Thus he clearly appears not to have been aware that in the second part of his sermon, which was employed in showing in what sense he regards men as sinners by nature, he was openly reasserting one of the principal features of the doctrine of physical depravity; nor that in his reasoning in his note in respect to one of the "groundless assumptions," he was literally and directly disproving his statements and argumentation respecting the other. He was, doubtless, equally unaware that in conjoining his admission that his theory is a mere "hypothetical statement," which, for aught he knows at least, is utterly incapable of proof, with the positive assertion that no one can ever prove the truth of the opposite theory; he fully conceded to the cavillers at the divine conduct whom he was opposing, the impossibility of refuting their objections; and he was, possibly, equally unconscious that in all the great principles of his theory and reasonings for its support, in place of meeting the enemies of "divine decrees and revelation," he was merely "humbly" walking in "the broad footsteps" of the great champions of Arminianism, the imputation of whose sentiments to him, he resents as so causeless and unjust.

His views of some of the subjects of which he has had occasion to treat, seem to have fluctuated very essentially when events have led him to contemplate them "under another aspect." When he had occasion to demonstrate the exact coincidence of President Edwards's views with his own, respecting the nature and cause of sin, he assured us that "nothing appears" in what Edwards says on that subject "like the doctrine that a propensity or tendency to sin belongs to human nature as a substantial attribute," and that "it is perfectly consistent with his notion of tendency to sin, that it should depend on man's external circumstances,

and wholly cease by a change in these circumstances." In his Concio ad Clerum, however, he presents precisely the opposite representation of the Calvinistic doctrine on that subject.

"What, then, are we to understand when it is said that mankind are depraved by nature? I answer-that such is their nature, that they will sin, and only sin in all the appropriate circumstances of their being.

To bring this part of the subject distinctly before the mind, it may be well to remark, that the question between the Calvinists and the Arminians on the point is this-whether the depravity or sinfulness of mankind is truly and properly ascribed to their nature, or to their circumstances of temptation? And since as it must be confessed, there can no more be sin without circumstances of temptation, than there can be sin without a nature to be tempted, why ascribe sin exclusively to nature? I answer-it is truly and properly ascribed to nature and not to circumstances, because all mankind sin in all the appropriate circumstances of their being. For all the world ascribe an effect to the nature of a thing, when no possible change in its appropriate circumstances will change the effect; or when the effect is uniformly the same in all its appropriate circumstances." p. 13.

From these representations it is apparent that unless he regards Edwards as having held the same theory on this subject, as the Arminians whom he was opposing, his views of the Calvinistic doctrine respecting it, have undergone an entire revolution since he penned the first of these passages! a singular subject, certainly, for such totally contradictory apprehensions and statements, by one who has made it so frequently the theme of controversy, and who thinks it" proper to remark that he is not aware of any change in his own views on these points since he entered the ministry!" His representations respecting several other topics, have exhibited mental fluctuations and revolutions equally extraordinary. Thus, at one time, the scheme

At

of physical depravity has been exhibited as the prevalent doctrine of New-England, and as constituting a most formidable obstruction to the influence of the gospel. another, however, all respectable Calvinistic writers, both there and elsewhere, have been represented as entirely agreeing with him in what he regards as the rejection of that doctrine; and none, it has been intimated, have ever thought of imputing it to them, except a few orthodox brethren who have fallen into "Arminian and Unitarian" errors, in interpreting the language in which it is supposed to be expressed.

No indications have hitherto been seen that the criticisms to which his disquisitions have been subjected, have proved of any service to him. Each of his discussions on these topics has been made the subject of animadversion; and to say nothing of the observations on them, which have been offered by myself, a multitude of mistakes in his definitions, statements and reasonings, and many essential errors, have been pointed out by his clerical brethren. Not a solitary topic of importance has passed under his discussion, respecting which it has not been shown beyond confutation, that he has fallen into fatal and palpable mistakes, and involved himself in inextricable inconsistencies. Not the slightest benefit, however, it would seem, has been derived by him from these important aids. Not a solitary concession has escaped him on any of the topics in regard to which he has erred, nor any indication of a wish to avert the injuries which his misconceptions are adapted to occasion.

In place of gladly correcting the errors of his speculations, when pointed out to him, his method has been, in some instances, to pass them in silence, or simply reasserting the accuracy of his views, to treat them as though no

objections had been alleged against them; as in regard to the incompatibility demonstrated by Dr. Woods, of his theory respecting the limitation of divine power, both with the doctrine of God's universal providence, and with inducements to prayer: objections obviously of the utmost importance, and utterly unavoidable by any other expedient than the abandonment of his theory. Instead, however, of attempting to elude them, he has preferred simply to assert, that "the providential government of God" and "the universality of his providential purposes are not obscured" by his system but that they "extend to all events on this scheme, and form the same basis for submission and prayer, confidence and joy, under the perfect dominion of God, which exists on the other."

In other instances, when urged by "the pressure of new objections," he has chosen to shift his ground, and ascribing new and arbitrary significations to his language, and objects to his reasoning, to affirm that it is only by misconception or misrepresentation that they are interpreted in the sense in which they were originally used. A signal example of this is seen in the pretence that he offered his theory respecting the admission of sin into the universe as a mere hypothesis or conjecture, without pretending positively to express any opinion in respect to its truth; while at the same time he not only employed it to vindicate the conduct of God from objection, and declared it to be in his judgment the only theory which can solve the difficulties of the divine administration, but affirmed that there is no medium between adopting it, and assenting to the dogma which he professes to discard, that "sin is the necessary means of the greatest good "

Another singular measure to which he has resorted for the purpose of shielding his speculations from objection, is

an attempt to show that he is fully sanctioned in them by most of the distinguished writers of New-England, and the pretense that they enjoy the approval of many of the most conspicuous and popular ministers of the present day. Thus while professing that he "has discarded the dogma that sin consists in any thing distinct from, or antecedent to moral action," and "called in question the theory that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good," he has laboured more strenuously than for almost any other purpose, to demonstrate, that in place of having deviated on these topics from Calvinistic theologians, the views of Calvin, the Westminster divines, Edwards and Dwight on the former, and Bellamy on the latter topic, are in coincidence with his own. In order however to give color to these pretenses, he has found it necessary to institute a number of new and extraordinary laws of interpretation, the most important of which is that which he denominates" the true usus loquendi," which teaches that the language itself of a writer, should never have any decisive voice in determining what the sentiments are which it is employed to express; but that its interpreters should be wholly guided in their judgment respecting its import, by the views which they themselves entertain of the subject of which it treats; a rule doubtless well adapted to the exigency for which it was devised, and the only one by which he could impart any show of truth to his representations respecting the doctrines of Edwards, Bellamy and Dwight; but which would annihilate at once all certainty respecting the meaning of language, and render it as easy to discover any one set of doctrines in an author as any other.

When no other expedient has promised an escape from the difficulties of his condition, he has ventured to turn round and boldly disavow his statements and reasonings, and claim that they were solely meant to express the opinions of his