another, or one volition in preference to another, it is claimed that the mind acts independently of the objects of its perceptions, and exercises choices, purposes, and volitions, not in fixed correspondence to the objects of its ideas, but in a manner in some degree arbitrary. It is claimed that it chooses perceived good, with power to have preferred perceived evil; and that it purposes or wills perceived good, with power to have purposed or willed perceived evil; and the contrary. This subject is not within the sphere of consciousness, as some suppose, but is fully within the sphere of observation and reason. What then

is the fact? With ideas of life and death before us, is it possible to choose death? Not on the condition that death is considered an evil. But if life is painful, and death is viewed as a relief, it is possible to prefer death to life. With bodily pleasure and bodily pain before us, is it possible to prefer pain to pleasure? Not if the bodily pleasure contemplated is viewed as producing no bad effects; and the pain no good effects. But if the pleasure is viewed as a cause of future evil, and the pain a cause of future good, the pleasure may be refused and the pain chosen. Instances of this may be multiplied without number. What do they prove? They prove that as a matter of fact choice is not conditioned generally on ideas, and the different kinds of choices left unconditional, but that while choices are conditioned generally on ideas, every particular choice is conditioned on particular ideas. Consequently we infer, that ideas cause choices by furnishing objects of choice generally; and that particular ideas cause particular choices, by furnishing particular objects of choice. We also infer that the ultimate object of choice generally, is the greatest perceived general good, and the ultimate object of all particular choices, the greatest perceived particular good; in other words, that the will is determined by the greatest perceived good, and is incapable of any self determination independently of this, or not in conformity with it.

§ 503. The power of choosing perceived evil in preference to perceived good, or the less good in preference to the greater, contrary to universal experience, and contrary to all reason, is contended for by many, as if the world's salvation depended on believing this absurdity. But let us admit this hypothesis, and try it by its legitimate conse. quences. Does a rational system of virtue require us in

any instance to prefer real evil to good? Never. "Hearken diligently to me," says God, "and eat ye that which is good, and let your soul delight itself in fatness. The ways of wisdom are ways of pleasantness, and all her paths are peace. See I have set before thee this day life and good, and death and evil, in that I command thee this day to love the Lord thy God, to walk in his ways, and to keep his commandments; therefore, choose life, that both thou and thy seed may live." All the sacrifices which virtue requires, are sacrifices of a less good, to secure a greater; and the good which it pursues is infinite, universal and eternal. If the principle of the ability of the mind to prefer evil to good is true, it is unnecessary. God never requires evil to be preferred to good, but the contrary.

$504. On the theory of the independence of the will, the control of voluntary beings by rational considerations is impossible, and destroys the essential practical element of all rational natures. If it is true, God himself does not choose good in preference to evil, from any necessity of his nature, nor angel, man, or animal from any necessity of their natures; and the choice of good in preference to evil, throughout the entire universe, is unnecessary, and capable of being reversed. On such a scheme, where is the ground of confidence in any voluntary being? Where is the ground of confidence in animals, except in their known capacity of being governed by motives? As far as we know their capacities of being governed by motives, we confide in them, but no farther. Where is the ground of confidence in men, but in the known power of motives to control their wills? As far as the human mind breaks loose from the controlling powers of known motives, we become unable to calculate on its operations, or to anticipate them. Where is the ground of confidence in God; any farther than we discover the motives by which he is governed? If we know of no motives by which God is governed, we cannot anticipate his voluntary action. According to this theory, voluntary action cannot be necessitated or made certain, till it is performed; therefore, there is no certainty of the future action of any voluntary being in the universe, and no possibility of making such actions certain. Here is universal skepticism with a vengeance; all certainty of future voluntary actions overthrown; all government of voluntary beings rendered impossible; and God himself a being of instability, whose will

is under no government of wisdom and goodness; who is under no necessity whatever of choosing good and refusing evil; and who has no power to control the voluntary actions of one of his subjects, from the smallest insect that is perceptible to the human eye, to the loftiest cherub that occupies a throne among the blessed. Beautiful system! Glorious universe of ungovernable wills!

These are legitimate and inevitable deductions, from the theory that the will is not governed by motives, and is not capable of government. If the will is essentially ungovernable; if its actions cannot be made necessary and certain; then all government of voluntary beings is impossible, and the doctrine of God's government is not a falsehood merely, but an absurdity.

Some may admit that the will is not perfectly uncontrollable, but subject to a partial control, and that it can be confined to certain channels, and excluded from certain other channels, by the influence of motives while within those channels; it will sometimes run up hill, and sometimes down, sometimes prefer perceived good and sometimes evil. The effect of this concession is to relieve the system of ungovernable wills from its absurdity, just in proportion to the extent to which the doctrine of their governable nature is admitted; but to relieve it entirely, they must be admitted to be entirely governable, and the control of motives admitted to be perfect and universal.

§ 505. Ideas that voluntary actions are necessitated, are common to all ages and all nations, and are among the fundamental conceptions of the human mind. We not only think that men may act in particular modes in view of particular motives, but that they must act in such modes; and that the contrary is relatively impossible. These ideas are common to the very philosophers who deny the dependence of choices, and who claim that they do not admit of being necessitated. In this respect the science of the will fares much as that of more general facts did in the hands of Hume and his fellow skeptics. They looked on the facts of nature and Revelation as ultimate objects, and denied that the human mind could legitimately predicate them of causes. In proof of this, they demonstrated that mere succession of events on which causality was universally based, in the philosophy of those times, established no such hypothesis. But still these very men regarded themselves and all other

known beings as causes, necessitating a great variety of effects, and based their very arguments against causality on the assumption of its truth. For what is the end of an argument, but to produce conviction? Or in other words, to cause an effect?

§ 506. So it is with these skeptics in regard to the dependence of choices, and other acts of will, on necessitating conditions. They deny this dependence totally; call it all manner of hard names; apply to it the most opprobrious epithets; bring a great variety of time-honored prejudices to bear against it; and assert, in unqualified terms, both its falsity and absurdity. One would suppose that they at least had lost all fellowship for a doctrine so horrible, and had renounced it for ever. Have they done so ? No such thing. They hold to it with their very teeth, and never for a moment cease to lean upon it, in all their practical judgments. By one torpedo touch of the wand of their metaphysics, they convert all the exercises of the will into independent facts; but the first word they speak, and the first act they perform, with a view to operate on the wills of their fellow men, or even of the animal tribes, breaks the charm, dispels the illusion, and restores the entire world of choices, and other acts of will, to their true character of dependent phenomena, capable, like all other phenomena, of being produced and indefinitely varied by the certain operation of appropriate causes. The governable nature of the will is an object of universal knowledge, and is virtually and necessarily assumed in the practical judgments of the very persons who deny and traduce it, and continually acted upon both by them and by all voluntary beings.

The power to choose evil instead of good, can never be of any real use to us, but renders us liable to act wrong, without increasing our ability to act right. With our existing constitution, we are liable to do wrong, through defective and erroneous ideas; but with independent wills we should be liable to do wrong, without any defect of this kind. On the theory of the a bsolute independence of the will, ideas would have no control over it, and would be of no service in its direction; and as the whole influence of things is exercised through the medium of ideas, things would have no control over it. Fire and water would have no tendency to stop a man from advancing; and destruction from behind would have no tendency to hinder his retreat. Possible good would have no power to induce him to act

right; and possible evil, no power to hinder him from acting wrong. Independence of the will is assumed for the purpose of avoiding the inference of the necessity of moral actions. The sinner is told that he has power to do right or wrong in all possible conditions; that his acts of will are in no case, and to no extent, necessitated; and that if he thinks sin is best on the whole, he is able, notwithstanding, to choose holiness for all that. But let us inquire in regard to the fact. Is it true that sinners can be holy while they think it is best on the whole to continue unholy? It is not true. A sinner has never yet become holy in that condition, and never can. Neither can they continue unholy, when they think it best to be holy. But if it was true, that sinners could do the opposite of what they thought was best at the time, what would be the effect? They might think it best to keep out of the fire, and yet run into it; and they might think it best to keep out of the water, and yet run into that. The doctrine of the independence of the will is inconsistent, both with Divine and human governments, because they appeal to the will solely through the medium of ideas, by means of motives. If the will, therefore, is not controlled by motives, it is not capable of being controlled, either by Divine or human laws. But the contrary is the fact; therefore, this supposition is erroneous. The will is controlled, both by Divine and human laws, proving that the supposition of its uncontrollable nature is false, and that the contrary hypothesis, whatever difficulties may seem to embarrass it, must be true. The actual government of men by motives, is a phenomenon to be accounted for which is incompatible with independence of the will.

But we have the phenomenon of self-government to account for. There is such a thing as self-government. Men are able to adopt certain princi les of action, such as the principle of doing right; the principle of speaking the truth; the principle of being temperate, industrious, and prudent; and so on. Do they adopt these principles arbitrarily, or on the ground of certain reasons? Does the reason on which the principle is based in any case cause its adoption or not? Principles are adopted on account of reasons; and there is a reason for every principle of action which men adopt, and for every action which they perform. Self-government, therefore, and all voluntary action, both in the adoption of principles of action, and in adhering to