of the experiences of the Bodhisattva could not, of course, be denied without repudiating the tradition, but to claim that these experiences were voluntarily undergone implies a doctrine which is wholly unacceptable to the Vibhajyavādins. The school denies also the belief of the Andhakas founded on a Sutta that Çakyamuni entered on the path of assurance under the dispensation of the Buddha Kassapa; if this were true, then he must have been a disciple of Kassapa, and this contradicts the essential nature of a Buddha which is to be self-developed.

4. The Perfections of the Saint

Especial stress was laid in the schools on the development of the view of the character of the Arhant, which assumed in the opinion of the Vibhajyavādins a rigidity, excluding human weaknesses and imperfections. Thus they deny strenuously the possibility of the falling away of an emancipated one, even in the case of one who attains only occasionally in meditation full emancipation, against the view of the Sammitiya, Vajjiputtiyas, Sabbatthivadins and some Mahasanghikas that the Arhant is liable to fall away. They deny also the doctrine of the Pubbaand Apara-seliyas that the gods of the Mara group can impose physical impurities on saints.' As against the Andhakas it is maintained that the saint has complete knowledge, that he cannot doubt, and that he cannot be surpassed in knowledge by others, while against Mahasañghika and Andhaka views it is claimed that he casts aside every fetter of ignorance and doubt in attaining his end. But the saint is human; the Uttarapathakas, who hold that he is entirely free in every regard from any connexion with the four intoxicants, desire, lust for rebirth, false opinion, and ignorance, are reminded that his body and his sense organs cannot be deemed uncontaminated by these intoxicants, and that only the path, its fruits, Nirvāṇa, and the factors leading to insight are really free from connexion with the intoxicants. Similarly, though the saint is indifferent as to sense impressions as part of his character, his indifference is manifested under

1 KV. i. 2; ii. 2; possibly one of Mahādeva's five points, JRAS. 1910, p. 418; Wassilieff, Bouddhisme, pp. 223 ff.

2 KV. ii, 2-4; iv. 10; xxii. 1.

human conditions; he cannot attend to more than one sense impression or idea at the same time, for his consciousness is essentially momentary, as also is that of a god. The gods also are forced into human mould; it is a mistake to hold, as the Sammitiyas do, that there is no self culture among the gods of the higher heavens of the worlds of desire and matter, save, of course, in the realm of the unconscious gods, for the Andhaka doctrine that consciousness really exists there is absolutely rejected. Again, the progress to sainthood must be carried out in strict accordance with the stages marked out; the Andhakas are wrong in defining saintship, so as to cover the simultaneous putting aside of all the fetters; in the first three stages five of the fetters are removed; in the last the aspirant rids himself of the desire for rebirth either in the world of matter or of nonmatter (rūpa-, arūpa-, rāga), conceit, distraction, and ignorance. The Uttarapathakas are also wrong in ascribing to a learner the insight of a saint."

The saint by his actions, gifts to the order, saluting shrines and so forth does not accumulate any action to continue to bear fruit; if he could win merit he could also win demerit, which is impossible. Nor is it necessary that he should experience the results of all his former action before his death, so that he cannot die an untimely death, as asserted by the Rajagirikas and the Siddhatthikas, in accordance with their general doctrine that all is derived from action. Still less can a saint fall away from sainthood because, as held by the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammitiyas, in a previous birth he has calumniated a saint.

The state of the saint in passing away raises difficulty; it is denied that he possesses an ethical consciousness at such a moment, which is contrary to the extinction of ethical considerations for the sage, though asserted by the Andhakas. Nor is the Uttarapathaka doctrine right, under which the saint attains the

1 KV. iv. 3, 5; doubt and ignorance of Arhatship are two of Mahadeva's points; contrast MN. iii. 110; AN. v. 155, 162; ERE. i. 744.

2 KV. i. 3; iii. 11; they do not practise moral control, iii. 10.

8 KV. iv. 10; v. 2.

4 KV. xvii. 1; 2; viii. 11. The Prajñaptivādins deny untimely death; Wassilieff, p. 244.

completion of existence in imperturbable absorption of meditation; on the contrary in accordance with the Canon we must recognize that he passes out of meditation before death, and that therefore he dies with possession of that sub-consciousness (bhavanga-citta) which is the normal characteristic of life, and which is non-ethical and purely resultant.'

No person may become a saint unless he has laid aside the life of a layman, canonical texts to the contrary and the views of the Uttarapathakas notwithstanding; it is impossible also for any embryo to become a saint at the moment of rebirth nor can a dreamer attain this state."

4. Nirvana as the Unconditioned

There is comparatively little development in the schools of the conception of release. The Milindapañha3 in the older portion insists on the conception of release as cessation of birth, old age, death, and the attendant woes of life; it is held that he who has overcome the tendencies to rebirth is aware of his success in producing cessation of craving leading to it, while those, who have not, still know the excellence of release by hearing of it from those who have experience of it, precisely as the pains of mutilation are known by listening to the moans of the sufferers. In the later portions we have, after an assertion of the nonexistence of any true being in the world, a discussion of space and Nirvana as uncaused by any of the recognized causes; there is a cause of the realization of Nirvana, but not of its origin, just as one can go to the Himalayas, but cannot bring them to oneself. Nirvāņa is uncompounded; it cannot be said to have been produced, or not to have been produced, or to be possible of production, to be past, future, or present, or perceptible by any sense organ. Nirvana exists and is perceptible by the mind; with a pure heart, free from obstacles and cravings the disciple can see Nirvāņa. Its nature can be explained only by similes, just as wind cannot be grasped, though it most assuredly exists. 1 KV. xxii. 2, 3.

KV. iv. 1, 2; xxii. 5; xxiii. 1 may sanction married life according to the Andhakas and Vetulyakas.

8 pp. 50, 69; 268, 271 f., 813 ff.

Nirvana is utter bliss, without pain; though its form, figure, duration, or size cannot be explained, yet something may be said of its qualities. It is untarnished by evil dispositions; it cools the fever arising thence; it is boundless, full of saints; it blossoms with the flowers of purity, knowledge, and emancipation. It is infinite, is satisfying to all desires, it is very exalted, and immovable. It can be realized by freedom from distress and danger, by peace, calm, bliss, delicacy, and purity. There is no place where Nirvāņa is stored up, save only right living.

The Dhammasangani almost ignores the term Nibbāna, but in the ancient supplementary exposition or comment (atthuddhāra) Nibbana is invariably substituted for the term uncompounded element. Yet it is noteworthy that in the text itself the uncom pounded element is never identified with the fruit of sainthood which is certainly one aspect of Nirvāņa. This uncompounded, element is described by a long series of negatives; it is not connected with thought in any form, nor with the fetters, the contagions, the ties, corruption, grasping, joy, ease, disinterestedness; it is, however, positively described as supra-mundane; it is invisible, non-impinging, without material form; uncaused; it cannot be affected by insight or culture; it is indeterminate and produces no result.1

In the Kathavatthu we meet the Andhaka conception of Nirvāņa as morally good, but this view is rejected, since morally good means positively that which will produce a good rebirth, and this is inappropriate to Nirvana. An interesting discussion arises on the dictum on the Majjhima Nikaya that the enlightened man does not think about Nirvāņa. This leads to the Pubbaseliya doctrine that Nirvāņa as an object of thought is really a hindrance, a view very imperfectly refuted by the Theravadin, while Buddhaghosa is so perplexed by the issue-the Pubbaseliya being accorded the last word in the discussion-that he falls back on the quite impossible solution that Nirvana here is simply temporal well being, a matter connected with the satisfaction of natural desires only.

2

1 Psych. Eth., pp. 359, 361, 367 ff. There is nothing new in ADS. vi. 14; ix. 9. 2 xix. 6; ix. 2; MN. i. 4. On Nirvāņa as void, see ch. xiii, § 1.

PART III

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE MAHĀYĀNA

CHAPTER XII

MAHĀYĀNA ORIGINS AND AUTHORITIES

1. The Origin of the Mahayana

Is it possible to deduce the origin and development of the Mahayana from factors immanent in the Hinayana, or must we allow for the introduction of an element of influence of foreign thought on India? There are facts which tell in favour of the latter hypothesis. It is clear that the rise of Mahāyāna was rapid in the first and second centuries A. D., and this was the time when after Greek and Parthian and Çaka princes the Kuşan dynasty was reigning in India. Matters had greatly changed since the days of the Buddha; foreigners had freely penetrated the country, commerce had grown, and it is not without importance that the most metaphysical of the treatises of early Buddhism the Milindapanha purports to be a dialogue between an Indian sage and a Greek ruler. The most important of all Madhyamaka texts, the foundation in a sense of the Mahāyāna is the Prajñāpāramitā, the book of the perfection of intuition or knowledge, twin sister of the Sophia or the Gnosis of Asiatic Greece. The doctrine of the Trikaya, the three bodies of a Buddha, seems to appear so abruptly as to suggest borrowing from without. Moreover, the sudden activity of the Mahayana, its conviction of the necessity of the preaching of salvation, and the doctrine of the duty of man to lay aside the dream of swift release from transmigration for himself, and to choose instead the career of a Buddha to be for the sake of the release of the world from tribulation, suggest the introduction of a new spirit, which India was eager and able to