "the Dwight professor of theology in Yale College." He solemnly assures us, that this is his argument in the passage in the note in question; and "that he made it merely as an argument ex concessis, which was fatal to his opponent."

A further difficulty with which his representation is perplexed, is, that both the essential thoughts, and the reasoning of the note, which he disclaims, are likewise exhibited in the passage itself of the sermon to which the note refers; where they are indisputably employed to express his own sentiments. The passage is the following:

"Do you then say that God gave man a nature, which he knew would lead him to sin? What if he did? Do you know that God could have done better, better on the whole, or better if he gave him existence at all, even for the individual himself? The error lies in the

gratuitous assumption that God could have adopted a moral system, and prevented all sin, or at least the present degree of sin. For no man knows this-no man can prove it. The assumption therefore is wholly unauthorized as the basis of the present objection, and the objection itself groundless. On the supposition that the evil which exists is, in respect to divine prevention, incidental to the best possible system, and that notwithstanding the evil, God will secure the greatest good possible to him to secure, who can impeach either his wisdom or his goodness, because evil exists? I say then, that as ignorance is incompetent to make an objection, and as no one knows that this supposition is not a matter of fact, no one has a right to assert the contrary, or even to think it. Suppose then God had adopted a different system, who is competent to foretell or to conjecture the results or even the results of one iota of change in the present system? Suppose God had made you just like Adam, or even like Lucifer, and placed you in similar circumstances, do you know that you would not have sinned as he did? How do you know that had you commenced your immortal career with such aggravated guilt, God would not have found it necessary to send you to hell without an offer of mercy, and that you would not have sunk in deeper wo than that which now awaits you? How do you know that what might have been true repecting yourself, had not been true of any other possible system of accountable beings? How do you know that had God ordered things otherwise than he has, this very world, now cheered with the calls of mercy and brightened with the hopes of eternal life, yea, that heaven itself would not now be trembling under the thunders of retributive vengeance?" Sermon, p. 29–33.

We have thus, in the sermon itself, in the passage to which the note refers, every important query, intimation, statement, and conclusion, that constitutes that part of the note which he now disclaims! We are not only assured as positively as in the note, that "the assumption that God could have adopted a system and prevented all sin, or at least the present degree of sin," is gratuitous and incapable of proof; but the same consideration is alleged to support that assertion; the assurance that there is no ground for the conclusion, that had God pursued any other course of

administration than he has, or departed an iota from his present system, a far greater sum of sin would not have resulted from it, and possibly the general apostacy of his kingdom in other words, that there are no materials for proving that those evils have not been prevented solely by the influence exerted by the punishment of sin; and that is, that there are no evidences that God may not "have chosen to admit the existing sin into the system, as the best means of securing his obedient kingdom in perpetual allegiance."

But the difficulty of assenting to his statement is consummated by the fact, that he repeatedly employs these representations in the review itself also, in which he disclaims them, and professes that they contain "no part of his scheme !" Thus he says in reference to that part of the note, and partially quoting its language :

“Dr. Taylor asked, on the supposition that God had prevented any past sin, who can prove that the requisite interposition for the purpose would not result in a vast increase of sin in the universe? Now this is a main question-a question on the face of it, fitted to show how absolutely naked are the assumptions of Dr. Woods, and of others. For how do they know, how can they prove-what can authorize them to assert that the least iota of change in God's appointed system of moral influence, would not have resulted in a vast increase of sin? We say man is too ignorant to make assertions to the contrary." p. 554.

The representation here, is thus indisputably fully equivalent to that which he imputes to his opponents, and disclaims as expressing his own opinion. If no one is authorized to assert or assume, that the least iota of change in God's appointed system of moral influence, would not have resulted in a vast increase of sin in the system; there must be an equal certainty that no one can have any authority for the assertion or assumption, that the reason of God's not

introducing any such change, is not, that the admission of "the existing sin into the system," is "the best means of securing his obedient kingdom in perpetual allegiance;" nor that the permission of "the sin of some," is not "necessary to secure the holiness of others." I add one more passage:

"We will, however, for the sake of bringing Dr. Woods to the real question, go still further-we will suppose that God, if he had pleased, could have prevented all sin in the human race for ever. But how does this prove that he could have kept all sin out of his immense moral kingdom? No one doubts that God can prevent some moral agents from ginning; but how does this prove that he could have prevented all! How does it prove that if he had changed the system as he must by other interpositions, in order to have prevented any from sinning whom he has not prevented, there would not have been as the consequence immeasurably more sin, than will exist under the present system as it is? Now this is the question which must be answered, let all subordinate questions be answered as they may. This is the real question as presented by Dr. Taylor, and in the most explicit manner. After saying of one supposition, be this as it may' (and thus showing that he did not place his reliance on that,) he says, but the question is what could God have done to secure more holiness and less sin in a moral system? This is the task then which devolves on Dr. Woods, viz. to prove that God could have kept all sin, or the present degree of sin, out of a universal moral system." p. 562.

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The passage in the note to which he here refers and partially quotes, is the following.

"If God could prevent all sin without this influence," (i. e. of the punishment of sin,)" why has he not done it? Be this, however, as it may, since God has not, so far as we know, prevented sin in a single instance without this influence, how can it be proved from facts that he could have prevented all sin, or even the present degree of sin, in a moral system? Had his creatures done what they could, then indeed there had been more holiness and less sin. But the question is, what could God have done to secure such a result? Had he pre

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