SERMON I.

EXISTENCE OF GOD.

MARK xii. 32.-There is one God.

THE existence of GOD is the basis of religion. This truth will be evident, if we remember, that the word religion always denotes either a system of truths, of which GOD is the great subject; or a system of affections and conduct, of which He is the supreme object. If we can prove to ourselves the existence of a God; that is, of a Being, by whom we were created, and by whom the universe is governed; some such system of truths, affections, and conduct, must be also capable of being proved. To such a Being we and the universe must sustain important relations; and out of these relations, must necessarily arise to intelligent beings a variety of duties, immediately, and alway owed to him. Were there no such Being, there could be no such relations nor duties. Were the existence of such a Being incapable of proof, the existence of the relations and duties would be equally incapable of being proved. Happily for us, and accordantly with his own wisdom, GoD has not, in this most interesting case, left himself without ample

witness.

In the text, the existence of GoD is declared, in the plainest and most direct terms. I shall, therefore, proceed immediately to the examination of the subject.

The foundation of all reasoning, concerning beings and events, and ultimately, concerning attributes and relations also, is a supposed, or acknowledged, connexion between cause and effect. By cause, (it will be observed, that I am speaking of what is called the efficient cause) I intend, that something, be it what it may, which produces, or is supposed to produce, existence, or any change of ex istence; and without which, the existence, or the change, would not have been. Between this something styled cause, and the some thing styled effect, all mankind, except a few sceptical or atheisti cal philosophers, have agreed, that there is an inseparable con nexion. As this connexion has been denied by these philosophers, and as it is the foundation of all our reasonings on this, and every other subject; a consideration of it, and of the evidence which attends it, will undoubtedly be a proper part of the present discourse.

In the first place, it will be admitted by these philosophers, as well as all other men, that we have no knowledge of any existence, or any change, which has taken place without a cause. All beings, and all

events, so far as our acquaintance with them has hitherto extended, have been produced by some agency, or influence, extraneous to themselves, and have never sprung up into existence casually, or without such agency, or influence. There is, therefore, not the least reason furnished by experience, or by any thing which we know, why we should believe existence to be casual; or why we should doubt an inseparable connexion between cause and effect. On the contrary, all the experience, all the knowledge of man, lends its whole influence to the doctrine, that existence has been invariably caused. The supposition, therefore, that existence is uncaused, or that the connexion between cause and effect is not inseparable and invariable, is perfectly gratuitous, and without a shadow of support. How absurd and ridiculous it is, for a man, professing to be a reasoner and a philosopher, to found his opinions, or his arguments, in any case, and especially in the most important case possible, on a mere supposition, I need not explain. 2dly. All mankind have acknowledged, in the clearest manner, and in every way of which the subject was susceptible, the inseparable nature of this connexion.

The language of every nation is formed only on this plan. In every language, there are not only many words directly expressing ideas of this subject; such as cause, efficiency, effect, production, produce, effectuate, create, generate, &c. or words equivalent to these; but every verb in every language, except the intransitive impersonal verbs, and the verb substantive, involves, of course, causation or efficiency; and refers always to an agent, or cause, in such a manner, that, without the operation of this cause or agent, the verb would have no meaning. In this manner have mankind declared, in the very structure of their languages, not only that they perceived, and acknowledged this connexion, but that it formed so considerable and essential a part of their thoughts, as to necessitate them to think in this manner only. Thus, to think, to speak, to sit, to run, to strike, to write, to love, to hate, all denote effects, and refer to an agent, or cause of those effects; and without such reference, would not contain, nor express, any meaning whatever.

I have observed above, that all mankind have agreed in the acknowledgment of this connexion, except a few atheistical and sceptical philosophers. These men have, indeed, denied this connexion in form; but they have acknowledged it, as fully as all others, in their customary language. On every subject, except creation, or giving existence, they have spoken exactly as other men speak; and the connexion between cause and effect, is as often declared in their conversation and writings, and as much relied on, as in those of other men. This fact is clear proof, that they admit this connexion in all cases, except those which respect the existence and government of God, in the same manner as the rest of mankind. In truth, language is so constructed, that it is impossible to write, or speak, in a different manner.

Children, so soon as they begin to speak at all, inquire more anxiously, and more universally, concerning causation and efficiency, than concerning any other subject of investigation. Every one, conversant with them, must have observed, that they almost continually inquire, who did this, that, and the other thing; or produced the several changes, of which they are witnesses? Who made themselves, and the various objects around them? In this manner, they teach us, that this is, to man, the natural and the only natural mode of conceiving: for all children think and speak in this

manner.

Nor, are the views of mankind less forcibly evident concerning this subject, in their actions. No man ever acted, without regard ing himself as a cause; and without expecting to produce some change in himself, or in the objects around him, by his efficiency; nor made use of any instrument, without expecting from it a degree of efficacy, which should produce some change, or other, not to be looked for without it. Thus, all men eat and drink; lie down, and act, universally, with a design to effectuate certain changes in themselves, or other objects: and atheists, as truly, and uniformly, as any other men. Thus, also, children act, from the beginning. Indeed, were men not to act in this manner, they would never act at all. No proof of absolute and universal conviction, concerning this, or any other subject, can be more perfect.

3dly. We learn this connexion from experience; and in two ways, by the testimony of our senses, and by the inspection of our minds.

Causes operate without us, and within us; and produce their proper effects in both cases. Those which operate without us, produce their effects before our senses; and so far our knowledge of the connexion between cause and effect, arises from sensitive testimony. Those which operate within us, produce their effects before the eye of the mind only; and so far our knowledge of this connexion is intuitive. I as clearly perceive, that I think, reflect, remember, choose, wish, love, and hate; that by a determination of my will, I turn my thoughts from one subject to another; and transfer my affections and my conduct, voluntarily, from one object to another, and from one course to another; as, that I exist. I also perceive this in the same manner, and with the same certainty; viz. with the bare inspection of the mental eye; commonly termed, intuition, and acknowledged to be attended with the highest possible certainty. Mr. Hume is, therefore, totally erroneous in his assertion, that the connexion between cause and effect exists, or rather is per ceived, only in the names; and that, if we would call both by the name, events, we should not suppose any connexion to exist between them.

This opinion is sufficiently refuted by the fact, that these names, and not that of events, have been given to them. Mankind never give names without ideas; nor form any names, which do not express such ideas, as they really have; nor suppose themselves to

have ideas, which they have not; or different ideas from those, which they really have. Wherever names have been given, the very ideas, which they denote, have certainly existed in the minds of those, by whom they were given.

The thing which we really perceive in this case, is, however, merely the fact, that cause and effect are thus connected; and not the nature of the causation, or efficiency, on which the connexion is founded. That I, and not something else, think, and act, in such manners as have been recited, and that but for me the thought and action would not have existed, I perceive intuitively; but I do not perceive at all why, or by what power, I think, and act. The nature of this subject lies, in every case, beyond the bounds of the human capacity. Yet this infers not, in any degree, any want of evidence, attending the fact. The contrary opinion would be attended with this absurdity that we cannot perceive one thing without perceiving at the same time another, totally diverse, and, in the view of the mind, entirely separated: an absurdity which cannot need to be exposed by me.

4thly. The mind cannot realize the fact, that existence, or change, can take place without a cause.

This is, at least, true with respect to my own mind. I have very often made the attempt, and with no small pains-taking, but have never been able to succeed at all. Supposing other minds to have the same general nature with my own, I conclude, that all others will find the same want of success. If nothing had originally existed, I cannot possibly realize, that any thing could ever have existed. Causes, absolutely the same, must, in the same circumstances, produce absolutely the same effects. This is, I think, certainly selfevident, and admitted as such. An absolute want of cause involves an absolute sameness of an opposite kind; and must, with nearly the same evidence, continue for ever. The necessity of causes to all the changes of being is, so far as I know, universally admitted. Mr. Hume, particularly, talks as commonly, or rather as uniformly, in this manner, as any Christian does; and not only argues from cause to effect, and from effect to cause, as much as other men, but discusses this subject abundantly, and gives directions, and principles, for this kind of argumentation. Indeed, without admitting it, neither he, nor any other man, could argue at all. But, if no change can take place without a cause, how can it be supposed, that existence can take place without a cause? Certainly less violence is done to our reason by supposing a being to be changed in some respect or circumstance without a cause, than to begin to exist without a cause.

5thly. No absurdity can be greater than to argue with a man who denies this connexion.

He himself, in speaking, exhibits himself as the cause of all the words uttered by him, and the opinions communicated; and, in the act of arguing, admits you to be a similar cause. If his body be

not a cause, and your eyes another, you cannot see him. If his voice, and your ear, be not causes, you cannot hear him. If his mind and yours, be not causes, you cannot understand him. In a word, without admitting the connexion between cause and effect, you can never know that he is arguing with you, or you with him. With these observations premised, which you will see to be inwoven with this and all other subjects of discussion, I observe, in the first place, that the existence of things, universally, proves the being of GOD.

The argument which leads to this conclusion is, for substance, conducted by Mr. Locke in the following manner: Every man knows, with absolute certainty, that he himself exists. He knows, also, that he did not always exist, but began to be. It is clearly certain to him, that his existence was caused, and not casual; and was produced by a cause, adequate to the production. By an adequate cause, is invariably intended, a cause possessing and exerting an efficacy sufficient to bring any effect to pass. In the present case, an adequate cause is one possessing and exerting all the understanding necessary to contrive, and the power necessary to create, such a being as the man in question. This cause is what we are accustomed to call GOD. The understanding necessary to contrive, and the power necessary to create, a being compounded of the human soul and body, admit of no limits. He who can contrive and create such a being, can contrive and create any thing. He who actually contrived and created man, certainly contrived and created all things.

This argument is, in my view, perfectly conclusive: nor has it been, nor will it ever be, answered, except with sophistry, or sneers. I will not insist, that every step of it is attended with what logicians call intuitive evidence: nor, that it amounts to what is, in the logical sense, an absolute demonstration. But it is, in every step, attended with such evidence as excludes all rational doubt; and approaches so near to the character of demonstration as to leave the mind completely satisfied. At the same time, it is opposed by no counter evidence.

2dly. The state of existing things completely proves the being of GOD.

The manner in which the argument, derived from this source, is conducted by Bishop Berkeley, is clearer, and more happy, than any other within my knowledge; and is substantially the following:

We acknowledge the existence of each other to be unquestionable; and, when called upon for the evidence, on which this acknowledgment is founded, allege that of our senses; yet it can by no means be affirmed with truth, that our senses discern, immediately, any man. We see, indeed, a form; and the motions and actions of that form; and we hear a voice, communicating to us the thoughts, emotions, and volitions, of an intelligent being. Yet it is