evil; virtue and vice are the subjects of their respective propositions; and is good, and is evil, are their predicates.

Propositions are either simple or compound. A simple proposition has but one subject and one predicate; as, God is eternal; wisdom is desirable; the universe is extensive; Columbus discovered America. A compound proposition has two or more subjects, or two or more predicates; as, Men and angels are created for virtue and happiness; virtue is the means of happiness, by involving its essential conditions. All compound propositions may be resolved into simple ones.

Quantity of Propositions.

§ 246. Considered in regard to quality, all propositions are either affirmative or negative; and correspond in this respect to the category of quality. Affirmative propositions are those in which things are affirmed respecting the subject; negative propositions, those in which things are denied respecting the subject. Virtue is good; wisdom is desirable and useful; knowledge is the fruit of study, are affirmative propositions. Vice is not good; weakness and ignorance are not desirable; knowledge is not the fruit of inattention, are negative propositions.

Modality of Propositions

All propositions are either categorical or hypothetical, Categorical propositions relate to objects as real, or not real; hypothetical propositions relate to objects as possible, hypothetical, or doubtful; virtue is good; vice is evil, and wickedness destroys happiness, are categorical propositions; if virtue is good, virtue may be good, should virtue prove good, are hypothetical propositions.

Several other divisions and subdivisions of propositions have been introduced into systems of logic; but they do not seem to be of any considerable use in the art of reasoning.

Propositions differ from terms in denoting objects not as single things, but in associations of two and two, as subjects and predicates. In this proposition, virtue is good; virtue denotes one object, is good another; but the proposition denotes one of these objects as the predicate of the

other. So, in the proposition, the house decays; the house denotes one object, decays another; but the proposition denotes one as the predicate of the other; that is, it denotes the house as the subject of decays.

§ 347. The relation of terms in associations as subjects and predicates corresponds to the relations of the objects of ideas as contemplated by the human mind. In thinking of objects we regard them as subjects and predicates, and we do this universally. No object of thought is perceptible or possible which does not admit of being viewed by the mind in connection with any one of its other objects of thought, and made the joint object of a common thought in which either of the two may sustain the relation of subject or predicate to the other. This fact is the foundation of propositions consisting of subjects and predicates. It is a fundamental law of thought and is distinctly recognized in the structure of all languages and all possible modes of expressing ideas. Terms express thoughts and the objects of thought, in their elements; propositions in associations of two and two. Terms express thoughts and the objects of thought absolutely; propositions express them in their primary and fundamental relations to each other in associations of two and two. Terms express thoughts and objects of thought as unities; propositions as dualities beginning in one unity and terminating in another. The idea expressed by a proposition embraces two distinct conceptions comprehended in one; it commences with an idea of one object as a subject and unites with this in one more extended conception, the idea of another object as its predicate. The subjective relation is one of the first objects and elements of human knowledge, and one that enters fundamentally into all associations of ideas in aggregates of two and two. Our conceptions of things as subjects and predicates, arises necessarily from our conceptions of them as things, and from contemplating them together in associations of two and two Suppose, for example, we are contemplating an apple, and we think of its form. We contemplate the apple as one thing, and its form as another; and get the idea of the apple as the subject, and the form as the predicate; which we ex press in the sentence, an apple has form; or we contemplate an apple and abstract the idea of size, and then, by contemplating the two together, we get the idea expressed by the proposition, an apple has size, and so on. But it makes

no difference how the second idea is suggested, or from what source it is derived, if we bring the two together and make them the simultaneous objects of thought, and compare them deliberately together we shall predicate one of the other in some of the categories of judgment. The leading idea, which ever it may be, will be made the subject, and the final idea the predicate of a complex thought capable of being expressed by a proposition.

Division of Propositions into Premises and Conclusions.

248. On a comparison of propositions we find them capable of being divided into premises and conclusions. Premises are those propositions from which others are derived; conclusions are propositions derived from others.. Conclusions are capable of serving as premises for other propositions, and are either premises or conclusions, in different instances in which they occur, according to their position and relations, as derivative or a source of derivation for other propositions. In many cases, the same proposition sustains the double character of a conclusion and a premise, being derived by inference from previous propositions, and serving as a ground of inference for subsequent ones.

The origin and derivation of ideas is one of the most profound and difficult subjects of human inquiry; and is involved in all those investigations in which we inquire concerning the correctness or incorrectness of particular ideas. To prove that an idea is correct, we must show valid grounds from which it may be derived. These grounds must be found in the original conditions of sensations and consciousness, or else in previous ideas derived directly or remotely from these conditions. The correctness of every questionable idea mist, therefore, be proved in one of two ways. We must go back to sensations and consciousness, and come down by a regular succession of judgments, till we arrive at the idea in question; or we must begin from some unquestionable idea, and come down from that by a continued series of inferences, till we obtain the idea in question; or else we must begin with the idea, and reason from it to some conclusions which will prove its incorrectness by their absurdity; in which case we may know that it is false, without passing any judgment on its derivation. When we have deduced a conclusion from a proposition

Extended processes of reasoning and argument enter into every department of literature, and are an indispensable means of the communication and diffusion of knowledge. All teaching is done to a greater or less extent, by reasoning. Men begin to reason as soon as they begin to think, and continue to prosecute and extend their reasonings, during all the subsequent stages of life, till the decay of their thinking

powers.

§ 235. Some principles are common to both modes of reasoning. Both require attention, discrimination, and precision of thought; and both require abstraction and comparison. Both are progressive, and proceed from certain conditions to conclusions; from first conclusions, to second conclusions; and so on, indefinitely. The capacity to reason implies a capacity to reason correctly. The large amount of incorrect reasoning by which errors are adopted and taught as truths, is a phenomenon which does not admit of an easy explanation. Of the great mass of human opinions which are the objects both of continual investigation and of continual instruction, many are contradictory and false; and not a few absurd.

False opinions are not only embraced by the ignorant and illiterate, but by persons of all classes and conditions, and are transmitted from age to age, and from generation to generation, as the most valuable treasures of the human mind. How many precious errors have come down from past ages even to our times, to be adopted and advocated by grave and wise men, and to be contended for and sustained by all the possible force of sophistical argument and violent denunciation. If we look abroad upon society in its most advanced stages, what diversities of opinion do we see! How are the wise and good divided and arrayed against each other! What one deems essentially good, another denounces as essentially evil; and what one holds as an unquestionable truth, another condemns as an inexcusable error. This diversity of opinion is not restricted to a few individuals, it is extended to large hereditary bodies, and is sustained by powerful organizations; neither is it restricted to a few subjects, but extends to many of the fundamental principles of morals, politics and religion. The evils which result from these errors are the greatest that flesh is heir to, and comprehend the principal calamities and miseries of the human race.

Are these errors, and are any errors, necessary and inevitable? Is the mind essentially and incurably impotent? Is it destitute of power to distinguish between truth and falsehood, virtue and vice? Some have supposed this to be the case, and have endeavored to meet the emergency thus created, by a system of despotism adapted to control the thinking power in regard to the most important subjects of human inquiry. They have given the Church, in its organized collective capacity, a right to tell men what to think, and what to believe; and to set bounds to the operations of reason, and say to it thus far shalt thou come and no farther; here let inquiries cease, and to this and that let all men agree. If reason is essentially weak and impotent, it is very kind in men to take it under their care, and assist its weakness by the authority of numbers. If reason is idiotic it ought to be provided for and controlled in the same way, that more decided idiocy is. If reason is lunatic or maniacal, absolute authority may be necessary to restrain its excesses, and to correct its obliquities. But if reason is rational, if the very end and purpose of this faculty is the discovery of truth, and the appreciation of evidence, and if God has made men rational that they might exercise an agency under his government, and that they might have a chance to work out for themselves and others eternal glories and infinite joys, then let reason have her natural liberty and her natural rights, and let every man sit in independent judgment on the traditions of all past ages, and on the teachings of his own age.

§ 236. The doctrine of the essential freedom of the human mind and of the inalienable right of private judgment on all matters of religious belief, was the essential element of the Reformation by Luther. That great man dissented from the popular opinion of his time, that the human mind in its individual capacity was incompetent to decide what was true. He asserted the contrary and claimed for himself and others liberty of private judgment as their inalienable right, and their inestimable privilege. The same principle has been introduced into politics, and is respected by most civil governments of modern times. The doctrine of the inalienable right of every man to be his own judge as to what is true and good; and to repel the officious interference of intellectual and moral despotism, from any quarter, involves the assumption that every man is a competent judge