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tween the several officers of this detachment, I would call the attention of the officer in charge of the Signal Bureau to the fact, that two good officers, who have been serving upon signal duty for two years and a half, are yet without appointments in the corps, never having an opportunity, so far as I can ascertain, to appear before the examining board. Should there be any further appointments made in the list of first lieutenants, I would recommend these two officers, viz: First Lieutenants Fuller and Neel for such positions. They are eminently deserving and fitted for it.

We occupy at present lookout stations at six points along our front and Hanks, from which we command fine views of that portion of the country through which the enemy would be likely to march in the event of their making a movement. It was impossible to render inspection reports for the months of April and May on account of the corps being scattered so much upon active duty. I have the honor to be, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant, B. F. FISHER,

Capt. and Chief Signal Officer, Army of the Potomac.

Maj. W. J. L. NICODEMUS,

In charge of Signal Bureau, Washington, D. C.

HDQRS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, SIGNAL DEPARTMENT,

October [22], 1864.

GENERAL: In compliance with Special Orders, No. 209, I have the honor to submit the following report of operations of the signal detachment connected with this army during the several epochs of the campaign, commencing with the crossing of the Rapidan upon the 4th of May, and ending with the assault on the enemy's position in front of Petersburg upon July 30, 1864.

The following was the organization of the detachment upon the 4th of May 4 officers with the Second Army Corps, 2 with the Fifth Army Corps, 2 with the Sixth Corps, and 1 with each cavalry division, and 12 in the reserve detachment. Attached to the reserve party were 25 men equipped as pioneers, whose duty it was to construct stations. In addition, accompanying each officer and detachment, were the enlisted men used as flagmen, lookouts, &c. During the campaign the use of flag signals were for two reasons seldom resorted to, first, the army operated constantly as a unit, and the system of field telegraphing, as developed by our corps and now worked by the American Telegraph Company, enabled the commanding general to be in constant telegraphic communication with the several corps commanders; second, the country through which we operated was covered with dense and extensive forests and so devoid of prominent points as to render flag signals, save upon several occasions, impossible. The officers of the reserve detachment were under these circumstances instructed to keep themselves along the flanks and advance of the army in the various movements and battles attending the campaign, in order to gather and forward to the commanding general any information that might be presumed to be of service to him. Those with the army corps had the general instructions to make themselves useful as additional aides when the

nature of the country prevented them from doing signal service. As the services rendered during the first four epochs of the campaign were of a very general character, I would beg leave to refer to them in this report in the same manner. During the crossing of the Rapidan the stations of observation upon Stony, Pony, and Garnett's Mountains were occupied by parties watching the movements of the enemy upon the south bank of the river, and reporting the same to the commanding general until the withdrawal of the cavalry from Culpeper County necessitated their being abandoned. Before these stations were abandoned the enemy's force had nearly all disappeared from the line of the Rapidan, and the direction taken by them learned and reported. During the battle of the Wilderness, the battles in front of Spotsylvania Court-House, the march to the North Anna, and thence to Cold Harbor, and in the several battles attending these latter movements, the officers of the detachment were almost constantly engaged in reconnoitering from the flanks of the army and tree tops in the vicinity of our lines, and made numerous reports of the enemy's movements and position, which aided, more or less, the commanding general in determining the actions of our army. In the battle of the Wilderness communication

by means of flag signals was established between the headquarters of General Warren at the Lacy house and those of General Crawford near Parker's Store. This communication was very opportune, as the enemy, moving against this advanced position, allowed but limited time to the officer commanding in which to receive instructions.

Upon the 9th and 10th of May, during the operations of a portion of the Second Corps upon the south bank of the Po River, signal communication was opened with advantage between the several division headquarters and those of General Hancock. At this time and upon other occasions the signal officers aided materially in directing the firing of the artillery. Upon the 19th and 20th of May the reports of Colonel Beale, commanding the enemy's cavalry covering the right flank of their army, to General Lee were intercepted and forwarded to the chief of staff. During the operations on the North Anna several lines of signal communication were established between the Second Corps headquarters and the several divisions upon the opposite side of the river. From this point until we reached the James River our services were confined entirely to making observations. To indicate the character of these observations I would beg leave to insert here a paragraph from the report of Capt. P. A. Taylor, the signal officer in charge with the Second Corps, to wit:

On the 30th of May Lieutenants Holland and Neel were directed to occupy the station at the Shelton house, where our batteries were established, to direct their fire, and give the general commanding any information of the enemy's position and movements which they might observe. The enemy's batteries were posted on the opposite side of the creek, at a distance of not more than 700 yards from ours, and kept up a fire during the entire day. Lieutenants Holland and Neel remained on duty at this station when every person around them had left, and sent frequent reports for the information of the commanding general, besides directing the fire of our batteries. Fifty shots from the enemy's batteries passed through the house, upon the roof of which Lieutenants Holland and Neel were stationed; solid shot cut down trees all around them, yet they remained firm at their posts of duty. * General Hancock, on hearing of their behavior on this occasion, sent at once a special dispatch to General Meade, commending his signal officers for great gallantry, mentioning the names of Lieutenants Holland and Neel.

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*

It was under difficulties of this character that the several officers of the corps sought to render service. During the operations in the vicinity of Cold Harbor, six stations of observation were established and various movements of the enemy discovered.*

I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. F. FISHER,

Major and Chief Signal Officer, Army of the Potomac.

Brig. Gen. S. WILLIAMS,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

No. 10.

Report of Brig. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, U. S. Army, Chief of Artillery.

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, ARTILLERY HEADQUARTERS,

October 31, 1864. GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the artillery of this army during the present campaign, commencing May 4, 1864, and ending October 31, 1864:

On May 4, the artillery was distributed, organized, and commanded as follows: The artillery of the Second Army Corps (Major-General Hancock) consisted of nine batteries of six guns each, or thirty Napoleons (light 12-pounders), and twenty-four 3-inch rifled ordnance guns, 46 officers, 1,395 enlisted men, and 1,095 horses, and of one battalion (Lieutenant-Colonel Allcock's) of the Fourth New York Foot Artillery, 19 officers and 517 men. The whole constituted a brigade, under the command of Col. J. C. Tidball, Fourth New York Foot Artillery.

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The artillery of the Fifth Army Corps (Major-General Warren) consisted of eight batteries of six guns each, or twenty-four Napoleons, eighteen 3-inch ordnance, and six 10-pounder Parrott guns, 44 officers, and 1,470 enlisted men, and 914 horses; and of one battalion (Major Arthur's) Fourth New York Foot Artillery, 12 officers, 432 men, constituting a brigade, under the command of Col. C. S. Wainwright, First New York Light Artillery.

BATTERIES OF THE FIFTH CORPS.

Stewart's (B), 4th United States, 6 Napoleons.

Winslow's (D), 1st New York, 6 Napo-
leons.

Mink's (H), 1st New York, 6 Napoleons.
Martin's (C), Massachusetts, 6 Napoleons.

Rittenhouse's (D), 5th United States, 6
Parrotts.

Phillips' (E), Massachusetts, 6 3-inch.
Reynolds' (E and L), 1st New York, 6
3-inch.

Cooper's (B), 1st Pennsylvania, 6 3-inch.

*For continuation of report, see Vol. XL, Part I.

The artillery of the Sixth Army Corps (Major-General Sedgwick), consisted of eight batteries of six guns each, twenty-four Napoleons, eighteen 3-inch ordnance, and six 10-pounder Parrott guns, 55 officers, 1,170 men, and 915 horses, and of one battalion (Sears') Fourth New York Foot Artillery, 15 officers, 517 men, constituting a brigade under the command of Col. C. H. Tompkins, First Rhode Island Light Artillery.

BATTERIES OF THE SIXTH CORPS.

McKnight's (M), 5th United States, 6 Napoleons.

McCartney's (A), Massachusetts, 6 Napoleons.

Bucklyn's (E), 1st Rhode Island, 6 Napoleons.

Harn's, 3d New York, 6 Napoleons.

Robinson's, 4th Maine, 6 3-inch.

Adams' (G), 1st Rhode Island, 6 3-inch. Cowan's, 1st New York Independent, 6 3-inch.

Waterman's (C), 1st Rhode Island, 6 Par

rotts.

The Horse Artillery, twelve batteries, sixteen Napoleons and fortysix 3-inch ordnance guns, 43 officers. 1,714 men, and 2,064 horses, was organized into two brigades. The First Brigade, under the command of Capt. James M. Robertson, Second U. S. Artillery, consisted of six batteries, eight Napoleons and twenty-four 3-inch guns, and was attached to the Cavalry Corps (Major-General Sheridan). The Second Brigade, under the command of Capt. Dunbar R. Ransom, Third U. S. Artillery, consisted of six batteries, eight Napoleons, and twenty-two 3-inch ordnance guns, and was held in reserve and attached to the Reserve Artillery of the army.

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The Reserve Artillery, under the command of Col. H. S. Burton, Fifth U. S. Artillery, consisted of two regiments of foot artillery, the Sixth New York, Col. J. Howard Kitching; the Fifteenth New York, Col. L. Schirmer, twelve batteries of field artillery, twentysix Napoleons, eighteen 3-inch, and twelve 10-pounder and six 20pounder Parrotts, and of eight 24-pounder Coehorn mortars. The troops of the reserve were organized into three brigades. The first, under the command of Col. J. Howard Kitching, Sixth New York Artillery, consisted of the Sixth and Fifteenth New York Regiments, six battalions of foot artillery armed as infantry, 84 officers, and 2,901 This brigade formed the escort and furnished the guards

men.

for the reserve and the park attached to it, and was at all times disposable as a reserve and to re-enforce the corps in battle. In this way it did valuable service, taking its full share of the marching and fighting of the army in addition to its special duties. The Second Brigade consisted of six batteries, six 20-pounder Parrotts, twelve 10-pounder Parrotts, four 3-inch ordnance and ten Napoleon guns, 33 officers, 837 men, and 647 horses, under the command of Maj. J. A. Tompkins, First Rhode Island Artillery. The Third Brigade consisted of six batteries, sixteen Napoleons, and fourteen 3-inch ordnance guns, 24 officers, 734 men, and 604 horses, under the command of Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh, First New York Light Artillery. The eight 24-pounder Coehorn mortars with 100 rounds each of ammunition were served by a detachment of Fifteenth New York Foot Artillery.

BATTERIES OF THE ARTILLERY RESERVE.

Second Brigade, Maj. J. A. Tompkins.

Taft's, 5th New York, 6 20-pounder Parrotts.

Hexamer's (A), 1st New Jersey, 6 10pounder Parrotts.

Sheldon's (B), 1st New York, 6 10pounder Parrotts.

Clark's (B), 1st New Jersey, 6 Napo-
leons.

Stevens', 5th Maine, 4 Napoleons.
McKnight's, 12th New York, 4 3-inch.

Third Brigade, Maj. R. H. Fitzhugh.

Ewing's (H), 1st Ohio, 6 3-inch.
Burton's, 11th New York, 4 3-inch.
Barnes' (C), 1st New York, 4 3-inch.
Brinckle's (E), 5th United States, 6 Napo-
leons.

Hart's, 15th New York, 4 Napoleons.
Bigelow's, 9th Massachusetts, 6 Napo-
leons.

SUPPLY OF AMMUNITION.

Each Napoleon gun and 20-pounder Parrott transported in the chests of the piece and caisson 128 rounds of ammunition, and each other rifle gun 200 rounds, excepting the rifle guns of the Horse Artillery, which had 150 rounds in the chests. The campaign allowance for each gun having been fixed at 250 rounds, there was assigned to each brigade a special ammunition column of ordinary wagons to transport the remainder, which formed in each brigade a reserve for supply of all its batteries. In addition 20 rounds per gun for each gun in the army was carried in the trains of the Artillery Reserve, so that the total supply carried with the army was 270 rounds per gun. Thus the artillery with the army at the commencement of the campaign consisted of forty-nine batteries, with 274 field guns, of which 120 were 12-pounder Napoleons (smooth-bore) and 154 rifled; 8 Coehorn mortars, 657 artillery carriages, including caissons, battery wagons, and forges; 373 officers, 11,691 men, 6,239 horses, besides 609 wagons and 3,721 animals, for the transport of the ammunition, &c. It formed eight brigades, four of which constituted the reserve under my immediate command, the other four being attached to army corps. The batteries had been carefully and diligently instructed by their commanders, under the supervision of the chiefs of artillery while in their winter camps, and were well manned, horsed, and equipped. At no time, indeed, had the artillery of this army as a whole been in so good condition as when it entered upon this campaign. Its principal defects were, first, a want of general and field officers, a subject to which I called attention in my report of the battles of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg;

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