smoke and fire in the mountain, and the inference to establish momentariness cannot be given such a form. The new doctrine insists that it is possible to prove the relation within (antar), that is simply between the thing to be proved and the thing by which it is to be proved, without the intervention of something external (bahis) in which the relation is to exist.

Somewhat earlier, perhaps, is a tract on Apohasiddhi by Ratnakirti, which deals with the significance of words, and promulgates the Buddhist doctrine that the word has both a positive signification and a negative, in that it differentiates the thing referred to from others; these two sides of its activity are simultaneous and not successive; the tract is interesting because it refutes in succession the views of Kumarila, Trilocana, Nyayabhūṣaṇa, Vacaspati Miçra, and Dharmottara.1

An interesting link between Buddhism and the Nyaya and Vaiçesika schools is provided in the conception of the perception of Yogins, which forms in Dharmakirti' the fourth of the forms of perception, the other three being sense perception in the narrow sense, mental perception which really forms one with sense perception, and self-consciousness which is regarded as essentially accompanying every psychical occurrence, an idea which Dharmottara illustrates, but not very lucidly, seeming, in part at least, to confound self-consciousness with the presence of feeling as emotion simultaneously with perception, e. g. of colour. There was an obvious difficulty for Buddhism with its doctrine of momentariness in allowing for self-consciousness, which none of the schools effectively faced; the later Nyaya doctrine frankly made the element of self-consciousness a secondary product supervening on consciousness. Self-consciousness is perception, since it reveals the self (ütmanaḥ sākātkṣāri), is devoid of imagination (nirvikalpaka), and free from error (abhrānta). The perception of Yogins is also without error, for it deals with matters such as the four noble truths which are

1 Ibid., pp. 1 ff., iii. Cf. Steherbatskoi, Muséon, v (1904), pp. 165 ff.; ILA., p. 106; MSIL., p. 140; NM., pp. 303 ft.

2 NB., p. 103; NBT., pp. 14 f.; Nyāyasāra, pp. 3 f., 82 ff.; TRD, pp. 39 f. (using NBT); NM., pp. 103 fr.; Gañgeça, Tattracintāmaņi, i. 795; ILA., pp. 78, 76, 258 f.

over and above the ordinary means of proof; it is without imagination, consisting of clear insight, which supervenes on intense concentration on the matters. This is interesting as a rationalized statement of the intuition (paññā) of the Pali Canon. It has a parallel in the perception of seers (arṣa) which figures in the Vaiçeṣika,' and in the doctrine of the Nyāyasāra of Bhāsarvajña, which recognizes an indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) intuition on the part of Yogins engaged in meditation (samādhi). Uddyotakara discusses in an interesting way the doctrine apparently ascribed to Vasubandhu, which defines perception as cognition proceeding from just that object (tato 'rthūt), the terms after cognition being asserted to be without meaning. They cannot serve to discriminate perception from inference, on the score that perception is derived from the object only, while inference involves other factors, for the definition is perfectly compatible with inference. Nor can it serve to distinguish perception of colour, &c., from perception of an object as such, e. g. a jar, for the perception of colour and of a jar are two perfectly distinct perceptions, and it is quite erroneous to assume that there is no such thing as a jar, but merely perception of colour, &c. Nor is it of any avail to exclude wrong cognition, for it is not the case, as assumed by the Buddhists, that false perception arises from something which is not the object, e. g. that the incorrect apprehension of silver in a shell is produced by something which is not-shell. Further, the Buddhists' view is open to the fatal objection that it makes the object the cause of cognition; now a cause must precede the effect; the object perceived thus exists before the perception, and, as momentary, has ceased to be before it is perceived, and this is plainly absurd, since perception is only of what is immediately present. It is hopeless to argue that the disappearance of the object and the emergence of perception are simultaneous, in the face of the impossibility of establishing any such effect; moreover, in any case, the object is admitted to have disappeared, and therefore to

Vaiçesika Sutra, ix. 1. 13; Praçastapādabhāṣya, p. 187; NK., pp. 189 ff.; ILA., pp. 81 ff.

2 NV., pp. 42 ff.; NVT., p. 100; MKV., p. 71.

be past at the very moment when it is being perceived as present, which is fatal to the Buddhist view.

The question of falsity touched on here is further confuted by the Nyaya' in connexion with the doctrines of Asatkhyāti and Ātmakhyāti, under which they discuss the explanations of incorrect cognition offered by the Madhyamaka and the Yogācāra · schools respectively. The former view holds that wrong cognition is a manifestation or making known of something which is unreal, non-existence (asat); to see silver in a shell is to assert the existence of something unreal. The obvious objection to this view is that it asserts that a non-existing thing can produce an effect, but this is met by the Madhyamaka contention that it is not necessary that the non-existing thing should have any such potency; it is enough to assume that cognition has the power of presenting the thing apprehended as existent or non-existent. The Nyaya answer insists instead that the false cognition proceeds from a real object which is misapprehended, understood otherwise than is correct (anyathā-khyāti).

In the case of the Vijñānavāda, incorrect cognition is explained by the fact that what is merely idea is referred erroneously to the external world, ignoring the fact that there is no real difference between the seif, the object of knowledge, and knowledge. The Nyaya criticism' is that, if the premisses of the Buddhist were correct, the cognition which arises would take the form not of 'this is silver' but 'I am silver', and this is obviously not the case. Moreover, the view is open to all the objections always available against the doctrine of the non-existence of external reality. Finally, even on its own merits the doctrine is not preferable to the Nyaya doctrine of Anyathakhyati, since in fact, even on the Buddhist view, error lies in cognizing a thing as something which it is not, and this is precisely the Nyaya doctrine,

1 NVT., pp. 53 f.; Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha, trs., pp. 85 ff.; cf. Bhāmatī, pp. 12 ff.; NM., pp. 545 f. 2 So Aniruddha, SS. i. 42.

ENGLISH INDEX

Ananda, 27, 62, 209, 221.
Andhaka sect, 53, 98, n. 1, 112, 151,
167, n. 2, 189, 188, n. 1, 211, 212,
218, 214, n. 2, 215, 277, n. 1.
Anvils, simile of, to illustrate sense
action, 190.

Aparacaila sect, 149, 150, 151, 156,
173. 180, 207, 212, 218.

Accident, 58, 59, 60, 109, 135, 172, Aparaseliya, see Aparagaila.