workings of intense desire; anon it is calm as the lake,

"whose waters are at rest,"

calm almost to listlessness and apathy;- now, soaring on the wings of a noble and lofty ambition, soon it falls wearied as it were with its flight; unbowed at one time, by the rudest rebuff of adversity, and unaffected by matters of a character to awaken its sympathy and to unloose the floodgates of memory at another, the simplest object in nature, a bird, a flower, a plaintive note of witching melody, will call up into the mind recollections of old associations, and endearments flown, like

the remembrance of which had apparently passed away for ever, and whose renewing produces feelings of exquisite tenderness or pain. With what fondness too doth the mind sometimes linger on the fled; with what tenacity will it cling to the present; with what a presentiment of ill and gloomy foreboding, anticipate and shrink from the to come; linger on the past it knows not why, and forbode for the future it cannot tell what. This, at the first blush, may undoubtedly tend to excite our surprise; yet may it be connected, though in some respects but imperfectly, with its immediate or proximate causes, and be traced, though perhaps but faintly, to some peculiarity in the intellectual phenomena. To attempt, however, to account for

every impulse to change of which the mind is the subject, or to describe every transient emotion by which the mental faculty is agitated, would be at once senseless and futile. As it has been well observed, to endeavour to examine every internal operation which the mind performs, would be, not only to essay the history of every movement in the life of every individual; but to define and exemplify every combination of thought and feeling of which the mind is capable. "Within man," says Sir John Herschel, * " "a world is open to his intellectual view, abounding with phenomena and relations; and of the highest immediate interest. But, while he cannot help perceiving that the insight he is enabled to obtain into his internal sphere of thought and feeling, is, in reality, the source of all his power, the fountain of his predominance over external nature; he yet feels himself capable of entering only very imperfectly into those recesses of his own bosom, and analysing the operations of his mind, in this, as in all other things; in short a being darkly wise."" All that we can do then, in our desire to develope the mind, and to assign the causes of its many and varied processes of action, is to examine, and argue on, the general principles and laws by which the mind is governed.

6

The mind, in its infantine state, has been aptly likened to a sheet of white paper; because, in that

* Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy.

condition, it may be said to be free to receive impressions from external objects, and because, in its then state, it is devoid, or unconscious, of idea. Hence, it is ultimately capable of obtaining only that quantum of knowledge which may be conveyed to it through some given medium. This knowledge, it is evident, is furnished in two ways, by observation and reflection; by observation, employed upon outward objects in the perception of their nature and qualities; and by the employment and exercise of those powers which inhere in the mind, in tracing, analyzing, comparing, and associating those simple ideas, which by the foregoing process have been engendered. This being so, the knowledge imparted must necessarily be of two kinds,-sensible, as derived from the organs of sense, and intellectual, as springing from the power of reflection. This sentient power is possessed by the inferior grades of created beings in a not less if not in a greater degree than by man. Man has, therefore, in common with all animals, what may be termed the sensible and percipient qualities of the mind; but the brute cannot be said to have, in common with him, the intellectual and reasoning faculties, nor to receive pleasure or pain from the exercise of these functions; consequently, as man is possessed of that superior power by which he is rendered an intellectual being, if his mind be rightly constituted, that which administers to his intellectual gratification will have the greatest influence over him, and be the most ear

That poetry exercises degree, it will be our

nestly sought after by him. this influence, in an eminent object now to prove.

66

The mind, abstractedly considered, may be defined to be the intellectual principle or faculty of man. It is our sentient self, the power within us, which feels, remembers, compares, and desires. It has been described in its native condition, by an able metaphysician, * simply as a substance possessing certain qualities, susceptible of various affections or modifications, which, existing successively as momentary states of the mind, constitute all the phenomena of thought and feeling." The faculties or functions which are employed in its various operations of perceiving, judging, and feeling, are both of a retentive and active character. Lord Bacon calls these the particular modes in which the mind operates on the subject of its thoughts; and he restricts them to memory, reason, strictly so called, and imagination. This division has also been followed by D'Alembert. But this is far from being a satisfactory enumeration of the faculties of the mind, inasmuch, as in the first place, it does not embrace the whole class; and, in the second place, as Dugald Stewart has justly remarked,† these functions" are perpetually blended together in

* Dr. Brown." Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind." + Preliminary Dissertation.-" Encyclopædia Britannica."

their actual exercise, insomuch that there is scarcely a branch of human knowledge which does not in a greater or less degree furnish employment to them all."

The states of the mind may perhaps, with more propriety, be held generally resolvable, primarily, into sensation or perception*, and memory; and secondarily, into judgment or reflection, and imagination; comprehending under the former of these terms (i. e. reflection), generalization, comparison, and abstraction; and under the latter (i. e. imagination), association and conception, or invention. This secondary class, it will be perceived, arises out of, and derives its properties from, the primary. The mind is thus demonstrated to be both passive and active; passive, in being wrought upon by sensation, originating in impressions derived from external objects; and active, in reflecting upon, recalling, generalizing, and associating those ideas which have already been engrafted upon it; and so, likewise, in its power of exhibiting when agitated or affected, as by its own internal energy, particular affections, emotions, and passions. The mind then may be considered as a principle sentient, intelligent, and emotient,-a principle to which the organs of sense

* Dr. Reid has held these to be two distinct features of the mind, but Locke and Brown have both of them shown that (excepting in a very minor respect) the two terms are to be regarded as synonymous.